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Abstract 
 
WANDERING IN CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE:  
A NARRATIVE THEORY OF COGNITION  
By  
Hillel Broder 
 
Adviser: Peter Hitchcock 
 
 This study offers a theory of wandering cognition as an animating feature of western 
literature, in general, and of contemporary literature, in particular. Unlike existing theories of 
peripatetic bodies and minds in fiction that focus primarily on political critiques, cultural 
practices, or pleasures of digression, this theory of wandering offers an aesthetic philosophy and 
ethical critique of representing cognition, memory, and narrative identity that finds affinities in 
the political, phenomenological, and ethical thought of Walter Benjamin, Emmanuel Levinas, 
and Giorgio Agamben.  
Unlike existing cognitive theories of literature that apply cognitive theory to literary 
study (or vice versa), this study develops an aesthetic and phenomenological theory of 
consciousness that emerges from within the representation of perception, attentiveness, and 
memory in literatures of wandering minds. Wandering generates narrative identity apart from 
conventional and normative narrativity, a narrative consciousness that accounts for the cognitive 
motion (and blindspots) in remembering selves and that illuminates cognitive mimeses of 
amnesic, episodic, and disabled consciousness.  
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Finally, while this study focuses primarily on the contemporary literary experiments of 
wandering in the works of Kazuo Ishiguro, W.G. Sebald, Ben Lerner, and Maud Casey, it has a 
wider reach in its retrospective and prospective rethinking of the function of peripatetic fiction. 
Wandering is built into the narrative motion and aesthetic technique of narrated and 
remembering identities in the early Romantic autobiography of Rousseau, Wordsworth, and De 
Quincey; and wandering underlies the conscious identities narrated absent memory in the 
emerging genre of the amnesic memoir. 
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Preface 
This project considers the question of narrativity as an ethical one, and the innovation in 
representing non-narrativist minds as a critical adjustment for representing consciousness. In 
particular, this study examines narrative minds that either wander in form or whose deficiency in 
memory make normative autobiography impossible.   
 Representation of such embodied “wandering” holds affinities with alternate narrative, 
cognitive, and even philosophical theories of cognition. Instead of applying cognitive models to 
literary texts, however, I follow Lisa Zunshine’s call for discovering cognitive models within 
literary texts. Ultimately, I look for the aesthetic underpinnings in the contemporary literatures of 
W.G. Sebald, Kazuo Ishiguro, Ben Lerner, Maud Casey, and others, and I foreground these 
texts’ particular innovations and departures for representing wandering bodies and minds as 
salvaging an ethics for the representation of the subject’s cognition.  
 What emerges is a study of memory experiments grounded in the history of narrative 
theory and gesturing towards a contemporary ethics for representing cognition. For even as I 
examine how these works inherit certain forms of autobiography, confession, and walking 
memoir from the inception of the novel, Romantic autobiography, and the Enlightenment, I 
question the ethics of aligning the narrative subject with generic and normative forms of 
narrativity. I discover that the aesthetic experiments in memory, in these contemporary works of 
diasporic wandering, were in fact recoveries of a narrative identity apart from the normative 
tradition but built into confessional works by Rousseau, Wordsworth, De Quincey, and even later 
by modernist Gertrude Stein. In so doing, I argue that the aforementioned contemporary authors 
under consideration in my dissertation foreground the texture of perception, historical 
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multiplicity, and even multiple subjectivities—thus recovering, in turn, narrative identities apart 
from normative cognitive selves.  
 The implications for this argument are important for thinking through a Kafkan 
genealogy of experimentally wandering fictions in the twentieth century, and far reaching both in 
terms of contemporary philosophy and contemporary memoir. Levinas’s “errancy”, Agamben’s 
“infancy”, Jost-Frey’s “interruption”, and even Jameson’s “schizophrenia” all assume narrating 
selves apart from structured narrativity. Contemporary studies and memoir of amnesia, too, 
assume a certain language of disability in their normative forms. As I argue in the conclusion of 
my dissertation, surveying the possibility for narration, in such genres of memoir, demonstrates 
again the recovery of subjectivity apart from narrative identity: a neurodiverse cognition in 
fiction. 
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Caminante, son tus huellas 
el camino y nada más; 
caminante, no hay camino, 
se hace camino al andar. 
Al andar se hace camino, 
y al volver la vista atrás 
se ve la senda que nunca 
se ha de volver a pisar. 
Caminante, no hay camino, 
sino estelas en la mar. 
Wanderer, your footsteps are 
the road and nothing more; 
wanderer, there is no road, 
the road is made by walking. 
Walking makes the road, 
and turning to look behind 
you see the path that you 
will never tread again. 
Wanderer, there is no road, 
only foam trails on the sea. 
 
--Antonio Machado, from “Proverbios y cantares” in Campos de Castilla, 1912 
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Introduction: Towards a Theory of Wandering 
Overview 
 
This dissertation is a study of wandering minds in contemporary literature. It is not necessarily 
an inquiry into walking practices, environmental psychology, colonial and post-colonial studies, 
or embodied cognition, though it does acknowledge, at the very onset, that wandering minds 
often perform as part of embodied wandering, are subject to colonialist forces, and are frequently 
stimulated and limited by the cognizance of embedded spaces. In what follows, however, I 
suggest that wandering is far more central to an ethical critique of the aesthetics of fictional 
minds than either a super-category of walking literatures, an intervention in post-colonial 
studies1, or a sub-category of digressive fictions, though it certainly includes the histories of 
assorted fictions and theoretical insights into generic form. 
 Though primarily a theory of narrative minds, at its core, this project is driven by an 
ethical argument. What are the consequences of assuming normative narrative structure for 
representing the motion of minds? What is lost to history through typical practices of 
remembering? How might identity be narrated within multiple iterations of memory, or without 
memory at all? Reading wandering in narrative fiction—and reading to discover such 
wandering—generates its own critique of normative theories of cognition, memory, and 
narrativity, and in so doing, recovers the narrated subject’s fragmentation and incoherence—and 
vulnerability, attentiveness, and presence.  As I will argue, noticing wandering demands an 
attentiveness in otherwise normative teleological texts and context. Wandering may underlie the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Nico Israel’s excellent Outlandish: Writing Between Exile and Diaspora (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
UP, 2000) that offers both a critical introduction to the varied uses and discourses of exile in modernist theory and 
fiction, diaspora in cultural studies, and the political and rhetorical space between the two—between the individual, 
home-oriented experience of exile and cultural refashioning experience of diaspora—generated by his study. 
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aesthetic perception or ethical imperative within phenomenological perception—even as it is lost 
to a continuous and ordered history. Indeed, the return to one’s work “as if nothing has 
occurred”, Kafka reminds us, is a myth recounted in countless stories, even if it hasn’t occurred 
in any of them.2 Such fragmentary wandering of both narrative and reader consciousness occurs 
in all texts, even if such interruptions are consciously elided to accommodate temporalized 
narrative coherence. 
 As a narratological critique, too, this study subverts the hegemonic history of aesthetics 
and narrativity of autobiography and the modern novel. As such, this study is far more an inquiry 
into the relation between narrative aesthetics and cognition than it is an excursus through the 
politics of power or critical history of cognitive psychology. Indeed, instead of invoking political 
or psychological models for representing the complexities of narrative cognition, this study 
attempts an inductive model of cognition through a philosophical and literary inquiry into the 
parameters of and possibilities for narrated wandering. Situated beyond any particular walking 
practice or model of consciousness, in other words, this study clarifies how wandering operates 
within a number of fictional mind models, encompassing those of both normative and non-
normative cognition.  
 In writing an argument of a narrative theory of cognition, I follow Lisa Zunshine, who 
has cited Raymond Williams’ original project of cultural studies as necessarily cognitive3, as 
well as the work of other pioneers in the recently established field of cognitive cultural studies, 
including Ellen Spolsky, Mark Turner, and Alan Richardson. However, unlike the reigning trend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For this citation, as well as many other aphorisms interested in the lacunae of consciousness and memory, see 
Franz Kafka, “Reflections on Sin, Pain, Hope, and the True Way,” The Basic Kafka (New York: Shocken Books,  
1979), 236–41. 
3 Williams writes in The Long Revolution that his project explores the relationship between the “evolution of the 
human brain [and] the particular interpretation carried by particular cultures.” (18), cited in Lisa Zunshine, “What is 
Cognitive Cultural Studies?” (3)  
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of such literary studies that adopt cognitive models (and vice versa), my project offers a 
newfound contribution to the burgeoning field of cognitive cultural studies—a cognitive model 
that enters into a complementary and critical relation with reigning research in cognitive and 
phenomenological studies but that emerges from within narratology and literary aesthetics. 
Indeed, following Alan Palmer’s thesis in Fictional Minds that narrative theory has always been 
interested in the construction, figuring, and cognition of fictional minds in their socially 
embedded contexts4, I argue for readings of wandering bodies that demonstrate, by way of 
mobilized performance, a poetics of cognition and memory.  
 Ultimately, I clarify the tenuous relationship between identity, narrative, cognition, 
memory, and consciousness through the diverse fields of contemporary scholarship regarding 
narrativity and narrativity’s relation to representations of memory and cognition. Wandering 
narrative, in other words, problematizes traditional focalization and narrative subjectivity. 
Wanderers lose track, as it were, of their own stories, and so doing, operate in contradistinction 
with normative, diachronic, and even conventionally autobiographical narrativity. Furthermore, I 
highlight how embodied fictions of walking and non-embodied fictions of movement perform as 
a critique of normative cognition and consciousness in their abruptly interruptive and even 
amnesic modes. What remains instead is a narrative consciousness articulated through a distinct 
poetics of wandering.  
 The goal of this introduction is to arrive at a definition of wandering that both 
acknowledges diverse disciplinary possibilities but surpasses these categories though an 
extended argument of wandering as a phenomenology of perception (Emmanuel Levinas) and its 
subsequently generated attentiveness (Walter Benjamin) and place in postmodern culture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For further reading, see Alan Palmer, Fictional Minds (Lincoln, NB: U. of Nebraska Press, 2008).  
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(Frederic Jameson). But first a productive digression—through a history of walking—to arrive at 
the practice of wandering. 
Wandering About Walks: Some Assumptions 
 
Indeed, broadly defined, “wandering” invokes divergent histories and discourses: the ambulatory 
contexts that saturate canonical narrative, fiction, and autobiography; the pleasures of dilatory 
and digressive narrative; and even subversive narrative “form” and deconstructionist philosophy 
that denies both telos and narrative arcs. If first loosely defined as a form of walking, 
“wandering” connotes a long and complex history of fictional travelogue, epic, pilgrimage, and 
exile, and within varied cultural, historical, and narrative genealogies.  
Perhaps the earliest instance of both literature in English and a mobilized narrative, 
Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales presents a pilgrimage as a pretense for a slice of medieval 
archetypes and personalities, along with—and through—their competing tales. Ostensibly, the 
“Hoste” of the Southwerk Inn initiates the story-telling contest of the Tales in order “to shorte 
with oure weye” (791-792). Stories thus pass the time of the “viage” to Canterbury, but they are 
also means to “pleye”, to entertain—and as is well known, become the sole focus of Tales, with 
their fragmentary and asymptotic reach from Southwerk towards Canterbury. Certainly, each 
individual story of the Tales presents ample material for sociological, political, and even 
narrative theorists. A far more subtle feature to the Tales’ narratological success is their method 
of communication: they are framed within an ambulatory context and told by multiple subjects 
who interact with one another and their shifting, ambient environments. Thus, the richness of the 
tales emerges from the implicit and explicit relations between the characters’ ordering and 
reactions: the Knight is parodied by the Miller, who is mocked by the Reeve. Further, the 
5	  
	  
	   	  
characters’ choices are influenced, too, by natural and social environments: for example, the 
penultimate tale by the Manciple is preceded by the Manciple’s cursing of the drunken Cook—in 
his tale, the Manciple concludes with the recommendation that one always “kepe wel thy 
tongue” (IX, 319). Likewise, the Parson’s tale is preceded by an admonition of the Host to 
hasten, as the “sonne wole adoun” (X, 70); in response to the sun’s descent, the Parson offers a 
doctrinal treatise of the “fruyt of penanunce” (X, 1076), with a recommendation, among many 
others, to purchase such “blisful regne” with “reste by travaille.” (1080) As the ultimate tale, the 
melancholic setting of twilight prompts both the Host and the Parson to close the collection of 
Tales on a somber note, one that expresses travel as both travail, its etymological source, and as a 
form of spiritual sojourn that is also a sort of restful serenity. 
The labor, or travail, of travel is both philologically originary and essential to its 
proliferation of discourses and expressions.  It is, too, the occasion and necessary context for 
realizing the travel narrative as such. Nearly half a millennium later, Henry David Thoreau 
expressed a similar philological sensitivity to the art of walking, though with an etymological 
focus on the root of the word “saunter”:    
I have met with but one or two persons in the course of my life who understood the art of 
Walking, that is, of taking walks, who had a genius, so to speak, for sauntering; which 
word is beautifully derived “from idle people who roved about the country, in the middle 
ages, and asked charity, under pretence of going à la sainte terre” — to the holy land, till 
the children exclaimed, “There goes a sainte-terrer”, a saunterer — a holy-lander. They 
who never go to the holy land in their walks, as they pretend, are indeed mere idlers and 
vagabonds, but they who do go there are saunterers in the good sense, such as I mean. 
Some, however, would derive the word from sans terre, without land or a home, which, 
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therefore, in the good sense, will mean, having no particular home, but equally at home 
everywhere. For this is the secret of successful sauntering. He who sits still in a house all 
the time may be the greatest vagrant of all, but the Saunterer, in the good sense, is no 
more vagrant than the meandering river, which is all the while sedulously seeking the 
shortest course to the sea. But I prefer the first, which indeed is the most probable 
derivation. For every walk is a sort of crusade, preached by some Peter the Hermit in us, 
to go forth and reconquer this holy land from the hands of the Infidels. (1) 
Here, “sauntering” is founded philologically on either a teleological pilgrimage towards the 
sainte terre, the holy land, or the sans terre—the exiled one without land. Though Thoreau 
adapts his first, “most probable derivation” of sauntering as a modern form of conquest—thus 
salvaging a noble pretense for the idling vagrant, he seems to suggest that such a Naturalist 
impulse to saunter as a type of “art” or “genius” is sourced in the impulse to recover a sense of 
belonging, even if displaced and “at home everywhere.” Thoreau’s complex history imagines his 
artfully sauntering geniuses to be both goal-driven and aimless, and so he conflates his 
purposeless idling with a mission-driven practice.  
 As just two examples, Chaucer and Thoreau speak for the long history of cultures 
founded upon animated and mobilized bodies that narrate in embedded contexts. From the 
ancient myths of Homer to the medieval tales of Chaucer; from the autobiographical and 
landscaped wonder of Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Whitman, to the urban and fragmented 
cosmopolitanism of Baudelaire, Benjamin, Joyce, and Woolf; and, through the contemporary and 
post-colonial exiles of Kazuo Ishiguro and W.G. Sebald, fictional narrative seems to have always 
emerged from imaginarily embodied movement. Such movement plays varying functions—as 
plot animation, structure for narrated experience, or occasion for a narrator’s mind—and 
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occupies overlapping genres, too: Heroes embark and return from quests; pilgrims, ancient, 
medieval or modern, voyage abroad; young men depart home to come of age; Romantic 
autobiographers roam country-sides to recollect life experiences; wandering flaneurs observe 
populated and deserted urban sites; post-colonial exiles mourn the ruins of history through their 
boundary-less and/or restricted movement.  
 Studies of such narrative movement—really, of narrative walking—note the critical place 
that such diverse forms of embodied ambulation holds in Western civilization. And indeed, with 
the recent publication and popular reception of Rebecca Solnit’s Wanderlust, as well as the very 
recent A Philosophy of Walking by Frederic Gros, readers are encouraged to notice the affinities 
between their own lives’ embodied and embedded narratives and those mobilized, fictional lives 
shaped by their imaginary settings. Solnit states this purpose of her study as clearly as possible in 
the words quoted above—walking, in her study, is the nexus of mind, body, and world—and the 
site of fictional and human consciousness and narrative5. Gros, perhaps less clearly, offers 
various dispositions and characteristics (e.g. solitude, eternity, freedom) that various walking 
practices generate through their particular application or broad cultural history6. Certainly 
Solnit’s, Gros’s and others’ works attempt comprehensive, inter-disciplinary, and cultural 
surveys of the varied forms of recorded—fictional or historical—walking. Yet even such studies 
ramble in their archival collection and cataloguing, ordering and organizing far more than 
proposing any sort of clearly unifying cognitive and/or narrative theory to this trans-historical 
and -cultural phenomenon. This study, therefore, is not principally concerned with walking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Walking shares with making and working that crucial element of engagement of the body and the mind with the 
world, of knowing the world through the body and the body through the world,” writes Rebecca Solnit in 
Wanderlust: A History of Walking (New York, NY: Penguin, 2000), 29. 
6 See Frederic Gros, A Philosophy of Walking Trans. John Howe (London: Verso, 2014).  
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forms and practices in the history of fiction, though it does acknowledge that such walking is the 
typical site for an inquiry into wandering.  
Wandering With(out) Structure 
	  
 If an inquiry into wandering is inclusive of but abstracted from walking, then, we might 
look for precedent in the study of digression as a comparable narrative form and as 
representative of narrative minds. Digression, for Ross Chambers, the great theoretician of 
“loiterature,” what he terms digressive narrative, is at once a definitive feature of normative 
narrative—it is the means by which an author distances an end from its beginning by avoiding 
the shortest path of one from the other—and it is the underlying characteristic of writerly 
pleasure for readers, as Barthes might have it7, through the dilatory practices of deferred endings. 
The reader’s desire for resolution is held at bay, in other words, through the pleasure of 
extending such a desire (Chambers 20). However, such a theory of digression assumes a 
narrative beginning and end. It assumes a site of origin from which a subsequent text digresses, 
even as it offers a theory of supplementarity that exemplifies what he calls the “etcetera 
principle,” which states that 
 whereas contextuality is a condition of all discourse, no context is ever the whole context: 
 there is consequently no message that does not admit of there being a second or other 
 message, and indeed, by continued application of the rule, a third, fourth, and fifth, to 
 infinity. (85-86) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See, for example, Roland Barthes in S/Z: “the goal of literary work (of literature as work) is to make the reader no 
longer a consumer, but a producer of the text” (5). Writerly readers are thus challenged to engage, even participate, 
in a text’s tensions. 
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As an infinite series of supplemental contexts, then, digression as a narrative method critiques 
the totalizing impulse of normative narrative structures. Even as the physical text in the reader’s 
hand is bound by the finitude of its material start and end, its compositional digression resists 
closure. “Etcetra,” Chambers claims, signifies the closing that forecloses closure—it confers 
“formal exhaustiveness” even as it is a “marker of a lack.” (86) Still, however, even in the most 
digressive texts, Chambers reads a continuum of shared experience with unidirectional narrative, 
in that digression offers a break, or diversion from its normative context, even as it retains the 
coherence of the normative context’s structure. 
 This becomes clear in his extended reading of Nicholson Baker’s The Mezzanine, a text 
that enacts such multi-contextual, readerly digression as its controlling principle and form, in 
which an escalator ride offers the occasion for a novel-length thought experiment. Chambers 
reads Baker’s work as both an “exploded” and “clogged” narrative, one that “obstruct[s] the 
unidirectionality of narrative,” opening it as a result to “the unlimited potentialities of textual 
multidirectionality, such that, through unlooked-for seepage-points, it can move, at any moment, 
in any number of possible directions.” (118) He cites another of Baker’s work, U and I, as the 
source of such a theory: 
 The only thing I like are the clogs...I wanted my first novel to be a veritable infarct of 
 narrative cloggers; the trick being to feel your way through each by blowing it up until its 
 obtrusiveness finally revealed not blank mass but unlooked-for seepage-points of 
 passage. (73)   
 In Chambers’ reading of Baker’s work itself, the explosion of “clogged narrative” is “simulated 
on the page by a riot of footnotes that divide the reader’s attention...one can’t quite decide 
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whether to continue following the text...or to plunge into a luxuriant note.” (73) Thus, with the 
simultaneous blockage of directionality, infinitely unique reading paths are enacted by each 
reader as she follows a particular combination of seepage-points.  
 Chambers is right to read Baker’s work as a pleasurable read, one in which the pleasures 
of digression are figured from within the corporate world in his book-length digressions along an 
escalator ride, itself a digression from and an element within the corporate sphere. He concludes 
that Baker’s subject “for a time...has left the constraining environment of the ‘usual channels,’ 
but now he is returning to them, duly refreshed.” (153) Essentially, for Chambers, digression’s 
pleasures are realized through an absolute autonomy, nearly akin to a flanerie, of readerly or 
authorial distance: on the one hand, dilatoriness tends towards dilation, towards a desire for 
totality and absolute comprehension (13); on the other, digression, too, enacts critical distance in 
its differed and even ironic difference (11-15)8.  His final call to his reader to choose not to 
conclude, “to try not to decide” and instead to “repair, like Benjamin’s flaneur, to the 
marketplace” (292) smacks of privileged autonomy. It prefers to resist closure, but it assumes 
that there’s a choice to do so. Thus far is a theory of digression—and, primarily, as a narrative 
pleasure enacted by writers and demanded of readers.   
 But how might we read a text that digresses from its very beginning, or a subject unaware 
of his own digression? What if, in other words, there is no proper beginning or end in such a 
digressive text or mind—and so the digression is always already active, as the very method of 
narration, from its inception? Narration in media res is a common trope, in literary performance, 
but digressing in media res, however, pushes the logic of digression to an absolute extreme. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chambers invokes Derridean differance as deferring and dilatory; he references digressive criticisms of Gayatri 
Spivak and Meaghan Morris as deliberate performances of digressive criticism.   
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What are the limits of digression, in other words, and how might we think, read, and identify 
wandering as a form of digression that not only assumes supplementarity, in its unfolding, and 
not only demands an explosion—and seepage—in the face of unidirectionality, but that exists 
apart from directionality to begin with?  
 Digression has been amply theorized in the history of western literature;9 wandering, 
however, has not. There are likely several reasons to render such a distinction in terms of critical 
terms and reception. As noted above, readings of digressive literatures, still admit to a telos and 
still admit, often, to a sort of resolution—novels end, heroes return from the Bakhtinian 
adventure-time that is still a hiatus from historical time. Subsequently, digressive literatures are 
positioned in relation to traditional literatures as a type of ethical reformation and modern 
sensibility from within the canon: they “undermine restrictive moral codes, social conventions 
and modes of thought to reveal the more transient, elusive realm of human consciousness.” 
(Grohman and Wells 6) Even in their revolutionary or instructional stance, however, in their 
most basic, structural mode, digressive narratives are positioned as dialectically engaged with the 
history of traditional literary form, “represent[ing] an attempt to break away from a literary 
tradition” or “renew[ing] the form of the novel from within.” (ibid.) While critical, such 
revolutionary modes still retain the essential binaries of historical genre and literary form: they 
acknowledge their sites of origin and retain the generic relations and teleological tropes.  
 Instead of a structural or aesthetic theory of digressive narrative, in what follows, I offer a 
theory of wandering narrative minds, both in structured wandering and in wandering structures 
that underlie the most normative narrative forms. Unlike their digressive cousins, texts that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for example the recent collection of essays Digressions in European Literature: From Cervantes to Sebald ed. 
Grohmann and Wells (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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inhere wandering as the overriding narrative structure do not necessitate a formal engagement 
with traditional or modernizing ethics, aesthetics, or narrative form. Wandering figures need not 
be seeking an ending to their journeys, a resolution to their digressions, or an alternative to a 
hegemonic ideology. Wandering narratives need not resolve in an easily abstracted or in a highly 
obtuse monomyth—in an absolute text of wandering, there is no departure from home, and there 
is no return home. Further, if narrative wandering is not embodied, but occurs either in the voice 
of a narrator or in the mind of a character, it pursues its own logic and associations, often 
interrupting itself, restarting, or leaving avenues of thought unexplored. Wandering bodies, 
therefore, might not be easily assimilated to discourses of exile and redemption, nor will 
wandering minds be easily admitted to generic structures of narrative.  
 This sort of wandering finds an easy partner in methodologies of postmodernism; Mark 
C. Turner writes, for example, “deconstructive criticism...[is] forever wavering and wandering.” 
(11) Such deconstructive thought that “calls into question the coherence, integrity, and 
intellibility of [the] network of oppositions,” in other words,  
 will, of necessity, be unsettled and unsettling. Repeatedly slipping through the holes in 
 the system within which it must, nevertheless, be registered, such thought is perpetually 
 transitory and forever nomadic. It is neither simply this nor that, here nor there, inside nor 
 outside. (ibid.) 
Wandering operates apart from narrative’s sequences and normative contexts, in other words. 
For a post-structuralist, wandering is not only a form—it is an orientation of reading a structured 
always-already digression that is elemental to the critique of historical progress, teleology, and 
even narrativity. Jacques Derrida suggests as much when he writes “We must begin wherever we 
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are”10. If we begin wherever we are—with the wherever initiating us, in turn, and conversely, 
ending without completion: without a center, without a controlling purpose, without the 
bracketing form of a beginning, middle, and end, then narrative, history, and theology must be 
thought otherwise. Structures of living, even of movement, take the shape of the formless error—
that of wandering. To err, to wander unceasingly—not as a temporary exile or a digressive 
indulgence, but as an always already drifter, as an errancy to which a fall or origin is never 
juxtaposed—is at once a negation of purposeful subjectivity and an affirmation of playful 
becoming. Wandering, in this manner, assumes Gilles Deleuze’s paradox of “pure becoming,” in 
which “insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the 
distinction of the before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to 
pull in both directions at once.” (1) Becoming every which way, in other words, eludes a 
conventional narrative sequence. 
 This sort of wandering, in its dynamism and teleological suspension, I should add, if 
transplanted from a theory of cognition in narrative and activated in Marxist theories of 
materialism, is comparable to Peter Hitchcock’s ambivalence regarding dialectical materialism, 
in which he prefers oscillation as both productively tense and progress-free for materialist theory 
and objects of that theory. For Adorno, Hitchcock argues, “homeostasis in art” is the “pause in 
oscillation...the mean in its corollary of movement.” (5) It is the oscillated movement at a 
standstill, much as Benjamin’s critique of historicity is realized as dialectics at a standstill. 
 With the assumption of wandering as a temporal paradox for the cognizing subject of 
pure becoming, as a structure and method that operates apart from coherent narrative structures, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Of Grammatology trans. G.C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976), p. 162. I am indebted to Turner’s 
citation of this quote in his introductory chapter. 
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assume as well that the instantiation of such wandering minds perform and are generated by their 
embedded and embodied sites. The representation of such bare cognition rarely happens in a 
vacuum, in other words: embodied consciousness is generated by its spatial contexts. While also 
not the focus of this dissertation project, this study acknowledges, by way of introduction, the 
complexity of assessing situated and embodied cognition, as well as the necessary admission to 
the presence of such cognition as the site of wandering. Indeed, contributing insights offered by 
fields as varied as environmental studies and philosophy of mind are generally assumed and 
necessary for a study preoccupied with aesthetic limits of narrative form and mind. Take, for 
example, Michel de Certeau’s reflections on “Walking in the City”: for de Certeau, the “ordinary 
practitioners of the city live ‘down below,’ below the thresholds at which visibility begins...they 
are walkers, Wandersmanner, whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban ‘text’ they 
write without being able to read it.” (93) Manipulated by the presences and absences of 
structured spaces, the walkers of the city are blinded to both the embrace and necessary 
dependence of their inscriptions upon the city’s layout and architecture. For de Certeau, every 
story is necessarily a travel story, inasmuch as every story is inscribed through embedded bodies 
manipulated by their environments, inscribing an unintelligible wander.  
 Others have suggested that post-colonial narrative, in particular, is especially demanding 
in its primacy placed on space in the contemporary political sphere and the subject’s tense 
relation with its own narrativity and embedded object-world-space. Sara Upstone recently 
reminds us11 that for Foucault, writing in 1967, “the present epoch will be above all else the 
epoch of space.” (22) Later, Upstone argues that the “cementing of the colonial space—and in 
particular of the colonial city”, for the colonized subject, in writing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See “Writing the Post-Colonial Space: Ben Okri’s Magical City and the Subversion of Imperialism” Partial 
Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas 2.2 (2004)  
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 has lead to a subversive re-imagining of space within the post-colonial nation. The post-
 colonial author does not accept absolute space as a reality: rather, he or she reveals the 
 sense of an overwritten chaos...In this way, the anti-colonial response to the colonial 
 space has centred not simply on attempting to overlay a new space of its own in what 
 would itself be an imperializing exercise. The real radicalism of such a response lies in 
 that the post-colonial author not only rejects the colonial model but also engages with the 
 chaos that underlies its construction in order to re-vision a new space with the 
 possibilities for resistance and survival. (164) 
In Upstone’s reading, the post-colonial author resists spaces designed for colonial practices, 
through not just overlaying “a new space” but by engaging with the underlying chaos at work 
beneath the colonial space’s construction. While her study and its application is highly useful in 
theory, her emphasis, both in theory and practice is on the resistance to form that inheres within 
post-colonial cities and landscapes. This study, on the other hand, focuses on the subject’s 
narrative and embodied cognition within the colonial space. Upstone will be useful, then, in our 
study of the subject’s cognizing of colonial spaces through the practices of both physical and 
perceptual wandering.   
 Indeed, as I continue the introduction, I signal an even more fundamental shift towards an 
understanding of narrative wandering: wandering is not only structured formally in opposition to 
the temporality of both conventional and digressive narrative minds; instead, wandering inhabits 
the dimension of materiality, of space, existing apart from temporality altogether. In so doing, I 
follow Fredric Jameson’s suggestion that the postmodern era “now inhabit[s] the synchronic 
rather than the diachronic,” dominated by space rather than time. (15) Wandering, then, denies 
16	  
	  
	   	  
conventional diachronicity in its resistance to conventional narrativity and in its occupation of 
embedded spaces as the site of its narration.   
 Thus far has been a review of certain assumptions regarding structures and sites of 
wandering. At its most elemental, wandering performs the disruptive and foregrounds the 
creative material by focusing on the motion of all fictional mind. To discuss the mind as such, 
this dissertation continues with a series of principles underlying its argument in the fields of 
cognition and neuroscience, with a lengthy focus on the phenomenology and ethics of wandering 
as expressed in both lived experience and fictional minds.  
Wandering Consciousness 
	  
First, this dissertation assumes models of cognition and consciousness that are inter-subjective 
and inter-objective and beyond (or preceding) the Cartesian dualities of mind and body. Indeed, 
if wandering occurs not only in embedded sites but in embodied minds, then cognition, and 
representation of such cognition, must necessarily be situated as such. Esther Thelen’s recent 
definition of an “embodied cognition” offers useful language for such a paradigm:  
 To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily interactions with the 
 world. From this point of view, cognition depends on the kinds of experiences that come 
 from having a body with particular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably 
 linked and that together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and 
 all other aspects of life are meshed. The contemporary notion of embodied cognition 
 stands in contrast to the prevailing cognitivist stance which sees the mind as a device to 
 manipulate symbols and is thus concerned with the formal rules and processes by which 
 the symbols appropriately represent the world. (xx) 
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As opposed to the traditional theories of cognition, in which the mind is abstracted from the 
body, an embodied cognition adopts the principles of phenomenology. Embodied cognition 
embraces the subject’s “perceptual and motor capacities” as forming the “matrix within which 
memory” and all other aspects of human cognition are “meshed;” the body, in other words, is the 
site of the mind’s articulation. The mind, therefore, does not exist as a discrete entity from the 
body and its embedded environment. Instead, cognition itself emerges from the body’s 
embedded nature and its relation to the brain, a single contributor to an emerging consciousness.  
 If cognition is necessarily embodied, then it emerges as well in its interactions, in its 
cognizing of the ambient world. Alva Noe, a philosopher of mind, posits such a theory of 
consciousness, one that is necessarily inter-subjective and that inter-weaves the experiencing 
subject and its embedded world. Noe defines consciousness as the real and imagined movement 
of a subject in his embedded world:  
 Consciousness isn’t something that happens inside us: it is something that we do, 
 actively, in our dynamic interaction with the world around us. The brain—that particular 
 body organ—is certainly critical to understanding how we work. I would not wish to 
 deny that. But if we want to understand how the brain contributes to consciousness, we 
 need to look at the brain’s job in relation to the larger nonbrain body and the environment 
 in which we find ourselves. I urge that it is a body- and world-involving conception of 
 ourselves that the best new science as well as philosophy should lead us to endorse. (24) 
In an extended, popular philosophy of consciousness that suggests how we “are not our brains”, 
Noe shows how consciousness emerges, on all sentient and creaturely levels, through an 
elaborate dance between an organism, its neural network, self-concept, and embedded 
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environment. In reading a wandering mind as both necessarily embodied and embedded, then, 
we must take into account how such wandering is constructed, in its narration, by its real and 
imagined cognizing of its ambient world.  
 For Antonio Damasio, the neuroscience of such a theory of embodied consciousness 
suggests the constructed nature of autobiographical consciousness—the imaginary of discrete 
identity—and the possibility for other, more fundamental representations of consciousness 
preceding autobiography. In other words, in his attempt at a nuanced account of the “birth of 
consciousness” (1999, 168) in both its fundamental and autobiographical stages, he offers a 
language for us to think about wandering representations of mind apart from narrative identities.  
 To generate a sense “of self in the act of knowing” (ibid.) Damasio argues, “our 
organisms internally construct and internally exhibit a specific kind of wordless knowledge—
that our organism has been changed by an object—and when such knowledge occurs along with 
the salient internal exhibit of an object.” (169) Through its embedded relation with the object 
world, then, the simplest forms of consciousness in all salient beings are first generated in a 
knowledge of the self in such a relation. Such knowledge first arises in the form of a primordial 
“feeling”, Damasio hypothesizes, as  
 Core consciousness occurs when the brain’s representation device generates an imaged, 
 nonverbal account of how the organism’s own state is affected by the organism’s 
 processing of an object, and when this process enhances the image of the causative 
 object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context. (ibid.) 
Thus, an image of the organism-object relation is generated—the “source of the sense of self in 
the act of knowing”, which in turn shades and embeds the object within a certain context and 
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with a certain feeling. Beyond this transient “core self” that apprehends itself in the act of 
knowing the object world, complex organisms with “vast memory capacities” can properly 
categorize those memories of experiences of self-knowledge and organize—and reorganize—
those experiences, thus developing an autobiographical identity as a historical self. Crucially, 
however, in Damasio’s neuro-cognitive framework, the “autobiographical self requires the 
mechanism of core consciousness so that activation of its memories can generate core 
consciousness.” (175) In other words, core consciousness underlies the generation of the 
memories that are collated through the extended memory and patterning of the autobiographical 
self.  
 Damasio is useful in that he offers a method for thinking through the varieties of narrated 
consciousness. And his model is doubly laudable for its convergence with philosophies of mind 
and phenomenologies of cognition. Recent scholars have harnessed the language of philosophy 
and merged it with recent, neuroscientific research to suggest a more nuanced phenomenology of 
cognition, one that adapts earlier philosophical critiques of Cartesian dualism towards 
reimagining possibilities for human cognition and narrative identity. Shaun Gallagher and 
Francisco Varela12 have demonstrated the deep historical, methodological, and research parallels 
between both fields. They, too, point to those who have resisted such a study (e.g. Daniel 
Dennett13) and demonstrate that well before it was formed as a discipline, phenomenologists (e.g. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty14) were generating useful inquiries into the field of cognitive science.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12.”Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences”. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy. Supplementary Volume 29 (2003): 93-132. 
13 Gallagher and Varela note that Dennet’s Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little Brown, 1991) mistook 
phenomenological method for psychological introspection (93). 
14 Gallagher and Varela point to Merleau Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception Trans. C. Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1962) as an early example of treatment of empirical treatment of psychology and neurology in his 
phenomenological methodology.  
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 Such recent research into and theories of cognition as embodied and consciousness as 
embedded reference a much longer, critical history of phenomenology’s method in the twentieth 
century.  Martin Heidegger’s transcendent subjectivity, scholars note, is greatly indebted to 
Edmund Husserl’s transcendent phenomenology, in that the material of human experience—
phenomenology’s methodological site—becomes the means by which human existence derives a 
knowledge of itself as such.16 Later in the 20th Century, phenomenology itself resurfaced as a 
critique of some of the more extreme forms of existentialist subjectivity. Emmanuel Levinas’s 
first book De l’existence a l’existant (Existence and Existents) posits an explicit reversal of 
Heidegger’s movement from metaphysics of beings to Being (Sein, existence) by reclaiming the 
precedence of others’—beings’—phenomenal existence prior to the \statement of the subject’s 
ontology that existence makes possible.17 
 Levinas’s entire oeuvre, it may be said, is a critique of Heidegger’s existentialism and the 
potentially violent political, social, and ethical fallout of such extreme theories of existence. For 
Levinas, it is not enough to exist as “being” or as “being-in-the-world”—as a subjectivity or as 
part of a whole via inter-subjectivity; instead, Levinas foregrounds a phenomenology that is also 
an inter-phenomenology: a paradoxical phenomenology that is, too, an epistemology, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 And since 2002, there has been a journal—Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, of which Gallagher is a 
co-editor—dedicated to the possible conference between the two fields.  
16 While not all later existentialists were phenomenologists, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) is a 
foundational existentialist work of the early 20th Century that cites Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method for 
precedence. Husserl privileges the subject’s perceptions and intuitions; Heidegger adapts such transcendental 
phenomenology for his theories of transcendental subjectivity.  For further reading on this topic, see Steven Galt 
Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology 
(Northwestern University Press, 2001). 
17 Historically, it would be an understatement to stress how Levinas, a Jewish prisoner of the second world war, read 
Heidegger’s existentialism as making an extreme, fascist subjectivity possible at the expense of other beings For 
more on Levinas’s historical relation to Heidegger, the strain of militarism that Levinas detects in Heidegger’s early 
existential thought, and the corrective, ethical phenomenology that Levinas presents, see Adriaan T. Peperzak’s 
critical preface to Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings ed. Peperzak, Critchley, and Bernasconi 
(Bloominton, Indiana UP: 1996) 
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“recognition without prior cognition” [reconnaissance sans préalable connaissance].18 Taken as a 
phenomenology that acknowledges, by way of critique, a certain language of existentialism, 
Levinas’s new cognitive science casts cognition as a “sensibility” that “marks the subjective 
character of the subject…an Urimpression [primal impression] that is the individuation of the 
subject.”19 
Wandering Phenomenology 
	  
In what follows, I channel Levinas’s thinking for defining a theory of narrated wandering. If 
such primordial pre-cognition is the base of Levinas’s phenomenological method, a method by 
which subjectivity is realized through the cognition of—and concurrent ethical relation to—the 
Other, the structural “form” of such cognizing, Levinas suggests elsewhere, is that of errancy: “in 
a home open to the Other—hospitality...is the very opposite of a root. It indicates disengagement, 
a wandering [errance] which has made it possible, which is not a less with respect to installation, 
but the surplus of the relationship with the Other.” (1969, 172) Such errancy—or wandering—is 
figured as a form of “separation” that refuses “to close itself up in its own egoism;” instead, it is 
an errancy from the home toward the Other, as “the possibility for the home to open to the Other 
is as essential to the essence of the home as closed doors and windows.” (173) Indeed, for 
Levinas, a theory of wandering is best articulated as both phenomenological experience of 
aesthetics and as an ethical orientation towards the Other—phenomenological sensibility, in 
other words, as an interruptive presence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I am indebted to Michael Sohn,  “The Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the Thought 
of Levinas and Ricouer” (Diss. U. of Chicago, 2012), 63, for an illuminating and critical discussion of this source, 
cited in Emmanuel Levinas, “Socialité et argent.” In Emmanuel Lévinas, ed. Catherine Chalier and Miguel 
Abensour, (Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991), 107.  
19 Again, I only became aware of this source by studying Sohn’s excellent research and analysis; he cites this text on 
p. 58 of his dissertation. The citation for the original source: Emmanuel Lévinas, “Reflections on Phenomenological 
‘Technique,” in Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1998), 97.   
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 Elsewhere, he clarifies the phenomenology of such errancy—the consciousness that gets 
lost and wanders about in a pocket of timeless awareness: 
 The movement of art consists in leaving the level of perception so as to reinstate 
 sensation, in detaching the quality from this object of reference. Instead of arriving at the 
 object, the intention gets lost [s’egare] in the sensation itself, and it is this wandering 
 about [egarement] in sensation in aesthesis, that produces the aesthetic effect. (1988, 53) 
Robin Durie20 has demonstrated how Levinas’s distinctive use of wandering here is informed by 
his Bergsonian influence—his interest in perception as a temporalized phenomenology of 
wandering, Durie shows, has much to do with Bergson’s theories of memory and consciousness 
as the extended duration of a singular moment in consciousness. While this Bergsonian strand 
justifies Levinas’s unique temporal sense—one that participates in time as becoming (much as 
Deleuze’s becoming) apart from the becoming’s temporal sense, it is worth noting, for our 
purposes, the paradigm for aesthetic perception that Levinas offers performs as errancy and 
wandering. For Levinas, when the mind experiences heightened perception, it is, in fact, 
wandering; when the mind finds itself outside of normative temporalization, it is wandering. 
 Moreover, the wandering underpinning aesthetic experience has distinct ethical relevance 
in its absolute mobility. For Levinas, either philosophy is produced as a “waiting preferred to 
action, indifference with regard to others”—a reference to Heidegger’s Warten—or as the 
structured digression of “Ulysses, whose adventure in the world was only a return to his native 
land—a complacency in the Same, an unrecognition of the Other.” Disengagement connotes 
immobility, and digression implies a structured complicity and complacency in an orientation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Robin Durie, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 48, Issue 4 (2010), 371–92. 
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even if digressive and mobilized, towards the Same. In contrast, a useful model for engagement 
with the Other is that of “a departure with no return”, a departure that is, too, a wandering 
inasmuch as it loses “absolute orientation if it sought recompense in the immediacy of its 
triumph.” This is a movement “radically conceived”, one from the “Same toward the Other which 
never returns to the Same.” (1996, 48-49) For Levinas, then, wandering might be conceived as 
the phenomenological ground of aesthetic perception, and wandering, too, as the deconstructed 
form of orientation, an ethical orientation that is disoriented in origin, context, and telos. 
Mobilized, embedded narrative minds express such heightened presence in their act of 
wandering—and in their movement towards facing the Other.  
 Elsewhere, Levinas positions such errancy, such wandering, as the very distinction 
between Maurice Blanchot and Martin Heidegger in relation to a philosophy of aesthetic truth. 
For both, art does not lead “to a world behind the real one” (1997, 137); however, for Heidegger, 
the light of truth conditions all human wanderings, whereas for Blanchot, the work of wandering 
uncovers an untruth, a darkness. For Heidegger, in other words, wandering discloses primordial 
light; for Blanchot, errancy is the “poetic quest for the unreal” (136). Blanchot, in fact, sees this 
form of wandering as founded in the “limit experience”, the gift of the Jews to western culture 
and civilization, epitomized in the primordial wandering Jew, Abraham: 
…would not this errancy rather signify a new relation with ‘truth’? Doesn’t this nomadic 
movement (wherein is inscribed the idea of division and separation) affirm itself not as 
the eternal privation of a sojourn, but rather as an authentic manner of residing, or a 
residence that does not bind us to the determination of a place to settling close to reality 
forever and already founded, sure, and permanent? As though the sedentary state were 
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necessarily the aim of every action! As though truth itself were necessarily sedentary. 
(127) 
Undoing an original conception of truth as static and discernibly structured, Blanchot suggests, 
much as Thoreau before him, that the presence of absence, the truth of exile, is realized in its 
very motion, in its lack of permanence, and in its sheer structurelessness, its residence in errancy. 
As boundless forms of orgin-less becoming, aesthetic, theological, and even cognitive theories of 
wandering are at once irreducible and entirely apprehensible through their networks of traces. 
Wandering Aesthetics 
	  
If phenomenology is the method by which the embodied cognition of wandering is best 
understood, then the mimetic material of such episodic cognition, I argue in what follows, is best 
represented through the philosophical and literary aesthetics of the gesture and the fragment. The 
realization, in the aesthetic form of the gesture, of pure, purposeless action entirely expressing its 
own mediation, resonates with Levinas’s inquiry into a wandering aesthetic perception and the 
core consciousness of an embodied and pre-autobiographical cognition. Such an aesthetic of 
perception, too, is necessarily fragmentary in its isolated and interrupted nature.  
 In assessing the representation of wandering minds, then, I will seek to use the language 
of both the gesture and the fragment. For a brief introduction of the two philosophical figures, 
however, I build on Levinas’s errancy with theories by Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin 
in their reading of the gesture underlying language, and I look to Hans Jost-Frey in his reading of 
the fragment in narrative, language, and philosophy. I conclude by suggesting that the “cognitive 
mapping” that Frederic Jameson theorizes, as an aesthetic ideology and strategy of 
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postmodernism in late capital, bears a striking resemblance to the aesthetic of gesture theorized 
by Benjamin. 
  Giorgio Agamben has recently written that we might think of the gesture as a third kind 
of action otherwise than “doing” and “praxis”, beyond or preceding means and end: 
 …if doing is a means in sight of an end and praxis is an end without means, gesture 
 breaks the false alternative between ends and means that paralyses morality and presents 
 means which, as such, are removed from the sphere of mediation without thereby 
 becoming ends. (Infancy 155) 
Gesture thus communicates nothing other than its “display of mediation” or “being-in-language” 
that underlies all communication. This pure mediality as a performative gesture is essentially 
cinematic, Agamben argues, but in truth, he owes this insight to Walter Benjamin (as Samuel 
Weber has argued21), who noted the theatrical gesture that underlies all of Franz Kafka’s fictions 
in his extended essay on Kafka.22 Arguably, too, Agamben is departing from Adorno’s cinematic 
reading of silent film as gesture, the last trace of communication’s failures in modernity; for 
Adorno, gesture is only an “interruptive shock” within the destruction of experience and powers 
of expression within language, realized as a momentary rupture through an otherwise whole 
failure. Such gestures serve entirely as markers of “alienation and horror.” (Weber 302) 
Benjamin and Agamben, on the other hand, identify singular gestures in narrative—and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See “Going along for the ride: Violence and gesture: Agamben reading Benjamin reading Kafka reading 
Cervantes.” Germanic Review 81.1 (2006): 65–83. 
22 The essay was first published in Judische Rundschau, December 1934. It later appeared in Gesammelte Schriften, 
II, 409-438. It was later published in English in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, pages 111-140. (Ed. Hannah 
Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books. 1968). The latest edition in English available can be found 
in Selected Writings: Vol. 2, Part 2 (Ed. Jennings, Eiland, Smith. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1999: 794-818). All 
quotations are taken from this final volume. 
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linguistic gesture, more abstractly, underlying language—as the very ground of communication 
itself.23  
 Regarding Benjamin’s reading of Kafka’s gesture: Werner Hamacher24 astutely notes 
how Benjamin elaborates upon what he terms the opacity, or “cloudy spot” in Kafka’s fiction in 
terms of the theatrical gesture, another central theme to the Kafka essay. In Benjamin’s words, 
“Kafka could grasp some things always only in gesture. And this gesture, which he did not 
understand, forms the cloudy spot of the parables. From this gesture arises Kafka’s fiction.” 
(“Franz Kafka” 808) For Benjamin, the theatrical literary gesture manifests as a cloudy spot; it 
disallows exemplary narrative that mediates instruction; remaining “opaque to doctrine” 
(Hamacher 298), in this analysis, lies at the heart of Kafka’s fictive interests in an embedded, 
enigmatic cloudiness that forbids both the reader and its protagonist access to the emperor’s 
authorial signature of signification.25 But the gesture does not only forbid explication; it makes 
possible an attentiveness to the texture of language and linguistic minds, and in so doing, it 
clarifies both the arbitrariness and playfulness underlying linguistic composition and linguistic 
representation of fictional minds.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For an extension of this argument, see Alastair Morgan, “‘A Figure of Annihilated Human Existence’: Agamben 
and Adorno on Gesture” Law Critique (2009) 20: 299–307 
24 See Werner Hamacher, “The Gesture in the Name: On Benjamin and Kafka” Premises: Essays on Philosophy 
from Kant to Celan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 294-336. 
25 An explicit reference to the opening of Benjamin’s essay in which he recounts a Kafkan story of kafkan parable 
entitled “Potemkin”, an original spin on a mythical folk-parable that performatively mimics Kafka’s tone and 
parabolic style. The story is told of a certain Emperor Potemkin who suffers from bouts of depression during which 
he is entirely unavailable to perform his services of signing official documents, much to the chagrin of his councilors 
of state. A lowly clerk, Shuvalkin, suggests that he be permitted access to the Emperor’s bedroom; with nothing to 
lose, Shuvalkin is allowed access by the councilors to the Emperor’s inner-most chambers. Shuvalkin strides with 
confidence to the bedside of Potemkin; while he finds the Emperor’s response to his intrusion a nebulously “vacant 
stare” (794), he presses a pen into the latter’s hand and places the documents on his knees. In his catatonic state, 
Potemkin signs each document in sequence, and Shuvalkin returns triumphantly to the anteroom. The story ends 
with a surprising discovery by the councilors: the documents were each signed one after the other as follows: 
“Shuvalkin…Shuvalkin…Shuvalkin….” (795).  In the near-exegesis that immediately follows this introduction, 
Benjamin states, anticipating Kafka: “The enigma which beclouds this story is Kafka’s enigma” (795). 
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 This quality of attentiveness carries with it a certain ethical valence in that it notices what 
has been elided: the distorted, contingent elements. Benjamin makes this clear in a materialist 
theology that he reads in Kafka—and which resonates with Benjamin’s weak historical 
messianism in his “On the Concept of History”—by linking Kafka’s own, personal “prayer” to 
that of the little boy in a hunchback folksong26: 
 So ends the folksong. In his depths, Kafka touches ground which neither “mythical 
 divination” nor “existential theology” supplied him with. It is the ground of folk tradition, 
 German as well as Jewish. Even if Kafka did not pray—and this we do not know—he 
 still possessed in the highest degree what Malebranche called “the natural prayer of the 
 soul”: attentiveness. And in this attentiveness he included all creatures, as saints include 
 them in their prayers. (“Franz Kafka” 812) 
Here, Benjamin attributes sainthood to Kafka; regardless of Kafka’s actual praying practices, his 
inclusion of those distorted figures lost to oblivion in his writing, his preoccupation towards a 
total awareness of the “hunched backs” in his texts, be they actual figural distortions in his 
characters or literary lacunae in his texts—that is, gestures or cloudy spots—is unmatched by 
ordinary men. This quality of attentiveness to the problematic loci that Kafka brings to his 
writing and reveals in his characters is akin to “the natural prayer of the soul”, which is, in 
profound simplicity, the contemplative exercise of attentive noticing. For Benjamin, only a child 
can be attentive in such a critical manner; for Kafka, reading for and writing as gesture can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 “When I kneel upon my stool /And I want to pray, / A hunchbacked man is in the room / And he starts to say: / 
My dear child, I beg of you, / Pray for the little hunchback too. Des Knaben Wunderhorn: Alte deutsche Lieder 
(1808; rpt. Meersburg, 1928), p. 297: “Das buckliche Mannlein.” (fn. 32, page 818: Selected Writings, Vol. 4, Ed. 
Jennings, Eiland, Smith Belknap: Harvard U. Press, 1999). Benjamin’s interest in children’s toys, books, and 
mythology permeated his body of work, and came to the fore in revisiting his own childhood in a book-length study 
that remained unpublished in his own lifetime, Berlin Childhood around 1900. 
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generate such attentiveness, from which, in turn, might emerge a certain critical patience that 
might, in turn, might allow for even more playfulness in reading: 
 There is no need to leave the house. Stay at your table and listen. Don’t even 
 listen, just wait. Don’t even wait, be completely quiet and alone. The world will 
 offer itself to you to be unmasked; it can’t do otherwise; in raptures it will writhe 
 before you. (Blue 98)27 
 For Benjamin, Kafka writes in gestures to compel patience by foregrounding 
attentiveness. If we read wandering narratives as foregrounding gesture, then, we are reading for 
the minority figures, the distorted hunchbacks, that are often left by the wayside in history’s 
meta-narratives. But gesture need not be structured as such within a narrative; for Benjamin (and, 
arguably, for Kafka), the gesture of language’s communicability underlies language’s failures of 
communication. To extend the argument to wandering: one need not have a wandering narrative 
to read for wandering or as a wanderer.  
 If wandering lies at the very base, as the texture of language, as a gesture beneath 
signification, then the playfulness in such a language resonates with Hamacher’s reading of 
Kafka’ name-play28, as a “naming” language:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Of course, knowingly or unknowingly, Kafka echoes the Tao Te Ching here: 
Therefore the Master / acts without doing anything / and teaches without saying anything. / Things arise 
 and she lets them come; / things disappear and she lets them go. / She has but doesn’t possess, / acts but 
 doesn’t expect. / When her work is done, she forgets it. / That is why it lasts forever. (2) 
 
28 See p. 308-312 of Hamacher’s Premises; Kafka’s Hebrew name was “Anschel”; he writes in an equally 
popularized diary entry: “In Hebrew my name is Anschel, like my mother’s maternal grandfather…” (T, 318; D, I: 
197) Kafka plays with the names of his characters, too: “Georg has the same number of letters as Franz. In 
Bendemann, ‘mann’ is only an amplification of ‘Bende’ intended to provide for all the as yet unknown possibilities 
in the story. But Bende ha exactly all the same number of letters as Kafka, and the vowel ‘e’ is repeated in the same 
places as the vowel ‘a’ in Kafka”” (T, 492; D, I: 279). 
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 In Kafka’s staging of his name, a certain trait makes itself known that marks every name 
 in its singularity: the name does not belong to a system of language that communicates 
 something but to the markings in this system whose only function is to secure 
 communicability itself. These markings do not “say” anything, they mark. In this sense, 
 they are the places most resistant to meaning in any system generally disposed towards 
 meaning (313). 
 Thus, the name, in Hamacher’s analysis, is freed of its signifying function; it instead is 
pure “communicability”, while not communicating anything at all. This function-less aspect of 
language, according to Hamacher, gestures towards another possibility for language: “suspended 
into a mere gesture of naming”, “the name holds on to the possibility of another praxis of 
language and understanding—a praxis no longer given over to the representational function of 
identification.” (317) In his argument, then, Hamacher explicitly links the theoretical gesture, in 
Benjamin’s reading of Kafka, to Kafka’s theory of language as a form of playfulness, 
exemplified in his “naming” language.  
 Though Hamacher doesn’t cite him, Benjamin too theorized about an alternative, gestural 
language of naming in his early essay “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” 
(1916). For the name, according to Benjamin, presents pre-modern precedent for post-modern 
linguistics and revolutionary materialisms:  
 All nature, insofar as it communicates itself, communicates itself in language, and so 
 finally in man. Hence, he is the lord of nature and can give names to things. Only through 
 the linguistic being of things can he get beyond himself and attain knowledge of them—
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 in the name. God’s creation is completed when things receive their names from man, 
 from whom in name language alone speaks (“On Language” 65). 
What emerges from Benjamin’s theory of language as naming is that it is not only its own prayer 
to God; but language, in its purest sense is always pre-Fall; it always retains its “naming” aspect: 
that is, its arbitrary nature that disrupts sign and signified, leaving the linguistic being alone with 
the linguistic equivalent of the visual semblance, the gesture of language, or, in Benjamin’s 
words, language’s very form of communicability, beneath its purposeful communication. Thus, 
for Agamben to suggest that a human being’s “being in language” is “pure gesturality” (Infancy 
156) is to cite Walter Benjamin without quotation marks.29 
 For Levinas, then, embodied cognition occurs before recognition as wandering; for 
Benjamin, gestural writing—and reading—generates a certain attentiveness to the texture of 
language itself. For both, the isolated, atemporal cognizance is a moment that drifts, inasmuch as 
it operates aside from an origin, context, or telos. Emerging apart from history, then, such a 
figure of gesture necessarily wanders in its articulation—and offers a useful language for 
thinking through wandering as such. 
 If a fictional mind might be animated by gestures in its form, as Benjamin showed 
Kafka’s fiction to be, then to be built by gestures is to narrate—to cognize, to experience—
fragmentarily. In his book length treatise on fragmentary narrative, experience, and the very 
possibility of closure, Hans Jost-Frey echoes Kafka’s sentiment of waiting—without 
expectation—as a radical patience of sorts:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Putting it this way reframes Agamben’s thought plagiarism as a Benjaminian ideal designated and performed in 
The Arcades Project (Harvard U. Press: 1999), p. 458: “This work has to develop to the highest degree the art of 
citing without quotation marks. Its theory is intimately related to that of montage” [N1, 10]. 
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 The fragment does not belong to expectation, because it does not expect to be completed. 
 The fragment is waiting. What makes the fragment fragmentary is the fact that its 
 incompletion does not create any expectation, but starts one waiting, far from any object 
 of expectation. (58) 
The fragmentary experience is one of waiting without expectation. The fragmentary state from 
which this experience emerges from the breaks “inside the possible” world in which we inscribe 
our limits: 
 We move mostly inside the possible, do what we can, build for ourselves a world in 
 which we can live. But there are breaks, break-ins in this order, states of the outer limit 
 that are, however, unfulfilled, that one cannot get beyond though everything urges 
 beyond them. I call them fragmentary states. They are the everyday experience of the 
 impossible. (31) 
If fragments are not delimited by the whole/incomplete binary, but simply by what is possible 
and not yet possible, then they are worthy analogues to reading in gestures that both are 
contained by and exceed their contexts through a radical form of decontexualization.  
 Finally, I close this introduction by folding the reading of the gesture and the fragment—
as the materials and figures of a narrated wandering—into a broader history of postmodernism. 
Certainly, these figures of narrative in the postmodern era, Fredric Jameson has shown, 
foreground its spatialized and synchronic nature, but this crisis in temporal organization and 
historicity might be best thought through Lacan’s description of the schizophrenic. On the one 
hand, normative monadic, egoic, subjective experience is of  
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 a twofold proposition: first, that personal identity is itself the effect of a certain temporal 
 unification of past and future with one’s present; and second, that such active temporal 
 unification is itself a function of language, or better still of the sentence, as it moves 
 along its hermeneutic circle through time. (25-26) 
However, the schizophrenic experiences a “breakdown in the signifying chain,” the “past, 
present, and future of the sentence,” thus foreclosing the continuity of a past, present, and future 
of the “biographical experience of psychic life.” (ibid.) The schizophrenic is reduced to a bare 
experience solely of “pure material signifiers” in a “series of pure and unrelated presents in 
time.” (ibid.) Echoing Agamben’s reading of the gesture as a form of pure mediation, and 
echoing Benjamin’s notion of the decontextualized gesture, Jameson suggests that a certain 
aesthetic emerges, as a result, that is both euphoric and dissociated, when describing a particular 
instance of its textuality: 
 ...breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities 
 and internationalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, 
 that present suddenly engulfs the subject undescribable vividness, a materiality of 
 perception properly overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the 
 material—or better still, the literal—signifier in isolation. This present of the world or 
 material signifier comes before the subject with heightened intensity, bearing a 
 mysterious change of affect, here described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of 
 reality, but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, 
 an intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity. (26-27)  
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This “joyous intensity,” in Jameson’s read of fragmentary and atemporal texts, “becomes 
generalized as a cultural style” of postmodernism beyond Lacan’s iteration of schizophrenia (28) 
that does not unify in its perception but that brings a heightened tension to differentiated 
elements through a paradoxical experience of form. Jameson terms it a “difference” that “relates” 
and describes such difference as a “positive conception of relationship”, one in which “vivid 
perception of radical difference is in and of itself a new mode of grasping what used to be called 
relationship” as a form of “collage” (30). For Levinas, Benjamin, and Jost-Frey, perception 
carries certain non-normative weights in relation to a temporal sense of narrative form when 
articulated through the figure of the fragment or the gesture. For Jameson, a resistance to Late 
Capital’s “decentered global network” (37) is the subject’s constructed perception through such 
schizophrenic aesthetics.  
 Thus far, then, I’ve narrowed and deepened the definitional focus of “wandering” as a 
generic category for aesthetic expression that incorporates cognitive, phenomenological, and 
narrative components. Wandering is a mode of becoming in narrative that exists apart from 
predetermined arcs; it is, too, the ethical site of aesthetic perception that might be conceived, in 
its isolated form, as a fragmentary gesture. As a dissertation on wandering within fictional 
minds, this dissertation argues for a wide scope of applicability for its theory of narrative 
cognition, but in practice, it demonstrates a cognition within texts that exemplify wandering 
minds in certain limit cases within particularly illustrative contemporary fictions. In other words, 
it admits that wandering is both central to diverse representations of cognition inasmuch as it is a 
form of narrated perception.  
 However, the overlaying of normative narrative structures and subjective narrativity often 
obscure the underlying wandering inhering within normative categories of cognition, memory, 
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and Theory of Mind. Thus, this dissertation examines experiments in narrative cognition not only 
for their own sake, but to show how  limit cases foreground the wandering underlying cognition. 
In so doing, it groups the fragmented and episodic perception of the amnesiac with the 
overwhelming recollection of the archivist; and it weaves the discourses together of both the 
privileged, invisible presence of the flaneur and the dissociated, mindlessness of the fugueur. In 
allowing for both attentiveness and blindspots, for both recollection and dissolution, it argues 
that wandering is the heart of the coin about which these variously opposed types are minted. 
With an understanding that the poetics of wandering exists in a perceptual space within the 
breakdown of temporality that approximates both fragmentary consciousness and the gestural 
attentiveness generated by such fragmentation, we might be able to rethink the possibilities for 
narrative consciousness when represented beyond the normative scale, as will become apparent 
in the study of various texts in this dissertation’s study, as well as in the aestheticization of 
wandering within the motions and episodic recall and identity of autobiographical consciousness.  
 Indeed, though I examine, as the bulk of this study, the wandering operating within the 
dreamy amnesiacs and post-historical cosmopolitans and pilgrims in the contemporary and 
postmodern fictions of Kazuo Ishiguro, W.G Sebald, Maud Casey, Ben Lerner, and others, I start 
by arguing that wandering underpins representations of narativity from the inception of modern 
autobiography and novelizaiton. In so doing, I  suggest an even more ambitious consideration for 
thinking through wandering as not only a structured form of interruption, but as a form of 
interruption underlying the fabric of so-called normative cognition. 
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Chapter 1: Wandering About Narrativity 
 
To start with Romantic autobiography is to arrive at the origin of normative narrativity—
that is, a cognitive and interpretive orientation towards life events that seeks narrative closure 
and identity within generically recognizable forms and types30— and the origin of narrating 
cognition in an aesthetic form. The two elements, narrativity and cognition, are related, of 
course, in terms of the construction of narrativity as sourced in the motion and layering of 
perception and recollection onto an autobiographical narrative identity. However, as I show, the 
inception of narrativity generated at once a totalizing impulse towards narrativity in the face of 
discontinuous elements of narration characterized aesthetically as structural and episodic 
wandering.  
 Birthed out of the Enlightenment, the aestheticization of narrative cognition in the form 
of normative narrativity was spawned by bourgeoisie predilections for apprehending and 
narrating cognition and have extended through the form of the canonical novel, a genre that has 
perpetuated a hegemony of hetero-normativity, colonialist ideology, and cultural amnesia not 
only in content, but in their very form. Yet, as Terry Eagleton has argued, bourgeoisie aesthetics 
are at once the extension of Enlightenment rationality onto the life of the body and “cognition 
itself caught in the act.” (331) In other words, aesthetics are at once supplements of mastery, 
driven by bourgeoisie claims to assimilate the Natural through a form of the Imaginary, and, as 
supplements, they reveal the very cognition underlying all bourgeois intellection as, itself, of the 
Imaginary. Thus, for Eagleton, “sensation and intuition” even as an aestheticized ideology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Galen Strawson’s definitions in his critical contribution to field: “Against Narrativity”, Ratio 17(4), 2004. 
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overwhelm “what they are meant to subserve”—the rationalist narcissism of the bourgeouis—for 
“the body has its reasons, of which the mind knows little or nothing.” (337) 
 In what follows, I amplify Eagleton’s lead regarding the constructedness and aesthetic 
ideologies in fictional and non-fictional texts of normative narrativity by locating a subversive 
aesthetics of wandering minds that operates apart from narrativized subjectivity—and, as I will 
show,  at the very inception of narrative autobiography. Not only will I review how narrativity 
itself is a tenuous standard in the history of ideas by examining its assorted and often conflicting 
philosophical, literary, and cognitive constructions and genealogies, but I will show how 
narrativity undoes itself through the distinct aesthetics of wandering in the critical reception of 
narrativity in literary studies, in general, and in the field of Romantic autobiography, in 
particular—the foundation of modern autobiography, novelization, and narrativity. 
Memory and Narrativity: A Brief History of the Modern Self 
 
Twentieth Century philosophers and literary critics such as Ian Watt, Frances Ferguson, Paul 
Ricoeur and others initiated a dominant and enduring inquiry around the emergence of 
autobiography and the early novel in relation to its cultural milieu; while their methods differ, all 
argued that the novel as a generic form, narrative autobiography as such, and the impulse for 
fictional narrativity emerge from a complex network of effects of the Enlightenment upon 
conceptions of various discourses about the self. Ferguson writes, for example, that John Locke 
identified “the importance of memory for anchoring a sense of individual continuity over time.”  
(509) Similarly, Ricouer points to Locke as the first philosopher to equate “identity, self, and 
memory” (97), thus turning the discourse around the self as developmental and towards a 
coherent, unified, and temporalized self. Watt’s theories have endured as some of the strongest in 
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relating emerging fictions to greater economic individualism and socio-political independence of 
the period31. Others, such as Anne Whitehead, have pointed to David Hume’s account of a 
remembering self as building on Locke’s, with the argument that unknowable past selves are as 
fictional or as imaginary as true fictions (59-63)32. And more recently, Elizabeth Barnes, Joseph 
Fichtelberg, and others have shown how early modern revolutions and colonial movements 
across centuries and continents have generated sympathetic cultures and communities in early 
America and Britain. Such sites of early fictions, through risky and instructive narrative 
discourse, realized a critical progenitor of modern narrative fiction33.  
With Romantic autobiography’s production of remembering selves, the subsequent 
emergence of novelistic fiction, and the contemporary critique of novelistic function, formation, 
and self-production, the modern conception of narrative selves perform a normalized 
diachronicity and generic form. Of course, as historians of ritualized memory and modern selves 
have shown, the far more historical shift from myth to history—that is, the movement from 
experience of a cultural, collective present to a diachronic and historical past, present, and 
future—made possible early forms of cultural literacy and far more historical (as opposed to 
mythical) forms of collective memory34. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (U. of California P, 1957) 
32 See pp. 59-63 in Anne Whitehead, “Memory and the Self” in Memory (Routledge: New York, 2009), pages 50-83.  
33 See, for example, Elizabeth Barnes, States of Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel 
(Columbia UP, 1997); See also Joseph Fichtelberg, Risk Culture: Performance and Danger in Early America (U of 
Michigan Press, 2010).  
34 See, for example, Jack Goody and Ian Watt, “The Consequences of Literacy” in J.R. Goody (ed.) Literacy in 
Traditional Societies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1968), pp. 27-68. And of course, see the 
distinction between pre-modern and modern conceptions of memory in relation to cultural myth and cultural history 
in the now paramount study by Y.H. Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle and London: 
U. of Washington Press, 1996). While such a shift is not the subject of our discussion (or of the present study), it 
does stand as a critical precursor to the present distinction between pre- and post-Enlightenment conceptions of the 
self.  
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What occurred with the advent of the Enlightenment rationalism, secularism, and 
individuated selves, however, was an innovation not only in historicized memory, but in the 
function and relation of the individuating self to memory. Thus, as critics have noted, memory 
within narrative seemed to have shifted functions from reproducing to representing, thus 
foregrounding the essentially constitutive and creative forces underlying the generation of 
narrative identity.  John Frow called this modern form of memory, as realized in the emergence 
of early narrative selves of the eighteenth century and subsequent period of Romanticism, 
distinctly textual, as “memory is no longer a recovery or repetition of physical traces, but a 
construction of the past under conditions determined by the present.” (208) As an inscribed text, 
memory is no longer a receptacle of lived experience, but a creative function and related 
production that constructs imaginary—and narrative—relations between past and present selves. 
Thus, while discourses of “truth”, “authenticity”, and “non-fiction” surrounding memoir—and 
breaks between fictional and non-fictional texts—often subdue the presentist nature of memory 
by imagining a linear history in memory’s function, the origin of modern autobiography and the 
early novel in the eighteenth century belies a discontinuous and creative relationship with 
remembered pasts.  
Even in response to the novel’s current, sometimes multiple forms, many have reclaimed 
utopian Victorian arguments for generating such sympathetic communities through narrativized, 
empathic engagement, without noting their historical reappropriation of narrow subjectivity. 
Martha Nussbaum’s public advocacy35 for the humanities has come under criticism in its nearly 
utilitarian claims for literature within a productive society. While Nussbaum argues for a 
positivist rehabilitation of literary study in order to broaden perspective, develop sensibilities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
2010) 
39	  
	  
	   	  
cultivate empathy, and even inspire altruism, some have critiqued the affective and even 
cognitive potential for literature to generate empathy—Suzanne Keen’s work is most vocal in 
this regard36—and others have noted the ethical dangers in offering literary models of 
redemptive life-scripts—a hazard that is deceptive in its intentions and complicit with reinforcing 
power structures37. More obviously, recent scholars of the genre, such as Leigh Gilmore, have 
noted the ambivalences of the autobiographical gesture “of looking back to look forward” (34) in 
that such methods of self-conception generated and reinforce cultures of surveillance and self-
monitoring that emerge in consonance with discourses of autobiography. Famously, Foucault 
theorized about such self-discipline in his study of the Panopticon as a primary architectural 
expression of a widely practiced urbanized and modern self-monitoring in the eighteenth 
century38, a relevant critique through the twenty-first century’s scandals of online and airborne 
surveillance.  
Since its inception, then, fictional narrative and narrativity—that is, the normative 
impulse for and project of story-telling, both fictional and otherwise—have become staples of 
modern cultural discourses about fictional and autobiographical narrative, and are often laden 
with positive, normative, and even ethical values. Narrativity, too, has come to both underlie 
normative human existence and is normatively considered a positive and healthy contributor to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel (New York: Oxford UP, 2007). In her introduction, Keen writes, “I do 
not assume from the outset that empathy for fictional characters necessarily translates into…’nicer’ human 
behavior” (xxv). 
37 This insight is generated by Anne Whitehead’s study of Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go in her article “Writing 
with Care: Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go” Contemporary Literature 52.1 (2011), 55-83. I is worth noting here 
how Whitehead writes of the Romantic myth of literature’s redemptive potential as an empathic hazard as follows: 
“Ishiguro indicates that both literature and care work can paradoxically function to uphold social inequalities, by 
producing consoling (but false) fictions of legitimacy and meaning. The apparently innocuous activities of reading 
and care work—how can they be harmful, when both aim at the improvement of either our own or others’ lives?—
although not ‘bad’ in or of themselves, can nevertheless provide distractions and diversions from activist 
agendas…” (73) 
38 See Foucault’s Discipline and Punish trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977) 
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human psychology.39 Narrativity encourages cohesion and singularity—multiple events are 
plotted, selectively, to generate a subjectivity. Fragmentation, either in identity or events 
recollected, is usually termed “experimental” for its complication of focalization and narrated 
memory—and is typically situated in opposition to conventional narrativity.  
The reception of conventional narrativity—in both fictional plots and narrated lives—by 
conventional narrative theorists takes on anthropological and mythological valences. Within 
studies of narratology, David Herman40 has argued that such a relation between text and life is 
culturally symbiotic and fairly complex. Herman suggests in his work that recognizable genres of 
life-scripts and literary texts enter into a complex reciprocal relationship: story-telling genres are 
determined by literary production, on the one hand, and literary production mirrors received 
cultural scripts (106-113). Both generative sources innovate, critique, and mirror one another in a 
sustained reciprocity. While such a thesis makes possible more original forms of narrativity for 
self-identity than those typological genres proposed by Zeno Vendler,41 still the predilection for 
narrativity as a means of self-conception remains. In a similar, though evolutionary vein, Blakey 
Vermeule has argued that the popularity of certain genres and character types over others speaks 
to certain desires for survival that transcend lived mortality through imagined and reflected 
omniscience.42 
Very recently, however, philosophers of mind and critical theorists have questioned the 
alleged inherency of narrativity and/or its supposedly positive value for the individual and even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity”, Ratio 17(4), 2004, 433; For a detailed critique, see Matti Hyvarinen, 
“‘Against Narrativity’ Reconsidered” in Rossholm Göran, Johansson Christere ed. Disputable Core Concepts of 
Narrative Theory. Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, 327-346. 
40 For an excellent introduction to the history of narrativity within narratology, see David Herman, Story Logic: 
Problems and Possibilities of Narrative (Lincon: U. of Nebraska Press, 2004) 
41 See Linguistics in Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1967). Vendler identifies a typology of preferences of event 
types based on narrative genre. 
42 See Blakey Vermeule, Why Do We Care About Literary Characters? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010.  
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the collective self by an analysis of its contributing components and its necessity for self-
conception. Whereas Kim Atkins and others have argued that “narrative identity and moral 
responsibility” must go hand in hand: to be a person, in other words, demands a narrative self-
conception (363); and whereas others, including Charles Guignon, have read Heidegger’s call for 
authenticity as one distinctly narrative-bound in that it is “authentically futural to the extent that 
it clear-sightedly faces up to the inevitable truth of its own finitude and lives each moment as an 
integral component of the overall story it is shaping in its actions” (89), famously, Galen 
Strawson has stirred significant controversy by suggesting that possessing a diachronic and/or 
autobiographical memory is not sufficient for narrative selfhood (430).  
Strawson’s philosophical model for narrativity, and its accompanying critique famously 
titled “Against Narrativity,” might be thought to correspond with comparable models in fields as 
diverse—though likewise concerned with questions of definitions of the self—as cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience. For Strawson, the generation of the narrative self is realized 
through a positive relation to memory and preference for a continuously temporal form. Even if 
Strawson’s definition of normative narrative is too narrow—indeed, Matti Hyvarinen argues that 
Strawson’s argument is somewhat of a straw-man, in that it projects “conventionality and 
coherence seeking upon narrativity”, a 19th Century convention of narrative realism43—such a 
statement is crucial for various critical studies of the relation between narrative and the self, as it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Strawson’s article has been cited in nearly every subsequent conversation about narrativity and narrative identity. 
With regards to the possibility of a narrativity for a non-Diachronic self—and a general disputation of Strawsen’s 
alleged straw-man categories of narrativity as a diachronic self telling its own story, see Matti Hyvarinen, “‘Against 
Narrativity’ Reconsidered” in Rossholm Göran, Johansson Christere ed. Disputable Core Concepts of Narrative 
Theory. Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, 327-346. Strawson’s 
elements of critique are of value to our introduction of the relation between narrative and identity, even if a 
significant portion of this dissertation explores forms of narrative that do not cohere with Strawson’s narrow—and 
straw-man—postulate. 
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relativizes, by way of critical inquiry into the supposedly essential components of narrativity, 
both the necessity for and the ethical value to narrativity.44  
In his analysis, Strawson identifies four tendencies for contributing varying degrees of 
narrativity: an episodic or diachronic outlook; a form-fitting tendency; a story-telling tendency; 
and a revising tendency. Using his own self as an extreme example of a negation of each 
category—and as an implicit critique of the universality of the model and the ethical need for its 
pursuit, Strawson writes 
I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a 
respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past 
experiences ‘from the inside’, as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of 
my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. 
Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of 
concern for my future. (433) 
To engage in the productive work of constructing a narrative, for Strawson, is to adapt a 
diachronic perspective—an awareness of one’s self as “something that was there in the past and 
will be there in the future” (430), as opposed to what he calls an episodic45 perspective of the 
self, one that is absolutely discontinuous among past, present, and future selves. Even with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Strawson argues that narrativity may be figured either (or both) as descriptive or normative. According to the 
descriptive “psychological” thesis, “one may think that we are indeed deeply Narrative in our thinking,” and even if 
one does not subscribe to the normative, ethical thesis that “conceiving of one’s life as a narrative is a good thing.” 
(430) Some fields assume the psychological thesis but remain silent about ethical implications; others assume value 
for narrativity, and uncritically so; others valorize narrativity without necessitating its psychological need. While 
Strawson’s manifesto is targeted at the popular and usually positive rhetoric around a normative, ethical narrativity 
(he cites the ethical demand for a narrative self as postulated by Oliver Sacks, Daniel Dennet, and others), his 
analysis demonstrates that conceptions of a temporal self and proclivities for form underlie the fully realized 
narrative self.   
45 This use of the “episodic” stands in stark contrast to Endel Tulving’s use of the term in relation to episodic 
memory, a memory system constituted, in part, by wholeness, continuity, and awareness of a reflecting and 
recollecting self across various temporalities.  
43	  
	  
	   	  
episodic temporality of the self, however, one can still construct narrative through a certain form-
fitting tendency that reflects coherence, unity, or basic patterning (441). Story-telling is a type of 
form-fitting, but it attempts to align with “some recognized narrative genre.” (442) Finally, the 
capacity for revision is another sort of fabrication, one that varies in each self’s iteration of 
narrativity and a factor that should not be confused with autobiographical memory’s nearly 
universal movement of construction and reconstruction. Instead, revision, even unconscious, has 
more to do with the self’s capacity and proclivity for active form-finding and story-telling—a 
drive that may have more to do with self-preservation in the face of a challenging, 
unconventional, or even uninteresting self-narrative (445). Strawson’s thesis, methodology, and 
strong critical reception is a single theoretical site within a single field to examine critically 
narrative, narrative identities, and narrativity. To temper his thesis about a narrative identity that 
is, too, a narrative belief, one critical retort by Hyvarinen advocates for a crucial distinction, 
absent in Strawson’s thesis, between “being able to tell about one’s life and having a sense of 
one’s life as a narrative” (328).   
In drawing a distinction between speaking of a narrative and identifying with that 
narrative, Hyvarinen’s fine critique of Strawson echoes Tony Fisher’s careful reading of 
Heidegger’s Dasein, in which Fisher considers the possibility of narrativity for Dasein by 
making a compelling case for Dasein’s narratability apart from a necessary narrativity. 
Acknowledging that most read Heidegger as rejecting Dasein’s capacity as a “finished self, 
integrated whole, or complete identity,”46 Fisher suggests a third manner to read Heidegger that 
is distinctly phenemonelogical and attuned to an episodic consciousness, one that does not 
possess narrativity but that is freed from—and bound to—the existential demand for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Fisher cites, in this regard, Taylor Carman’s Heidegger’s analytic, interpretation, discourse, and authenticity in 
being and time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 266. 
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narratability: within each iteration of episodic consciousness, Dasein’s limits of existential 
Being-in-the-World—from thrownness to projection, in Heidegger’s temporality—must respond 
to the existentialist question: “what person ought I be?” (43) Thus, Heidegger’s insistence that 
“Dasein is precisely not to be interpreted in the differentiation of a particular existence” is 
retained—existentiality is Dasein’s primary characteristic. But its existence, in Heidegger’s 
boundedness, retains a certain moral sensibility in its incessant response, in Fisher’s reading, of 
narratability.  
At the very least, then, Strawson’s conceptions of narrativity are useful for their critical 
eye to its contributing elements. Comparable models in parallel fields investigating the nature of 
autobiographical selfhood invoke comparable requirements for narrativity. For example, 
cognitive neuroscientist Stanley B. Klein’s suggests that “to experience memory as 
autobiographical self-knowledge,” the following three components are necessary, at a minimum, 
as normative capabilities:  
1. a capacity for self-reflection…to know about my own knowing… 
2. A sense of personal agency, personal ownership… 
3. The ability to think about time as an unfolding of personal happenings centered about 
the self. (2004, 461)  
Such capacities make possible the transformation of discrete, episodic memory into 
autobiographical narrative. As they are “jointly sufficient for autobiographical memorial 
experience,” impairments in each of these registers generates a “taxonomy of amnesiac 
disorders” (460) with varying potentials for autobiographical recollection.  
 And take another model for the narrative-based autobiographical self, this time from 
Antonio Damasio who offers an evolutionary neuro-scientific hypothesis of the emerging self 
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through varying stages of consciousness. First, Damasio distinguishes between a first stage of a 
“proto self,” a state of consciousness that generates “primordial feelings” and “consists of a 
gathering of images that describe relatively stable aspects of the body and generate spontaneous 
feelings of the body,” (2010, 180) and a “core self”, which emerges “from establishing a 
relationship between the organism (as represented by the proto-self) and any part of the brain 
that represents an object-to-be-known.” (181) This core self is engaged in a sort of “narrative 
sequence”, albeit momentarily, that is constructed through the creative relation between the felt 
subject and perceived object. Finally, the third state of consciousness is one that Damasio terms 
the “autobiographical self”, a temporalized form or narrative-self, as it allows “multiple objects, 
previously recorded as lived experience or as anticipated future, to interact with the proto-self 
and produce an abundance of core pulses.” (ibid.) This speculation regarding a structured series 
of core pulses, then, emerge to coalesce into a “coherent pattern” that remains continuous and 
inter-related over a temporalized sequence—an aesthetics of autobiographical consciousness.    
Such cognitive neuro-scientific approaches are only some of the many possible routes for 
inquiring more profoundly into the epistemology of narrative identity; to survey the vast 
disciplinary fields concerned with categories and functions of narrativity would be 
overwhelming. However, at the very least, what is common to all theories of narrative identities 
is the diachronic and generic forms they adapt, sourced originarily in the Enlightenment’s 
theories of memory and popularized—and modeled—through the proliferation of early 
autobiography and fiction.  
Ultimately, for Damasio as for Klein and Strawson, such narrativity is realized through 
coherence, temporality, and the relation of the subject to the object-world, with an awareness of 
itself as such (if not a relation of the subject to itself as experiencing the object-world). And even 
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further, it should be noted, such a cognitive model reflects the Enlightenment philosophies of the 
(evolving) conception of self: all suggest that a normative narrative identity is articulated through 
a certain diachronic imaginary of self and memory. Underlying all of these models, however, is 
the critical insight regarding the possibility for self-conception beneath narrativity—and, 
perhaps, without autobiographical memory. 
When thinking through the possibilities for narrativity and narrative identity in disabled 
selves, for example, cognitive psychologists are concerned primarily with mental representations 
of the self and its disabled capacity for memory, and the contours of such representations in both 
normative and non-normative forms of narrativity. Endel Tulving has shown that pathologies of 
memory in amnesics do not necessarily affect self-conceptions of personality.47 Klein and others 
refined Tulving’s thinking, in earlier research, that episodic amnesia did not affect self-
conceptions and dispositions realized through semantic memory; and in more recent research, 
they showed that semantic trait self-knowledge may very well function independently of factual 
semantic and episodic memory.48 In one particular study, Klein and Moshe Lax showed that 
character trait resilience persisted even beyond significant memory loss in amnesics—
demonstrating an independent system of trait self-knowledge (e.g. “I react this way, because I 
am stubborn”).49 In a slightly more popular vein, Paul Eakin’s Living Autobiographically makes 
a similar case for the cultured rule-governance of a continuous self-conception, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See Endel Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness,” Canadian Psychology 26, no. 1 (1985): 1–12 and Endel 
Tulving and Martin Lepage, “Where in the Brain Is the Awareness of One’s Past?” in Memory, Brain, and Belief, 
ed. Daniel L. Schachter and Elaine Scarry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 208–29.  
48 See Stanley B. Klein, “A Self to Remember: A Cognitive Neuropsychological perspective on how self creates 
memory and memory creates self. In C. Sedikides & M.B. Brewer (eds), Individual Self, Relational Self, and 
Collective Self (Psychological Press, Philadelphia, 2001), pp. 25-46; See more recently Klein, et. al “A Social-
Cognitive Neuroscience Analysis of the Self” Social Cognition 20.2 (2002), pp. 105-135 and Klein, “The Sense of 
Diachronic Personal Identity” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12.4 (2013), 791-811. 
49 See Stanley Klein and Moshe Lax, The Unanticipated Resilience of Trait Self-Knowledge in the Face of Neural 
Damage” Memory 18 (2010), 918-948.  
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persistence of a self-conception—in a form of narrative identity—in the person of his father, a 
victim of Alzheimer’s, absent of episodic and semantic memory, though persistent through an 
abstract vehicular conception of “will.”50 And in a very recent study, echoing Eakin’s 
devastating memoir, Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols showed that the perception of identity 
(by a third party) in individuals affected by neuro-degeneration is influenced by the degree of 
perceived presence of a moral faculty far beyond the retention of semantic or episodic memory.51 
In thinking about literary performances of consciousness apart from conventional narrative 
identities, I will draw on such studies to argue for narratable consciousness apart from 
narrativity.  
Critics have noted,52 too, that such persistence of an identity theory apart from memory is 
a certain departure from Locke’s original construction of the self as one who must necessarily 
possess conscious memory of the past in order to construct a continuous history. Without 
conscious memory of the past, for Locke, such a self cannot be held responsible for the present: 
“whatever past actions [the mind] cannot…appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it 
can no more be concerned in, than if they had never been there.” (312) Present research, 
however, seems to suggest that—contrary to reigning models of narrative selves—consciousness 
of the self exceeds memory, an insight that possesses radical implications for the figuring of 
boundaries between normative and so-called disabled cognition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See Chapter 1, “Talking About Ourselves: The Rules of the Game” of Living Autobiographically: How We Create 
Identity in Narrative (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), pp. 1-59. See also Paul J. Eakin, How our lives become stories: 
Making selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999), where Eakin similarly examines the amnesiac’s narrative identity 
apart from memory. 
51 See Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols, “Neurodegeneration and Identity” in Psychological Science (2015): 
Forthcoming. (Published Online: August 12, 2015) 
52 See John Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding: A Selective Commentary on the Essay 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970). I am indebted for this critical reference in Anne Whitehead’s chapter “Memory 
and the Self” in Memory (Routledge: New York, 2009), pages 50-83.  
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And present research in narrative theory, as well as critical theory in literary studies for 
much of the twentieth century, has questioned conventional narrativity and narrative form as an 
inherently necessary, politically just, or even ethically sound. Gerald Prince famously wrote that 
“further study of narrativity constitutes perhaps the most significant task of narratology today.”53 
While “narrativity” has not been easily defined54 and has come to mean, for narrative theorists, 
degrees or kinds of narrative characteristics in a text or discourse55, Brian McHale follows a 
critical path for discerning a “weak narrativity” in postmodern texts and lyric poetry, arguing for 
a narrative sense of degree, as opposed to kind (165), and evoking the possibility for reading 
“narrative coherence while at the same time withholding commitment to it and undermining 
confidence in it.” (ibid.) 
While McHale’s argument is only interested in discerning a narrative theory for a generic 
type and a narrative theory for narrativity, more generally, others take McHale’s terminology and 
use it for disciplinary or ethical ends. Pekka Tammi, for example, worries that the nuanced 
criticism around narrativity within both cognitive and literary fields makes sweeping 
appropriations or ambitious transvaluations from one to the other “actually harmful.” (21) She 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Cited in Brian McHale, “Weak Narrativity: The Case of Avant-Garde Narrative Poetry” Narrative 9.2 (2001), 
161-67. See Gerald Prince, “Revisiting Narrativity”,  in Grenzüberschreitungen: Narratologie im Kontext / 
Transcending Boundaries: Narratology in Context. Ed. Walter Grünzweig and Andreas Solbach. Tübingen: Narr, 
1999. 43-51. 
54 See, for example, Meir Sternberg, “Narrativity: From Objectivist to Functional Paradigm” Poetics Today 31:3 
(2010), pp. 508-659. Sternberg’s first three pages are dedicated to the diverse invocations, definitions, and contexts 
to which the term “narrativity” has been assigned in the history of narrative criticism. See also the comprehensive 
collection to theories of narrativity in discourse and narratological theory: Theorizing Narrativity ed. John Pier, et. 
Al (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 2008). Stories, John Pier writes, have the dual components of both “being narrative” 
and “possessing narrativity”, a definitional and theoretical challenge to which Gerald Prince has responded in his 
categories of narrativehood (an extensional category among a class of entity) and narrativeness (an intensional 
category designating a quality of a single entity). (8). See Gerald Prince, “Narrativehood, Narrativeness, Narratavity, 
Narratability”, ibid. pp. 19-29 
55 See also the definition provided by A Companion to Narrative Theory, Ed. James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz  
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 548: “the formal and contextual qualities distinguishing narrative 
from non-narrative, or marking the degree of narrativeness in a discourse; the rhetorical principles underpinning the 
production or interpretation of narrative; the specific kinds of artifice inherent in the process of narrative 
representation.” While somewhat self-definitional, this reference attempts to echo the move of identifying 
literariness within literature popularized by 20th Century literary theorists. 
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cites Mark Turner, for example, who in his work The Literary Mind argues that the human mind 
not only constructs narrative, but constructs literary narrative, and is engaged, therefore, in the 
“construction of fiction.” (ibid.) She invokes Alan Palmer, too, who in his Fictional Minds, 
suggests as well that “we are all novelists” in our “scripted life-plans.” (21) In response to both 
Turner and Palmer, Tammi argues that privileging sequence, progression, and causality as the 
“natural” or “realist” method of story-telling undermines history as it is lived—without morals, 
certainly, and without coherence and continuity—and obfuscates the brokenness of individuated 
history, as in the instance, for example, of terminal illness narratives that demand but can’t 
achieve healing (27-28).  
Instead of appropriation, Tammi  engages in a theory of life-text reciprocity, akin to 
David Herman’s dialectical relation of the two (106-113), with the conclusion that normative, 
lived narrativity is often critiqued from within literary fiction in a weak form, citing McHale. In 
her reading of Chekhov, for example, she suggests that the narrator in “A Boring Story” 
demonstrates through a “‘weak’ narrative design” that life as narrated “involves indeterminacy 
and oscillation between boring routine, repetition, and singularities.” (37) Much like Tammi, 
Herman has posited that form-breaking is as critical to narrative identity as form-fitting. 
Ultimately, Tammi concludes that literature’s innovative effects hinge on a present but “weak” 
narrativity, one that acknowledges how “life is not shaped by a narrative...or not only a 
narrative,” but whose suggestion is to adopt and subtly alter or deconstruct such narrativity from 
within traditional and recognizable generic forms (ibid.).  
And renowned narrative theorist Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan makes a similar argument 
regarding illness—and this time, on ethical grounds. She demonstrates that the “paucity of 
fragmented narratives” in illness memoir speaks to the narrative coherence sought by those in 
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fragmented conditions; she worries that such closure-seeking, in its “implied redemptive or 
therapeutic role of telling and writing,” overwhelms the minority voices who express illness 
“without epiphanies and [through] writing that does not overcome chaos.” (24) For Rimmon-
Kenan, making space for fragmented and chaotic illness narratives is driven by an “ethical 
commitment” to lay bare “the ill subject’s vulnerability” and suggest the “limitations, even the 
hubris, of the better-structured narratives” of the illness genre. (22) 
I follow Rimmon-Kenan, Tammi, McHale, and Herman in the twofold argument that 
lived experience does not necessarily possess a literary form, nor do fictional lives necessarily 
possess  an inherent narrativity. While such critics sense the political, ethical and social 
problematics of normative narrativity aestheticized by the Enlightenment, critical theorists in 
cultural and post-colonial studies have demonstrated how insidiously present such narrativity 
operates within and subsequently reifies a swath of hegemonic discourses; indeed, the social 
sciences and humanities have long worked towards exposing the lack of difference—enforced 
through cultural amnesia—in various textual, ethical, and narratological media. Of course, for 
critical theorists of modernity, amnesia is the reigning force in a culture of reification; Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer famously proclaimed “all reification is a forgetting.”56 This is a 
theme that is later assumed by Andreas Huyssen in his work on memory and the archive, where 
he writes that “Without memory, without reading the traces of the past, there can be no 
recognition of difference (Adorno called it non-identity), no tolerance for the rich complexities 
and instabilities of personal and cultural, political and national identities.”57 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Axel Honneth reads Adorno and Horkheimer’s famous remark that “all reification is a forgetting” (Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, p. 230) as follows: “It is this element of forgetting, of amnesia, that I would like to establish as the 
cornerstone for a redefinition of the concept of reification.” (Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2008, p. 57) 
57 Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 1994), 252. 
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Reading Romantic Autobiography for Wandering 
	  
Modern critiques of narrativity abound in both contemporary narrative theory and literary 
and cultural studies, recovering the lost, suppressed memories of stories told and lives 
represented otherwise. In turning back, however, to the very inception of modern narrativity in 
the form of Romantic autobiography, I demonstrate that wandering present in such narratives—
both in body and mind as well as in deliberate narrative structure—makes possible its own 
critique of normative narrativity through the performance of cognizing selves apart from 
narrativity. In suggesting such a reading not only of wandering but for wandering—of reading 
within autobiography for moments of wandering—I offer a counter-reading to the hegemonic 
discourse around stable, diachronic, autobiographical selves.  
 The Enlightenment, as noted above, is the philosophical precursor to the emerging 
discourse around a distinctly continuous and creative conception of the narrative self. Locke, on 
the one hand, projects continuity of the self through diachronicity; Hume, on the other, postulates 
the necessarily creative work of memory and levels memory with the imaginary faculty. What 
emerges subsequently is the early form of modern autobiography, memoir, and narrative, first by 
the hand of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 18th Century, and then by the subsequent history of 
Romanticism, represented here in the work of William Wordsworth and Thomas de Quincey. In 
what follows, I review this early history of narrative identity told in autobiographical prose and 
poetry, noting the prominent contextual and structural feature to this project of wandering both in 
body and in mind, and the dynamic relation between memory and narrative within such 
structures of wandering58. I conclude that wandering, as represented in Romantic and modernist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Of course, I acknowledge that excellent summaries of the aesthetics and cultural criticism of geographical 
Romanticisms exist, most notably Andrew Cusack’s monograph on German Romanticism, a study to which 
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autobiography, is figured prominently as a deep cognitive structure and a significant precursor—
both structural and aesthetic—to contemporary fictions of wandering59.  
Rousseau initiates his retrospective Confessions (1770, 1781),60 a work that begins in its 
life-long memoir in the year of his birth, 1712, with the humble quip: “Simply myself,” (1) an 
ambitious claim to both a profoundly simple and idiosyncratically singular and accurate self-
portrait that attempts, according to traditional criticism, the expression of an “inner truth”61—a 
novel and even groundbreaking fusion of subjectivity and narrativity.  He then proceeds with 
confidence that he will present this very work, The Confessions, as a representation of his very 
being, with an admission to its blindspots, erasures, and general forgetfulness. As he imagines 
himself in an afterlife, handing this written work to “my Sovereign Judge”, he projects the 
following proclamation: 
Here is what I have done, and if by chance I have used some immaterial embellishment it 
has been only to fill a void due to a defect of memory. I may have taken for fact what was 
no more than probability, but I have never put down as true what I knew to be false. I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sebald’s Romantic sensibilities are certainly indebted. Still, the purpose of the following introduction is to simply 
identify salient structures and aesthetics common to the genre as we proceed further in our study of contemporary 
fictions of wandering. For further reading on the German movement and its intellectual geneaology, see Andrew 
Cusack, The Wanderer in 19th Century Literature (Camden House: Rochester, 2008). 
59 An excellent history of the wanderer in Romantic German literature exists, and while the geneaology that I 
construct here is focused around certain aesthetic questions, a comprehensive survey of the figure of the wanderer in 
various Romanticisms is far too ambitious of a project for the present. One need only start with Caspar David 
Friedrich’s now iconic painting, Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer , to acknowledge that the figure of 
Romanticism, however imagined, is originaily that of the wanderer. However, for an excellent history of the 
Romantic wanderer in the German Romantic tradition, see Andrew Cusack. The Wanderer in Nineteeth-Century 
German Literature: Intellectual History and Cultural Criticism. Studies in German Literature, Linguistics, and 
Culture. (Rochester: Camden House, 2008). Cusack does a fantastic job exploring the poetics of aimlessness (as 
opposed to teleological processes and purposes) in the history of the Urbildungsroman. Within the varied contexts 
of his study, Cusack shows that wandering has been figured as a performance of historical analysis, as an 
exploration of infinity, as a process of political and social instability, and as an innovative form of recreation.  
60 The work was completed in 1770 but only published posthumously in 1781. 
61 See, for example, Jean Starobinski’s Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction Trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1988), 188.  
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have displayed myself as I was, as vile and despicable when my behavior was such, as 
good, generous, and noble when I was so. (1) 
From the start, Rousseau’s life confessions include a formal confession about their contents’ 
flawed nature, a problematic that Rousseau himself attributes to a “defect of memory” or a 
creative tendency to include probabilities instead of fact. It is an apology as much for his 
depraved “vile and despicable” self in the memoir as for his inaccuracy in its record. His is an 
apology, too, for memory as such, and the possibility for an authentic account in its narration62.   
Given his reflexivity and self-consciousness regarding the comprehensibility of his 
narrative,  it is noteworthy that Rousseau finds great joy in recounting his extensive travels by 
foot. Indeed, he laments that what he regrets the most, throughout his life, is “that I did not keep 
diaries of my travels.” (157) For, he claims, never did he exist “so vividly, experience so much” 
as when he took journeys “alone and on foot.” What he enjoyed the most about these wanderings 
were their overall aimlessness—that is, “the absence of everything that makes me feel my 
dependence, of everything that recalls me to my situation.” (158)  
This sort of wandering, he suggests in a following clause, offers true creative agency, as 
it allows him to combine and re-combine the bare materials of the object-world and of his 
subject- memory—at his own will: “all these serve to free my spirit, to lend me a greater 
boldness to my thinking, to throw me so to speak, in the vastness of things, so that I can combine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Rousseau has great precedent for the admission of failed memory, in the literary history of the confession, from 
the founder of the genre, St. Augustine. For Augustine, only what can be recalled or remembered must be confessed; 
that which was part of Augustine’s “savage days” of extreme youth are exempted: in his words “it is lost in the 
darkness of my forgetfulness” (10). Yet, with the confession of his consciously recalled sins, Augustine claims a 
forgiveness of “evil and nefarious deeds” (32)—and in doing so, by recalling his sins to memory, his “soul feels no 
fear from the recollection” (32). See Saint Augustine, “Book I”, Confessions Trans. Hendry Chadwick (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1991), pp. 10-32 Huntington Williams notes such precedent in his book-length study of Romantic 
autobiography; he argues, however, that Rousseau only follows Augustine “in form” (183). See his Rousseau and 
Romantic Autobiography, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983). 
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them, select them, and make them mine as I will.” (158) Through his peripatetic wanderings, his 
acts of discovery—of self and other—in his travels rehearse the very routes of his own writing 
and recollection of experience—or at least idealized as such. Frederic Gros, in his Philosophy of 
Walking, has characterized Rousseau’s propensity for walking—sometimes aimlessly—as a form 
of self-discovery by way of dissolution, “losing yourself the better to hear your heart, to feel the 
first man palpitating within you,” (76) discovering a “walking man” as “natural man, one not 
disfigured by culture, education, art: man as he would have been before books or salons, before 
society or paid labor.” (73) 
There is a sense that Rousseau wants to discover all and tell all in his Confessions without 
selectivity and reimagining—a popular reading of Rousseau’s confidence exemplified by 
Frederic Gros in a typical gloss of Rousseau’s Idealism. There is also a complementary and 
complicating sense that his fear of not telling “everything” (170) has much more to do with his 
own experience of the medium of narration, and less to do with the supposedly bare, objective 
materials of memory and the world. His Confessions, in that sense, are quite selective in their 
intuitive “choice” of subject matter and exposition—what is most important, as a critical sense in 
his countryside wandering, is that he should not “foresee that I should have ideas. They arrive 
when they please, not when it suits me.” (158) A remembered childhood anecdote allegorizes 
such a dynamic in its cognitive performance: Rousseau recounts a “childish notion” (230) that 
prompted the tossing of an apple at a tree at close proximity in order to glean an omen of his own 
salvation. Such playfulness regarding the construction of a future performs this very notion of an 
artificial and creative construction of memory. Of course, for Frances Ferguson and other readers 
of the Romantics, the definition of ‘romantic memory’ is “seeing a past that one didn’t 
experience at the time of its occurrence.” (533) While Rousseau is clearly generating memory in 
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the passages cited above and in what follows, I add the notion that such cognitive leaps are 
brought into an embodied relation with his journeying—and usually aimless—mobility.  
Indeed, towards the very end of his life, Rousseau foregrounds the critical practice of 
walking as the structuring means for generative imagination and thoughtful discovery in his final 
book-length memoir Reveries of the Solitary Walker (1782). Though the stated goal of this 
record, as Rousseau writes is to “describe my habitual state of mind,” he affirms that he “could 
think of no simpler or surer way of carrying out my plan than to keep a faithful record of my 
solitary walks and the reveries that occupy them, when I give free reign to my thoughts and let 
my ideas follow their natural course, unrestricted and unconfirmed.” (35) Thus, unlike his 
Confessions’ greater philosophy of memory within the context of walking, Reveries realizes a 
greater philosophy of walking within the structures of thinking. His reveries, much as his 
narrative identity of the Confessions, are diversely focused or scattered, depending on the nature 
of quietude, flux, or interruption as he proceeds on his walks.   
Just as Rousseau sets the stage to insure his own salvation, he carefully rewrites (or, one 
could say, writes for the first time) his own life’s story through means of wandering about a 
conventional temporality. As he puts it, wandering provokes the possibility for bare experience, 
and bare experience catalyzes the later formation of memory in a present recollection. 
Wandering is thus figured as a form of collection of experience; memory’s activity is figured as a 
collation of that experience. Such collation requires a persistence of activity, even mobility: 
travel’s pleasures stem from the immersion within the “vastness of things,” a state of being that 
spurs the work of memory “to combine them, select them, and make them mine as I will.” 
Confessions and Reveries thus acknowledge the construction of memory retrospectively through 
a means and method that is distinctly spurred by traveling bodies and mobile and nimble minds.  
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Rousseau’s system of recollection is selective in that it does not contain everything he 
may have perceived or felt, but it is organic in his insistence that his ideas and experiences that 
are worthy of recollection originate in an unknown place within his own mind. In some sense, 
wandering forward, this is the very dialectic with which Wordsworth seems to struggle: how 
does one make sense of the selves in prior temporalities from one’s own, present mind? 
Rousseau’s affirmation of such a possibility—with its awareness of a complicity in utilizing the 
imagination—demonstrates his own method of resolution: the collection of present experience 
takes place beneath consciousness, but the recollection of experience is still both retrospective 
and strongly subjective. Like Hume before him and Wordsworth and De Quincey after him, 
Rousseau noticed that memory only occurs in the active site of the present’s circuitous motion 
and is not shaped by a self that is continuously static from past to present.  
Written within a similar philosophical tradition but in a very different literary mode, 
William Wordsworth’s notion of the wandering mind63, as manifest in his autobiographical texts, 
appears at moments of meditation on the nature of memory as well as in moments of recollection 
of experience while, too, reflecting on his thoughts gleaned from his own walking practice. 
Unable to locate experience in what was once-inspiring poetry, he offers a controlling metaphor 
for recalling the memory of an experience of being enthralled by poetry as that of an empty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 In relation to such wandering, I would be amiss if I were not to mention one contemporaneous Romantic, John 
Thelwall—a influence upon Wordsworth’s who has been marginalized, historically, in the study of the period—and 
his book-length essay on The Peripatetic (1793). In his diverse reveries in which he finds occasions for poetic, 
philosophical, and political reflections. Thelwall interrupts his thoughts, in the voice of his narrator, Sylvanus 
Theophrastus, to apologize to the reader for his digressive mode: “Dear Reader, If, in the foregoing digressions, I 
should appear, according to thy better judgment, to have wandered too far from the point, thou wilt be kind enough 
to remember, that, as I am only a foot traveler, the bye path to the right and left is always open to me as the turnpike 
road…(105) Here, Thelwall clearly foregrounds his character’s contemplative practice with his practice of embodied 
traveling, noting how his cognitive processes are spurred by his walking practice. While Thelwall has received his 
historical due as an important Romantic, his philosophy of the embodied walk as cognitive performance reads as a 
prototype for Wordsworth’s. For a book-length study, see the recent John Thelwall’s ‘The Peripatetic’ Ed. Judith 
Thompson (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 2001)  
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“theatre / fresh emptied of spectators” (574-575), a site through which Wordsworth generates his 
own poetry that contains within it certain memorable experiences that paradoxically 
acknowledge the impossibility for capturing experience. And while the poetry in The Prelude is 
certainly autobiographical, the moments that seek to instruct us about or convey particular 
memorable experiences resist narrative coherency and tend towards—and even center 
themselves in—narrative fragmentariness and structural wandering. Instead, Wordsworth seems 
to suggest that his experience of moving towards achieving a lofty experience is disappointed 
upon noticing the absence of a recognizable experience, and so in his poetic recollection, he 
wanders about such a narrative blindspot, drifting through an act of signification that might be 
better characterized as one of non-correspondence—wandering among signs absent signification 
and narrative articulation of experience. 
 In this light, consider the passage in Book Sixth in which Wordsworth describes his 
passing through the Alps, an illuminating but demystifying experience. When he first beholds the 
summit of Mont Blanc, Wordsworth records that the group had “To have a soulless image on the 
eye / Which had usurped upon a living thought.” (454-455) Here, Wordsworth first mourns a 
loss of an imaginative capacity: now that he beholds an objective and deadened “image” of the 
peak, he could no longer enjoy “a living thought”—dynamic and ever-changing imaginary 
thoughts of its varying possibilities. As a loss of imagination that is almost immediately 
“reconcil’d” (461) by the beauty of the vista, its movement prefigures the discovery of a greater 
absence to follow. He recollects a  “far different dejection” (491) experienced upon ascending 
and crossing the Alps. In fact, the discovery that he had “crossed the Alps” (524) unknowingly 
(he and his crew had questioned and then followed a “peasant” (513), and had, by chance, 
arrived at and passed their destination) acts as an important poetic trope for experience and 
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recollection of experience more generally. For Wordsworth, in this passage, discovers that the 
myth of achieving such an experience is always-already undermined—in fact, it is precisely in 
the eluding of such narrative production that allows for a direct experience with “the invisible 
world” (536) of his own cognition. In other words, by bracketing the expectation of any 
experience Wordsworth realizes directly his imagination; all experience becomes non-
progressive, and therefore fragmentary. With this realization, there is no beginning, middle, or 
end, to the story—the “climax”, as it were, never happens. Such ambulatory wandering, realized 
both in body and mind, generates for Wordsworth a certain blindness to normative experience, 
much as Hume and Rousseau acknowledged before him, and as fellow Romantic and lifelong 
friend Thomas De Quincey acknowledges after him. Such blindness is an aesthetic product of an 
active mind seeking the site of experience in recollection—and it is an important narrative 
feature to which we will return in considering later in this study the contemporary narratives of 
wandering.  
Blindness by structural cognitive interposition recurs, too, in De Quincey’s opium-
infected mind meandering and peripatetic movements through the streets of London in his 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821). For example, De Quincey’s meditation on his 
misplacement of his childhood friend Anne, as he wanders the streets of London, is haunted by 
the possibility of her simultaneous proximity and distance; he writes how “if she lived, doubtless 
we must have been sometimes in search of each other, at the very same moment, through the 
mighty labyrinths of London; perhaps even within a few feet of each other…” (34) An echo of 
this non-encounter is heard in De Quincey’s acknowledgment while approaching Eton, that 
while he approached the Heath, he and the “accursed murderer” who had both been roaming free 
that night “might at every instant be unconsciously approaching each other through the 
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darkness.” (29) Again, the possibility of meeting another, of being confronted by an unexpected 
figure—spectral or real—is both part of the deeply associative narrative structure of the 
Confessions and part of De Quincey’s own fears and torturous mind-scapes. 
Such veiled blindness to a telos—that is, the dwelling within an “interspace” (ibid.) or 
time-space suspended in time,64 is in fact deeply desired in the Confessions; De Quincey writes 
that “I wished in my blindness” (35), that is, he realizes retrospectively how he preferred a 
certain opacity and lack of closure. The pleasure of interposition, of labyrinthine walking—of 
what Walter Benjamin calls the schooled loss of one’s way in a city as in a forest (Berlin 53)65— 
requires a certain intention and purposefulness and seems to anticipate the privileged flanerie of 
Benjamin’s strolls at the turn of the Twentieth Century. Perhaps it is principally expressed, in my 
reading of the Confessions, in one of De Quincey’s pleasures in which he partakes while affected 
by opium: that of the music of the stage, the orchestra, and of the voices of and at the opera. 
These pleasures are the materials of signifiers, to cite Jameson’s characterization of 
postmodernism, in that their form exceeds their function: the language of operatic music is 
language relegated to the non-functional realm of art; and their content is unknown and their 
languages are foreign to him. De Quincey’s preferred participation in such pleasures while on 
opium is itself a commentary on the nature of his philosophical reveries: he luxuriates in those 
(non)spaces, (non)times, and (non)languages that exist as nakedly wrested from their usual 
contexts.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Of course, one is reminded by such a formulation of Levinas’s errancy—the site of aesthetic perception. See my 
discussion of Levinas in Chapter 1.  
65 See, for example, Walter Benjamin, “Tiergarten,” Berlin Childhood in 1900. Trans. Howard Eiland (Cambridge, 
Harvard UP, 2006), 53. 
66 To consider these pleasures even further: it is significant that De Quincey enjoys the chatter of the Italian women 
at the Opera for the musicality of their language: he claims not to comprehend the signification of their language, 
but he does enjoy the form of the language—in and of itself. Similar to Stein’s ear for the rhythm in all languages, 
De Quincey contextualizes this aural pleasure with the statement that “a succession of musical sounds is to me like a 
collection of Arabic characters: I can attach no ideas to them.” (45) Thus, music functions for De Quincey as an 
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Through the ambient musicality of the opera, its orchestra, and even its inhabitants, De 
Quincey suggests that he can weave a whole re-collection of his past life—not through an act of 
memory, but through an alternative mode of surface textures in the music itself: Luxuriating in 
these melodies, De Quincey comes to discover a singular truth about memory, confession, and of 
course, autobiography:  
It is sufficient to say, that a chorus, etc. of elaborate harmony, displayed before me, as in 
a piece of arras work, the whole of my past life—not, as if recalled by an act of memory, 
but as if present and incarnated in the music: no longer painful to dwell upon: but the 
detail of its incidents removed, or blended in some hazy abstraction; and its passions 
exalted, spiritualized, and sublimed. [italics mine] (45-46) 
Within a nearly synesthetic conflation of the aural and visual, De Quincey imagines his past life 
as taking place in a non-representative, but visualized and textured surface of music. When he 
experiences this viscerally and immediately, he notes that it is “no longer painful to dwell upon” 
because “the detail of its incident [is] removed, or blended in some hazy abstraction.” Such 
recollection does not bring with it pain, as it does not contain the prior emotional explanations or 
previous interpretations ascribed to given events. Instead, the memory experienced here is non-
narratalogical inasmuch as it is non-verbal: it is “displayed,” as it were, visually, and the purely 
visual, that is, the gesture, cannot contain within it explication. Afterlives of reading these 
Benjaminian cloudy spots are left for the critic, instead.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
artistic mode that defies representation or signification. Similarly, De Quncey recalls the intervals during the  
Operatic performance as offering a similar musical pleasure: “I had all around me, in the intervals of the 
performance, the music of the Italian language talked by Italian women: for the gallery was usually crowded with 
Italians: and I listened with a pleasure…for the less you understand of a language, the more sensible you are to the 
melody or harshness of its sounds.” (46) 
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In sum, then, De Quincey desires a form of being that is itself blind to its context—that 
is, it is inherently fragmentary in its disavowal to narrative sequencing; and he desires a form of 
recollection that is blind to localized context or interpretation—a form of remembering best 
embodied by the textures of music or untainted images. As a theoretician and practitioner of 
autobiography, then, De Quincey intuits the generic problematic later articulated by modernists 
such as Gertrude Stein and Walter Benjamin: how does one write a story or narrative within or 
about a history that is necessarily fragmentary? The answer, as De Quincey articulates in the 
Confessions, is to construct his life and memory blindingly and therefore fragmentarily—without 
context and sequence, and without inherent interpretation. In other words, to do so by embracing 
a cognitive, embodied, and narratological structure of wandering that generates distinctly 
decontextualized, and yet sensory textures of memory. 
Modernist Autobiography: Inheriting Wandering Form 
	  
While DeQuincey, as well as Wordsworth and Rousseau, don’t ventriloquize their 
autobiographical voices into a third-person form of radical exteriority, I will close this chapter by 
suggesting that modern autobiography, in the experimental form and theoretical concerns of 
Gertrude Stein’s Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, foregrounds the motions of wandering and 
fragmentation nascent in its Romantic progenitors. Like De Quincey, Stein’s text does not 
represent mimetically but instead mimics the visible—and luxuriates within—the rhythms of its 
own textual world. Furthermore, to meet the formal challenges of the autobiography as 
necessarily fragmentary, her text performs a roving narrative voice that feigns a radical 
exteriority to the autobiographical subject and her milieu. Finally, much as Wordsworth and 
Rousseau before her suggested, the work of memory is itself one fraught with blindspots and 
saturated with its present preferences to such a degree, in Stein’s work, that memory itself 
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unfolds as a sort of fragmentary becoming, denying certain closure, as well as exposing these 
sites of incoherence as both counter-narratives to conventional narrativity and new avenues of 
literary and self reproduction.  
Stein’s text not only falters in the face of, but flaunts the traditional expectations of the 
genre of autobiography as possessing a narrative voice that is continuous, coherent, and faithful 
to the story of its author’s life. One need not look very far to discern Stein’s intentions in so 
doing. In Toklas’s parroted voice, Stein is described during the summer of 1912 as gradually 
shifting her style from a focus on interiority—”the insides of people, their character and what 
went on inside them” to an absolute exteriority—”a desire to express the rhythm of the visible 
world,” (119) echoing De Quincey’s earlier propensity for the textures of the visible. According 
to Toklas, Stein “was, [and] always is, tormented by the problem of the external and the 
internal”, that is the problem of expressing an impossibly unknowable subjectivity. It is for this 
reason that Stein proclaims that “the human being essentially is not paintable.” (ibid.) Thus, 
while Toklas concludes that Stein has always “made her chief study people and therefore the 
never ending series of portraits,” (ibid.) “never ending” offers an over-determined gloss to the 
barrage of literary portraits produced by Stein in her lifetime, an important thematic of 
fragmentary non-closure.  
Similarly, in his discussion of Stein’s grammar study “Sentences and Paragraphs,” Steven 
Meyer sees a certain move towards an experimental grammar that played with fragmentariness in 
what he calls Stein’s innovative “paragraphing” (102); this preference for the fragment in textual 
composition and portraiture is emphasized early in her study when she famously proclaims that 
“A sentence is not emotional a paragraph is” (1931, 25) and proceeds to contend that a paragraph 
is traditionally determined by the succession of sentences that creates a certain rhythm—or 
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exudes a certain emotion: “[O]ne sentence coming after another sentence makes a succession and 
the succession if it has a beginning a middle and an ending as a paragraph has does form create 
and limit an emotion.” (23) Instead of a traditional paragraph that generates an emotion as one 
that necessarily contains a progression of sentences, a paragraph no longer requires “the ‘internal 
balancing’ of individual sentences.” (Meyer 102) By differentiating between the rhythm of 
succession and the syntax of progression—”do not forget that…succeeding one thing succeeding 
another thing is succeeding and having a beginning a middle and an ending is entirely another 
thing” (1931, 32)—Stein is able to craft the non-progressive paragraph, that is, the paragraph that 
maintains rhythm, but is entirely self-contained and non-progressive.  
In so doing, she anticipates Jameson’s study of schizophrenic “reading” in the 
postmodern age as an affect of “intensities” in both the “breakdown of the signifying chain” and 
the bare experience of “pure material signifiers.” Much like Jameson, Stein’s work is not only 
grammatical or cognitive, but it speaks to the breakdown of biographical experience that can no 
longer be narrated from the inside, as it were, of signification. What remains is Jamesonian 
collage of external intensities.  
 As a mode of writing that is itself fragmentary inasmuch as it is without ends—or 
beginnings, for that matter—Stein’s autobiographical composition is at once fragmentary self-
portraiture and a study of modernist aesthetics, extending to the art objects that saturate the work. 
While Stein “has a horror of people” who value the unbreakable in art, she finds in Cezanne’s 
work a wholeness in its strangely unfinished sense, with a frame as the sole indicator of 
completion (1990, 34), a trope that foreshadows the fragmentary modernism narrated and 
performed in an interaction between Stein and Picasso. Indeed, the curious history of Picasso’s 
portrait of Stein is recorded as follows: Stein had posed for the portrait “ninety times,” (45) but 
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dissatisfied with Stein’s head as represented in the portrait, Picasso had “painted out the whole 
head.” (53) (“I can’t see you any longer when I look, he said irritably” (25).) And then, upon 
returning to Paris from Spain, “painted the head in without having seen Gertrude Stein again.” 
(57) Neither could remember what “the head looked like” after he had painted it out, but both 
were “content” with the final version. Upon Stein’s arrival, Picasso’s first, harsh reaction was to 
protest her departure from his portrait; his second and softened response was “mais, quand meme 
tout y est, all the same it is all there.” (ibid.) 
This particularly nebulous anecdotal record of Picasso’s spoken resolution allows for a 
re-thinking of much of Picasso’s and Stein’s body of portraiture, as well as a greater theory of 
modernism predicated on both fragmentation and hermeneutical possibility. The referent to the 
final “there” in “it is all there” is left as unspecific and over-determined: it might refer to Stein’s 
affected face, to the perceived comparative defect in Picasso’s portrait of Stein’s present look, or 
to an unknown conceptual abstraction that was imagined as lacking. While the ultimate referent 
is, in the end, unknowable, I suggest that the problem and resolution here posed by Picasso 
reflects a greater thematic concern to the writing of autobiography. How does one create a 
faithful self-portrait that remains temporally bound, or closed to its own futurity? In other words, 
if haircuts can change, so can modes of thinking, personality characteristics, and ways of being. 
Picasso’s response to this fundamental problem to the genre of portraiture is two-fold. On the 
one hand, “it is all there” means that Stein’s portrait exists in-and-of-itself—it marks a particular 
temporality that departed from its objective source in the moment of its composition; yet it is all 
there as it faithfully commemorates that terminal temporality. On the other hand, “all there” 
stands as a statement of inclusion; as opposed to delineating terminal and differentiated 
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temporalities, “all there” connotes certain omnipresence, or a sense that all potential futurities lie 
latent in the portrait.  
To interrogate the first reading further: “all there” means that the work is complete even 
without context and even without temporal closure, that is, subjective narrative coherence to an 
outside, objective source or setting. In this sense, it is a fragment, and it is a masterpiece. Hans-
Jost Frey writes of the theoretical fragment—literary or otherwise—that “the fragment has 
meaning when it can be brought into a context within which it fulfills a task. But the fragment is 
what it is precisely because there is no context for it.” (25) He has likewise written that without 
futurity for the fragment, “incompletion does not create any expectation, but starts one waiting 
far from any object of expectation.” (58) Thus, to be truly fragmentary is to exist apart from 
whole-ness and without context; it is also to engage an aesthetics of waiting that is, too, a 
wandering within an axis of spatiality.  
Further, in Stein’s own reading of the fragment’s non-temporality, in its waiting that is a 
wandering in its non-becoming, she discerns the potential for a masterwork. In her 1936 lecture 
“What are master-pieces, and why are there so few of them?”, Stein claims that master-pieces 
exist because they came to be as something that is an end in itself and in that respect it is 
opposed to the business of living which is relation and necessity. That is what a master-
piece is not although it may easily be what a master-piece talks about. It is another one of 
the curious difficulties a master-piece has that is to begin and end, because actually a 
master-piece does not do that it does not begin and end if it did it would be of necessity 
and in relation and that is just what a master-piece is not. (308) 
 
In other words, master-pieces do not exist in relation to anything other than themselves, nor do 
they contain a particular sort of internal narrative coherence—a beginning and an ending, or a 
temporality in realizing contextual closure. In a word, master-pieces operate like Frey’s 
conception of the fragment: they are fragmentary, and without reason. In Frey’s words, 
“Understanding the fragment means: understanding its incompleteness…when the fragment 
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contains in itself the reason why it is unfinished, it stops being a fragment.” (25) Thus, Picasso’s 
indecipherable satisfaction with his portrait is intentionally inexplicable: the fragment cannot be 
understood narratively or in context; it simply is. Or, it is simply “all there”. 
 To return to the second gloss of Picasso’s resolution: “all there” connotes a certain 
inclusiveness of the potentiality of his portrait. In other words, his portrait allows for the 
objective departure in Stein’s new hair-dress because it anticipates multiplicity in its state of 
potentiality. This, I suggest is the very substance of wandering: movement uninterested in 
progression, a foregrounding of bare potentiality without the foreclosure of a master-narrative—
the product of other forces—seeking closure.  
 This opening towards nothing, this wandering forth and about, carries with it a certain 
ethical grounding. Giorgio Agamben, in writing on “the point of departure for any discourse on 
ethics,” establishes the discourse with the negative foundation that “there is no essence, no 
historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny, that humans must enact and realize.” 
(Community 43) The flipside, what is made possible, in other words, is an “ethical experience 
(which, as such, cannot be a task or a subjective decision) is the experience of being (one’s own) 
potentiality, of being (one’s own) possibility—exposing, that is, in every form one’s own 
amorphousness and in ever act one’s own inactuality.” (44) In other words, the ethical 
experience is to both admit the fragmentation of subjectivity and to make possible one’s singular 
potentiality. Narrativity, in its demand for destiny, tasks, and subjective decisions, undermines 
the base of this ethical imperative.  
  In this sense, Picasso’s portrait acts as an essential base or blueprint from which disparate 
futures or histories might be traced. Not only Picasso’s visual portrait of Stein, but Stein’s 
literary and oblique self-portrait achieve this radical hermeneutic potentiality through their 
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distinctly modernist insistence on non-representation in their portraiture of exterior rhythms, 
gestures, and surfaces.  
 Stein makes space for such an experience of potentiality in a reflexive note, via Toklas, 
about her visual capacity for anticipating and finalizing artistic representation. Toklas tells us 
that Stein “never knows how a thing is going to look until it is done”; in fact, “she cannot draw 
anything.” (76) Of course, Stein is quite equipped to draw—she does so all through her 
anatomical sketches in Medical school. Instead, what Stein indicates here regarding her inability 
to draw is related to a deeper anxiety regarding the act of whole and complete representation as a 
form of mastery, when she states just a few sentences later that “she felt no relation between the 
object and the piece of paper.” (ibid.) 
As shown earlier, words were equally arbitrary signifiers for Stein. In terms of their 
signification, we might apply the very same terms with which Stein refused visual 
representation: she saw no connection between the word or signifier on the page and a 
supposedly fixed signified. The use of writing—and here, again, Stein anticipates Jameson’s 
schiziophrenic aesthetic perception, though in the form of intentional creation—was within the 
linguistic and non-pictoral space of the sentence: the realm of syntax, rhythm, and internal poetic 
play. The performance of writing, in other words, wanders forth and about in Stein’s unfolding 
process.  
Similar to Stein’s later critique of the progressive paragraph mentioned earlier in terms of 
her refusal to sequence progressive sentences, Stein was solely interested in internal coherence 
and relation within syntactical structures—be they sentences or paragraphs67. This interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67Admittedly, the same critique could apply to the stability and implicit sequencing within particular words 
composed of roots, suffixes, etc. However, Stein herself later writes about herself that “the use of fabricated words 
offended her, it was an escape into imitative emotionalism” (119). Thus, the realm of her experimentation was 
minimally syntactical on the level of the sentence. 
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linguistic rhythm instead of signification stems from an inherent ear for the musicality in 
language apart from the communication achieved by language—echoing De Quincey’s opium-
fueled reveries. This is expressed well through Toklas’s eyes upon her first getting to know 
Gertrude Stein in Paris: 
When I first knew Gertrude Stein in Paris I was surprised never to see a french book on 
her table, although there were always plenty of english ones, there were even no french 
newspapers. But do you never read french, I as well as many other people asked her. No, 
she replied, you see I feel with my eyes and it does not make any difference to me what 
language I hear, I don’t hear a language, I hear tones of voice and rhythms, but with my 
eyes I see words and sentences and there is for me only one language and that is english. 
(70) 
 
While her final comment regarding her singular use of the English language requires further 
explication, I would like to first focus on her insistence that she does not hear a particular 
language; her aural sense is universal in that it hears only “tones of voice and rhythms”. This 
claim, of course, is not entirely literal; of course, Stein communicated verbally and aurally with 
those around her. Instead, I take this claim as a suggestion towards a new sense of language’s 
underlying “communicability” apart from its signification, a suggestion Walter Benjamin has 
made in his early essay “On Language as such and On the Language of Man” (1916).  
 In his explication of Benjamin’s theory of communicability, Gasche writes “Beyond the 
Cratylian alternatives of understanding the word either as a means to designate things different 
from it or as expressing immediately the essence of things themselves, communicability refers to 
the speech act in the word.” (67) Thus, the “speech act”, the gesture of speaking itself—as 
Benjamin reads Kafka’s opacity—that underlies all languages; it is this communicability, then, 
this cadence within which Stein’s aurality exists, that language can continue to perform an 
artistic function. Of interest to us is this gestural sense: as in Benjamin’s reading of Kafka’s 
fiction, these gestures are cloudy in the sense that they are impossible to properly contain or 
69	  
	  
	   	  
explicate; yet, in their eternal interpretability, they manage to generate a potentiality unfounded 
in ordinary language. To relate, then, the metaphors of the linguistic to the visual, or the spoken 
to the textual, one might relate the aforementioned sense of “communicability” underlying 
language to the “gesture” underlying the visual. Both forms refuse to signify, but both express—
or foreground—a certain rhythm latent within all language or all visual representation.  
Stein’s use for English then is when it is radically decontexualized, when it becomes 
irrelevant to everyone besides herself: 
One of the things that I have liked all these years is to be surrounded by people who 
know no English. It has left me more intensely alone with my eyes and my English. I do 
not know if it would have been possible to have English be so all in all[emphasis mine] 
to me otherwise…I like living with so very many people and being all alone with English 
and myself. (70) 
 
Instead of being a language that communicates the mundane—or that communicates at all—
English remains for Stein a self-contained poetic palate within which she can experiment (127). 
Thus, Stein avoids the modernist questions of linguistic signification by alienating her own 
language from its speakers, by making it, in some sense, a linguistic material. Further, and of 
interest to our inquiry regarding the fragmentary nature of Stein’s language and greater project of 
self-portraiture, Stein describes the isolation of English as allowing a personal sense of English 
become “so all in all to me”. Of course, such language recalls the very same words with which 
Stein uses elsewhere to denote a master-piece and with which Picasso comforts himself upon 
noting the stylistic distinction between the hairstyle of his portrait-Stein and of the living Stein. 
In other words, to decontextualize the English language, to render it self-contained, Stein had to 
imagine “her” English as an entirely irrelevant form of communication. Thus, Stein’s English 
language could stand as a medium (as it were) for the expression of literary masterpieces. And to 
follow Picasso’s comment (“it is all there”) mentioned above, such linguistic expression is 
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entirely exclusive in that it does not promise an obvious narrative coherence; it is inclusive, 
however, it that it enacts a verbal gesture a la Kafka: it allows for an eternal read-ability and 
interpretability by insisting on both familiar language and interpretive opacity. 
To reflect more broadly on Stein’s autobiographical text, then: the nature of her 
presentation performs a radical exteriority: it insists on her life-story told from the “outside”, as it 
were, by the voice of Alice B. Toklas. This exteriority is necessary, Stein maintains, for the 
direct translation of self onto paper is impossible, given the nature of writing: writing does not 
strive to represent, but rather mimic the rhythms of the world, as perceived from the outside. 
Further, the rhythmic nature of Stein’s text must be both self-contained and must mimic the 
world it reflects: within the nature of its unique composition—its digressions, repetitions, and 
irresolutions—her autobiographical text strives to capture the rhythm of particular places, 
moments, and times in which Stein (and Toklas) was present. Finally, this sort of composition, as 
Stein might say, strives to achieve what is both master-piece and fragment: as an autobiography 
told from the “outside”, as a wandering narrative that revels in the textures of language but 
denies closure, it insists on the impossibility of interpretation and narrativization; in a sense, it 
strives to achieve what a documentary film might capture—sans narrator.  
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Chapter 2: Memory’s Wandering Ethics—A Postmodernist Ontology 
As a byproduct of waiting and non-closure in the original form of modern narrative, Romantic 
autobiography, memory, and even perception itself, are left to wander. With such wandering 
taken to its logical conclusion, normative, transparent, or essentialist self-conception, in the 
genre of Modernist autobiography, is subsequently called into question. The last chapter 
established that in an ethical sense, wandering narrative cognition is the human experience of 
lived and even narrated non-closure, and a pre-requisite for such radical waiting—and its 
accompanying potentiality—is its absolution of destiny. I use the term destiny purposefully: 
Giorgio Agamben has opined that destiny forecloses a certain ethics: 
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that 
there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans 
must enact or realize. This is the only reason why something like an ethics can exist, 
because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that 
destiny, no ethical experience would be possible—there would be only tasks to be done. 
(Community 43) 
 “Wandering,” as I’ve attempted to define it and explore it, does not demand an absence 
of memory and capacity for recall—it only requires that the poetics of recollection admit a 
weakened or non-essential relationship with the subject’s narrative identity. The previous 
chapter’s critique of narrativity and subsequent distinction between the capacity for encoding 
memories and structuring those memories into a generic form retains the ethics of memory in an 
anti-narrativist state. Within such a wandering mind, memory’s function and poetics contributes 
to but are not assimilated by a masterplot of narrative identity. Without exclusive narrative 
closure, memory’s fragmentary materials anticipate multiple futures and partake in multiple 
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histories, retaining a necessary relevance by constantly reordering their relationality within the 
subject’s cognition and for the subject’s narrative identity. 
 In the next two chapters, I explore contemporary fictions by contemporary authors W.G. 
Sebald and Ben Lerner that are at once embodied performances of cognitive wandering and that 
enact, in their very composition, a resistance to narrativity in the form of a wandering memory. I 
have chosen these fictions for their generic transgressions: they are at once structured as 
autobiographical narratives, episodic tales that mimic narrative form and that claim authorial 
experience, and they are as well fictional constructions and elaborations, both in generically 
experimental form and content. Both particular works discussed, Lerner’s 10:04 (2014) and 
Sebald’s Rings of Saturn (1998), are easily categorized as postmodern in their blurring of generic 
categories (fiction/non-fiction), reflexive and non-linear structures, theoretical concerns 
regarding history’s end, and general periodization.  As such, they both engage the tradition of 
autobiography and highlight its salient features and characteristics through certain intentional 
artifice. What emerges in my reading is a subversive and distinctly postmodernist aesthetics of 
wandering that foregrounds an ethical orientation to personal memory and collective history. 
Such an aesthetics and ethics, too, will be sufficiently abstracted to allow for cross-generic 
application.  
 Finally, in this chapter, I follow Brian McHale in focusing and limiting my use of 
“postmodern” in this context to signify post-cognitive (as opposed to cognitive) and therefore 
ontological (as opposed to epistemological).68 For McHale, the “dominant”—a term McHale 
borrows from the Russian Formalists to indicate foregrounded characteristics, as opposed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See “From Modernist to Postmodernist Fiction: Change of Dominant” in Postmodernist Fiction (Routledge: New 
York, 1987), 3-25.  
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historical opposition or sequence (6)—in postmodernist fiction is the interest in interrogating 
possible selves and possible worlds that the narrative inhabits. Articulating the possibilities and 
limits of such an ontology becomes the formal narrative concern in content and form in 
postmodernist fiction: narratives make possible multiple selves and multiple narrative worlds 
through various characteristic techniques, including repetition and multiplicity.  
 While such compositional strategies are certainly present in both works, the animating 
impulse behind their “dominant” presence is the motion of memory apart from narrativity, thus 
structuring a subjectivity of varying histories through a distinctly fragmentary understanding of 
the objects of memory and through a distinctly perpetual understanding of memory’s 
recollection. While for McHale, modernist works interrogate the limits and possibilities of 
knowledge as their “dominant,” these postmodernist works, in my reading, acknowledge 
epistemological limits but foreground concerns of subject and world in following memory’s 
motions.  In the focus on memory’s poetics in this chapter, then, a wandering mind narrates 
diverse modes of being. In other words, with memory unfixed and subjectivity never destined or 
realized, the work of memory becomes the ontological catalyst for the reproduction and 
articulation of selves and worlds.   
Postmodern Memory: A Critical History 
	  
As a study of memory, then, I begin by assuming that a theory of memory serves as the method 
by which these postmodernist fictions arrive at multiple selves and worlds. McHale, too, would 
agree that cognition need not disappear in an ontological text; indeed, the cognitive causes might 
simply foreground the postcognitive effects, as is the case in our texts. Thus, in acknowledging 
memory as the stimulus for ontological effects, I begin with acknowledging the history of 
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philosophy of memory in order to arrive at a modernist and epistemological ground upon which 
these works are based.  
 Memory, Anne Whitehead notes in her introduction to the subject, quoting Mieke Bal, is 
a “traveling concept,” one that travels through and between disciplines, histories, and 
geographies.69 The “art of memory,” from the ancient Greeks and Romans through the present 
day took on assorted metaphors that carried assorted valences: Plato’s wax tablet for memory 
inscription; Roman “place systems” for imprinting memory on imaginary pages; Augustinian 
mysticism that combines both Platonic Idealism and “place systems”; medieval visual and 
textual mnemonics; Renaissance “memory theaters” for visual mnemonics and recall; and 
modern conceptions of displaced memory in books, archives, and digital clouds.  
 Yet despite its long history, memory’s figurative conception has generally been one of 
either personal or collective storage and recall from storage—repetition in mind, in other words, 
of past stored events thus indicating successful recollection—a popular conception that has 
received a sustained critique by Romantics, Moderns, and contemporary theorists.  As I noted in 
the previous chapter, Romantics represented memory as a form of reconstruction, not 
reproduction, even as they acknowledged memory’s stored source. And moderns did away 
altogether with memory’s construction on epistemological grounds, even as they acknowledged 
its more profound storehouse—the unconscious. For Proust and Freud, for example, memory’s 
place and effects are well beyond conscious reach, if at all ever accessible; for Proust, the 
practice of immersive recollection is involuntary and unexpected, “unstring[ing] subjectivity,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Qtd. in Anne Whitehead, Memory, 4. See Mieke Bal, Traveling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide 
(Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 2002).  
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“subvert[ing] consciousness,” and “confront[ing] us with the incomprehensible.”70 For Freud, the 
work of psychoanalysis makes certain symptoms of memory’s effects “modified or removed,” 
but the “underlying cause of the symptom, the unconscious memory itself, cannot be fully 
eliminated” or even fully apprehended on a conscious level.71 In other words, in Richard 
Terdiman’s reading of Freud, although the unconscious provides “output” to the rest of psyche, it 
is itself “inaccessible to input, moderation, modulation, or diminunation.” (284) Terdiman is also 
right to note that Freud and Proust share common characteristics in memory’s impenetrable 
depth and unanticipated rupture, though for Proust, of course, recollection takes on a far more 
pleasant connotation.72  
 Even for these modernists, however, past memories are stored in a latent, if unknowable 
unconscious, lurking in the shadows to eventually overwhelm and even traumatize the present. 
As thinkers that maintained the Romantics’ intuition of both “too little and too much” memory 
(14), they modulated memory’s overwhelming effects with a healthy dose of repression and 
forgetting, much as Nietzsche argued before them regarding the “disease of too much 
memory”73. And as Anne Whitehead, Richard Terdiman, and Susan Radstone have argued, these 
theorists of “too much memory” play a crucial role in anticipating the memory crises of the late-
modern Twentieth Century in their “prolonged and intense fascination with the power of the past 
over the present,” (Whitehead 100) a “deepening” concern of ninenteenth and early twentieth-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993), 212 for this 
reference, quoted in Anne Whitehead, Memory, 111 
71 See Freud’s 1915 study on “The Unconsious” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud (24 Vols), trans. and ed. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud (London: Vintage, 2001); 
referenced in Anne Whitehead, Memory, 95. 
72 See Terdiman, 200: “[d]espite Proust’s effort to mould our understanding of it in salvationist directions, the 
phenomenon Proust narrates as involuntary memory uncannily recalls the description in Freud of the pathologies of 
traumatic injury and involuntary neurotic reminiscence.” 
73 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” in Daniel Breazale (ed.), Untimely 
Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 84, qtd. in Whitehead, 86. On a related 
note, one should note as well his recommendations regarding memory’s balances: “the unhistorical and the historical 
are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture.” (1997, 63) 
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century philosophy that emerges, according to Radstone, from “ambivalent relations to 
community, tradition, and the past” sourced partially in the traumas of the twentieth-century, 
including the centrality of the Holocaust to “memory’s resonances in contemporary culture.” (6) 
 Following Freud and Proust, contemporary philosophers of memory and contemporary 
researchers converge on the moment of recollection as the event of memory, even as they take 
divergent approaches to memory’s source for such recollection. For Daniel Schacter and other 
contemporary memory researchers, “memory” is not a particular object or experience to be 
recalled in any holistic sense, but an event in a present act of encoding and recollection, during 
which a past “engram”—or encoded fragment from the past stored by the subject—supplements 
present reflection in the form of recollection.74 Ulric Neisser put it this way: as opposed to the 
popular “reappearance hypothesis” in which copies of experience are restaged in the subject’s 
mind, memory should be thought of the fragmentary work of a paleontologist—”out of a few 
stored bone chips...we remember a dinosaur.” (285) In other words, each engram is not 
characterized as a fully stored and retrievable memory imprinted upon the mind; it presents 
instead as an always already encoded ruin or fragment that complements the present subject’s 
present cognition. Shachter explains, too, how the theory of the engram—attributed to pioneer 
cognitive psychologist and researcher Endel Tulving—is sourced in “connectionist” or “neural 
network models” that are built on the “principle that the brain stores engrams by increasing the 
strength of connections between different neurons that participate in encoding an experience.” 
The “specific pattern of brain activity constitutes an engram”; when a “retrieval cue” induces 
another pattern of activity in the brain, “if this pattern is similar enough to a previously encoded 
pattern, remembering will occur.” The “memory” that is activated, however, is not simply an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See Daniel Shachter, Searching for Memory (Basic Books: New York, 1997 ) 
77	  
	  
	   	  
activated engram; rather, “it is a unique pattern that emerges from the pooled contributions of the 
cue and the engram.” (71) This is how Endel Tulving and others account for memory distortions 
and even false memories: due to the “constructive role of retrieval information,” engrams may, in 
fact, construct, echo, or invoke false correspondences between present and past memories. (1983, 
181) 
 As an unfolding and varied event, memory is cued by an environmental or cognitive 
stimulus, a corresponding impulse to an already encoded engram. Thus, in the remembering act, 
a constellation between the stimulating cue, the subjective, recollecting self, and the engram 
constitute the present experience of recollection. Such research confirms both Romantic models 
of creative recollection and modern epistemologies of memory’s fragmentation. Even Shachter 
acknowledges that the confluence of all contributing elements for the unique memory act smacks 
of Proust’s memorie involuntaire. In Shachter’s words: 
 ...for the rememberer, the engram (stored fragment of an episode) and the  memory (the 
 subjective experience of recollecting a past event) are not the same thing. The stored 
 fragments contribute to the conscious experience of  remembering,  but they are only part 
 of it. Another important component is the retrieval cue itself. Although it is often 
 assumed that a retrieval cue merely arouses or activates a memory that is slumbering in 
 the recesses of the brain, I have hinted at an alternative: the cue combines with the 
 engram to yield a new, emergent entity—the recollective experience of the rememberer—
 that differs from either of its constituents. This idea was intimated in some of Proust’s 
 writings, in which memories emerge from comparing and combining a present sensation 
 with a past one, much as stereoscopic vision emerges from  combining information from 
 the two eyes. (70) 
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Given that memory as event occurs in the mind of the present subject, then, encoding and 
remembering are nearly inseparable, if not identical, functions. To encode a memory, in other 
words, for Shachter, is to remember it for the first time. Furthermore, the strength of a memory 
lies in the complexity of its encoding, as the strength of each subsequent recall is determined by 
all previous acts of remembering.  
10:04 and a Postmodern Ethics of Memory 
	  
 Ben Lerner’s very recent 10:04 assumes Shachter’s denial of a storehouse of memory, 
even as it is both a chronicle of collective experience in the form of art objects, city life, and self-
consciousness itself, in the form of reflexive and even failed writing processes.75 Somewhere 
between Proust and Shachter, Lerner’s work adopts a process of memory that mimics past 
fragments even as it recollects, often involuntarily, in the present tense; it constellates engrams, 
encoding the past through present cues and resurrecting lost histories through a recollection of 
multiplicity that wanders through varying histories.  
 Importantly, this work represents a critical bridge between cognitive theories and 
narrative representation in its performance of a cognitive model of memory. It is a work not only 
about history’s objects and processes but about possible subjectivities and the nature of a 
subject’s constructed history, interrogating as well conventional narrativity in generic form and 
in subjective cognition. And most of all, it is a work of amplified wandering both in body and 
mind. Lerner’s protagonist “the author” drifts both in immediate perception—he suffers from a 
disabled proprioception, an inability to generate a nearly Jamesonian cognitive map onto his own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Hari Kunzru’s review in The New York Times on September 7, 2014 located the work along these two axes. See 
Hari Kunzru, “Impossible Mirrors” Sunday Book Review, BR12. 
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body, let alone his social sphere—as well as in the work of memory as it relates to the 
construction of a narrative history of multiplicity.  
 Lerner’s work starts with a startling aphorism of theological materialism as its 
epigraph—a tribute to the power of recollection but to the distinction, too, between recreation 
and creation in the processes of memory: 
 The Hassidim tell a story about the world to come that says that everything there will be 
 just as it is here. Just as our room is now, so it will be in the world to come; where our 
 baby sleeps now, there too it will sleep in the other world. And the clothes we wear in 
 this world, those too we will wear there. Everything will be as it is now, just a little 
 different. (i)  
Both “the world to come” and the concluding sentence of this adage recur throughout the work, 
and in contexts of materialist history. The world to come, as the reader learns, is the fully 
realized history of a living subject or material object as it is liberated from the processes of 
memory and history at history’s end. As a theology of memory, this final, absolute recollection is 
the process of memory—even cognition—arrested, at a standstill.  
 While Lerner claims he discovered this parable in Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming 
Community as attributed to Walter Benjamin,76 in truth, it is sourced in Walter Benjamin’s essay 
on Franz Kafka, a point to which I will return later this chapter. Most importantly, it is quite 
obvious that Lerner has studied Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” a short series of 
aphorisms about history’s end and a “weak” materialist messianism possible for redeeming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 He writes, in his Acknowledgments to the work: “I first encountered the text I use as an epigraph in Georgio [sic] 
Agamben’s The Coming Community, translated from the Italian by Michael Hardt. It is typically attributed to Walter 
Benjamin. “ (244) 
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history’s lost materials and narratives. Indeed, not only does Lerner include a full-page image77 
of Paul Klee’s “Angelus Novus” (25) that Benjamin claims as the angel of history78 but at a 
moment of personal historical crisis, he cites Benjamin directly (though without quotation marks, 
a Benjaminian trope, too!) when imagining how a personal past history—once a fact, now found 
to be a lie—might also be included in the archive of a personal history as a past that “happened 
but never occurred.” (109) In imagining a response to a co-worker at the Park Slope co-op for 
whom such a discovery has affected her own personal history, the protagonist dreams, conflating 
both the work’s epigraph and Benjamin, as follows: 
 If there had been a way to say it without it sounding like presumptuous co-op nonsense, I 
 would have wanted to tell her that discovering you are not identical with yourself even in 
 the most disturbing and painful way still contains the glimmer, however refracted, of the 
 world to come, where everything is the same but a little different because the past 
 will be citable in all its moments, including those that from our present present 
 happened but never occurred. (109) 
The world to come, in this context as in all others in this work, signifies a future present liberated 
from time itself in which all pasts are citable, because the subject is no longer partaking of 
history’s temporality. “Everything is the same but a little different,” as objects still exist in 
history or memory, but in the form of a revolutionary historicity—history remembering all 
possible pasts, even those lost to history’s master narratives and plots.  Here, Lerner knowingly 
cites Benjamin’s third aphorism in his series “On the Concept of History” regarding the 
revolutionary and even messianic potential for a historical materialism: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Lerner, 25 
78 See “Part IX” in Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” 392. 
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 The chronicler who narrates events without distinguishing between major and minor ones 
 acts in accord with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened should be 
 regarded as lost to history. Of course only a redeemed mankind is granted the fullness of 
 its past—which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all 
 its moments...[emphasis mine] (390)  
As fully citable, a redeemed history “brushes history against the grain” (392) of transmitted 
historicism, which conforms to authority and genre. Historicism, which “rightly culminates in 
universal history” is progress and plot driven; materialist historiography, Benjamin’s method for 
redeeming history, is based on a constructive principle that arrests history by arresting the 
process of thinking about history, a theory of cognition in its very articulation: 
 Thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where 
 thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that 
 constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a monad. The historical 
 materialist approaches a historical object only where it confronts him as a monad. In this 
 structure he recognizes the sign of a messianic arrest of happening, or (to put it 
 differently) a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past. (396)79 
For Benjamin, historical materialism is the apprehension of a “historical object” arrested when 
“thinking suddenly comes to a stop.” With the cessation of cognition, then, the articulation of 
oppressed and suppressed pasts are articulated in a nearly “messianic” manner. Thus, Benjamin 
offers a cognitive theory of history that is driven by a certain ethical-political poetics for memory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Editors Eiland and Jennings note that “oppressed past” in Zohn’s translation translates “underdruckte 
Vergangenheit,” which also suggests “suppressed past.” (Ibid., fn. 27, p. 400) 
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itself; his “weak messianic power” (390) is a theology constructed out of historical materialism’s 
language (389).  
 Perhaps most important for our reading of Lerner’s text, in such a calculus, is the strength 
of the historical materialist’s cognitive function: through memory arrested at a standstill, 
history’s suppressed pasts can emerge—and revolt. Here, memory and history are not 
interchangeable, but they are inter-dependent and dependent, too, upon the gaze and arrested 
procession—progression—of the historical materialist’s thought processes. Reading Lerner’s 
work with this backdrop is to acknowledge both the underlying theory and overlying thematics 
of arrested cognition as a device for narrating subjective memory and collective history. 
 Looking at the work’s loose structure, one starts with the enigmatic title, 10:04,which 
acknowledges the centrality of art objects as contingent upon subjective cognizance and 
historical valuation and devaluation. In particular, the title references the precise time that 
Lerner’s protagonist had hoped to view, both in real time and in the art piece, The Clock, a 24-
hour “montage of thousands of scenes” from movies and TV “edited together to be shown in real 
time,” each scene indicating “the time with a shot of a timepiece or its mention in dialogue.” 
This film, directed by Christian Marclay and shown around the clock at Lincoln Square in July 
of 2012 for 20 days80, attempted to synchronize “time in and outside of the film” (52), according 
to Lerner’s narrator. This alignment, he continues, signifies the possibility for a collapse of 
“fictional time into real time,” suggesting as well the recovery of possibility in the remembered 
past:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See Roberta Smith, “Artwork That Runs Like Clockwork,” The New York Times, June 21, 2012, C29 
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 as I made and unmade a variety of overlapping narratives out of its found footage, I felt 
 acutely how many different days could be built out of a day, felt more possibility than 
 determinism, the utopian glimmer of fiction. (54) 
The Clock in its very performance critiques narrative or generic representations of lived 
experience. In aligning itself with lived time, in other words, it undoes the erasure of lost time 
condensed in a normative film narrative. On another level, The Clock performs Benjamin’s 
attention to lost time in its unforgiving focus on each moment, suggesting recovered 
potentiality—”how many different days could be built of out of a day”—as a utopian glimmer. 
Its structured focus, in other words, is not a critique of generic narrativity, but an unforgiving 
attentiveness to multiplicity by presenting a collage of a disjointed (non)narrative and 
discontinuous selves.  
 10:04, in particular, carries with it certain temporal ambivalences whose reference is 
central to the work’s thematics. As the titular example, the time of 10:04 is the moment when 
“the lightning strike[s] the courthouse clock tower in Back to the Future, allowing Marty to 
return to 1985” (52), the particular time by which Lerner’s protagonist had hoped to arrive—and 
subsequently failed to witness, as “Alex couldn’t get a train back from her mother’s in time.” 
(ibid.) As not only a missed opportunity but a particular failure, this comment, inserted in 
parentheses, demands commentary for its reference to—and source for—the work’s title. 10:04 
is missed by both the narrator and his companion, Alex, because of a failure of her return, even 
as 10:04 is a moment of return to the future, when, we are told at the book’s end (when the film 
is projected by both characters during the work’s second storm), “white people would have 
invented, not appropriated” rock and roll, as Marty had taught Chuck Berry how to play the 
musical form. Even at this later juncture, however, when the author protagonist had “spent a few 
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minutes describing this ideological mechanism to Alex,” his words fall into a past that had 
happened, but not entered history—he had failed to realized that she had fallen asleep 
beforehand (230). 10:04, then, signifies a return to a future in its reference to the film Back to the 
Future, but the work, 10:04, in its inclusion of all pasts, even those that don’t enter history, 
denies that this return alters the past that now has an unrealized future in its failure to enter 
history. Back to the Future, in other words, attempts a poetics of closure, while other art works in 
Lerner’s text, such as Marclay’s The Clock; Donald Judd’s “Aluminum Boxes” in the desert of 
Marfa, Texas; Alena’s fictional “Institute for Totaled Art” (131), a project collecting totaled 
masterpieces; and even Jules Bastian-Lepage’s Joan of Arc, housed at the Met, operate as 
ekphrastic correspondences, even references to Lerner’s work, both in terms of their multiple 
subjects and histories and in terms of their generic resistances.  
 The tension between closure and non-closure is striking in this work, and lies as a 
productive site for memory’s work both in outward perception and self-conception. In Lerner’s 
protagonist’s words, his book is “written on the very edge of fiction” (237), “neither fiction nor 
nonfiction but a flickering between them.” His work, in other words, attempts to align itself with 
life as experienced, much as Marclay’s The Clock constructs a lived time in cinematic 
observation, but with adapting Agamben’s and Benjamin’s orientations towards history’s pasts’ 
multiplicity, and by acknowledging, too, epistemologies of memory put forth both in literary 
history and cognitive psychology. On the other hand, another book, this one produced in 
collaboration between Lerner’s protagonist and his third grade illegal immigrant tutee, Roberto, 
about the palentological error regarding the history of the apatosaurus, is titled To the Future, 
assuming certain closure in its research regarding errors in past paleontological history. Indeed, 
as a work that the protagonist hopes “might help bring us closure,” it both affirms a flawed 
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paleontology and denies the possibility for keeping open unexplored pasts. Lerner’s eponymous 
character’s book, on the other hand, is a non-book, it is an abandoned past itself, chronicling 
process and retaining various histories, leaving its ending open, full of possibility In the 
protagonist’s words: “Abandoning the book about forging my archive left me feeling as though I 
actually possessed one, as though I were protecting my past from the exposure of publication.” 
(212)  
 The ekphrastic art works saturating Lerner’s text, too, are art-works that anticipate or 
include various histories—or, in their very material afterlives, exclude themselves from a 
particular history in their irrelevance and abandonment. In fact, early on, Lerner’s protagonist 
contrasts  Back to the Future with Joan of Arc’s gesture towards the future: both involve 
dissolution, but the latter’s gesture admits presence towards a future, while the former forbids the 
past’s presence: 
 Joan appears to stagger toward the viewer, reaching her left arm out, maybe for support, 
 in the swoon of being called. Instead of grasping branches or leaves, her hand, which is 
 carefully positioned on the sight line of one of the other angels, seems to 
 dissolve...Standing there that afternoon with Alex, I was reminded of the photograph 
 Marty carries in Back to the Future, crucial movie of my youth: as Marty’s time-traveling 
 disrupts the pre-history of his family, he and his siblings begin to fade from the snapshot. 
 Only here it’s a presence, not an absence, that eats away at her hand: she’s being pulled 
 into the future. (9) 
Fading a past discounts the past’s presence; fading into a future offers a certain afterlife for the 
present, constructing a history for a future’s past. This becomes clear in the perception of Judd’s 
86	  
	  
	   	  
box structures in the Marfa desert, inspiring Lerner’s protagonist to wonder if their function, one 
shifting by its varied perceptions—”set in time, changing quickly because the light was 
changing, the dry grasses going gold in it” (179)—has a future that has not yet been realized in 
their “terrible patience” (223) (as he later recalls then it), much as structures like Stonehenge, 
“clearly built by humans but inscrutable in human terms, as if the installation were waiting to be 
visited by an alien or god.” (180)  
 The flipside of Judd’s pre-historical art is work collected by the protagonist’s friend, 
Alena, for her “Institute for Totaled Art,” a collection of valuable works paid off by an insurance 
company and “legally declared to have ‘zero value.’“ (129) No longer bound by market 
valuation, these post-historical works can be touched (“Why aren’t you touching anything, Alena 
asked” (132)) and even joyfully destroyed. Indeed, while holding the pieces of a freshly shattered 
Jeff Koons balloon dog sculpture, his protagonist celebrates: “It was wonderful to see an icon of 
art world commercialism an valorized stupidity shattered.” (131) Ultimately, the apprehension of 
such decommissioned and decommodified work is a taste of the world to come. While studying 
an unframed and ostensibly undamaged work by Henri Cartier-Bresson, he remarks: 
 It had transitioned from being a repository of immense financial value to being declared 
 of zero value without undergoing what was to me any perceptible material 
 transformation—it was the same, only totally different. (133) 
Here, we are reminded of Picasso’s remarks made to Stein regarding her portrait’s divergence 
from her lived self: “It is all there,” Picasso claimed, even as the art work entered its own 
material history. While Picasso’s work has its own commodity history, the sense that a work of 
art can be altered by its framing is shared in both texts.  
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 As a work of art that is not only an object of art but the articulation of a self, then, 
Lerner’s text references these ekphrastic objects to write himself differently, to push the limits of 
his textual self—”the tension between biological and textual mortality” (55)—beyond a 
singularity by including all possible selves and worlds within his fiction. In Lerner’s work, in 
other words, “It is all there.” As an ontological, postcognitive work, Lerner does not grapple with 
the choice among many selves and worlds—he chooses, instead, to include all of them. His is a 
work that echoes Delueze’s problematic regarding time’s invisibility, and to which Deleuze 
offered the “crystal-image” to make time thinkable as contemporaneous layers in the present:  
 What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the 
 past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split 
 itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, 
 or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogenous 
 directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the other falls into the 
 past. (1989, 81) 
Lerner’s work follows Deleuze’s Bergsonian insights: time here emerges as a contemporaneous 
and layered experience of multiplicity in the present. Most importantly, however, time is not an 
interiority for Deleuze, as Keith Ansell-Pearson shows; instead, “it is the interiority in which we 
move, live, and change.” (165) Correspondingly, in Lerner’s work, the narrator protagonist 
seems to cycle easily through multiple temporalities, invoking them as the medium in which he 
resides. 
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Wandering Attentiveness and the Construction of Ontological Multiplicity 
	  
 The inclusion of all possible generic worlds, including those of fiction, non-fiction, and 
failure, demands the sort of patience a wandering consciousness generates in its attentiveness. As 
a work chronicling the failure of extending his short story into a novel-length work, his is a 
fiction in its imaginary feat and non-fiction in its history and production of failure, of non-event, 
positioning its narrating self beyond its absented story. Such generic inclusiveness, too, in a 
performative narrative of wandering of physical walks through the city of New York embodies 
the movements and jaunts across space and time through remembered pasts.  
 As a backdrop to the wandering recollection of the protagonist’s mind, New York itself 
expresses a catalog of participating, competing, and even interrupting voices in its recorded, 
textual, and even visual languages. In a narrated sequence that brilliantly captures not only 
dialogue between two subjects but the participating language of the embedded environment, 
Lerner’s “author” shows how the city’s contributing voices disrupt one another, generating 
instead an incoherent material history realized through an attending, wandering perception: in 
one ambulatory sequence, a “passing ambulance” throws “red lights”; a train interrupts with 
“stand clear of the closing doors”; “Get tested for HIV today” a poster instructs on the D train; 
“Shine bright like a diamond” Rihanna sang through the earbuds of a fellow rider (31). While the 
narrator claims to write as a “would-be Whitman” and cites Whitman’s attention to and love for 
the city’s unified organism (4), such sequences chronicle more than they do synthesize. They 
seem to invoke the wandering that Levinas characterizes as a form of aesthetic perception—an 
egarement that drifts and collects, in its decontextualized attention, between continuous contexts 
of narrative moments.  
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 And not only are voices from the present staged and dramatized in the wandering 
perception of the city, but voices of the past converge in the spaces of the present, foregounding 
an overdetermined historical material for its various temporalities. While attending to the very 
ground of material space, wandering perception makes possible a certain attentiveness to lost 
time. Here, in the short story written by Lerner for The New Yorker (a fiction that has entered the 
space of the real and that is embedded, too, as the heart of his book-length fiction), Lerner’s 
third-person narrative describes such an event as the culmination of physical wandering: 
Eventually he turned from the river and wandered back through Brooklyn Heights. On a 
small cobblestone street that dead-ended unexpectedly, some conspiracy of brickwork 
and chill air and gaslight gave him the momentary sense of having traveled back in time, 
or of distinct times overlaid, temporalities interleaved. No: it was as if the little flame in 
the gas lamp he paused before were burning at once in the present and in various pasts, in 
2012 but also in 1912 or 1883, as if it were one flame flickering simultaneously in each 
of those times, connecting them. He felt that anyone who had ever paused before the 
lamp as he was pausing was briefly coeval with him, that they were all watching the same 
turbulent point in their respective present tenses. Then he imagined his narrator standing 
before it, imagined that the gaslight cut across worlds and not just years, that the author 
and the narrator, while they couldn’t face each other, could intuit each other’s presence 
by facing the same light, a kind of correspondence. (67)  
As a vignette from a short story about an author imagining a hypothetical narrator, this passage 
lies at the nexus of narratological and cognitive convergence. First, the short story’s author 
character imagines his nonexistent narrator as standing before a site in which multiple histories 
have emerged. Not only do material histories materialize from a sustained, patient, and  
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wandering mind, but fictional histories of material character, too: as a narrator himself for an 
author that is, too, a narrator of a work authored by Lerner, both author and narrator do converge 
in a sort of imaginary correspondence, even if the apprehension of the street itself is 
fictionalized. As a correspondence of pasts across time, the story’s author (narrator) discovers—
and recovers—the fragments of suppressed pasts in a present time, allowing the material of 
history, when arrested, to speak its assorted histories.  
 Most interestingly, as a cognitive theory of memory that is, too, a theory of ontological 
postmodernism, Lerner’s text ensures the radical inclusion of that which might be otherwise 
entirely occluded from history. Here, again, I reference my reading81—of Benjamin’s reading of 
Kafka’s gesture—as that of wandering. Benjamin writes that Kafka’s foregrounding of the 
cloudy spot in his parables as gesture is not an epistemological problematic but an ontological 
multiplicity. And while Lerner’s text cites Agamben’s work for its epigraph, acknowledging, in 
passing, the epigraph’s source in Benjamin’s text, I would like to call attention to this context, at 
this juncture, as particularly gestural. Indeed, in his reading of the gesture in Kafka, Benjamin 
writes that “the messiah” will “not wish to change the world by force but will merely make a 
slight adjustment to it.” (“Franz Kafka” 811) In reading distortions and in noticing “little 
hunchbacks” who ask a “dear child” to “pray for the little hunchback too,”82 Benjamin attributes 
to Kafka the sort of prayer that “Malebranche called ‘the natural prayer of the soul’: 
attentiveness.” (812) This attentiveness, in Benjamin’s reading of Kafka, is to the neglected 
subjects, the form of distortion, or hunching, “which things assume in oblivion,” typified by 
Odradek in Kafka’s story, “Cares of a Family Man.” (810) Occupying an attic (and the staircase, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See the introduction of this dissertation, in which I offer a full treatment of Benjamin’s reading of Kafka’s 
gestures as the aesthetic correlate to wandering.  
82 Nursery rhyme quoted in “Franz Kafka,” 811.  
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corridors, and halls), Odradek is both discarded and indeterminate83, signifying both pre-history 
and post-history—-exiting history, in other words, to be staged again.  
 The post-history of unrealized pasts is realized, in Lerner’s text, through its very 
performance of a wandering memory, an attentiveness, in other worlds, to a world to come. 
Indeed, in recovering pasts for the “present present” (109) as the narrator terms it, is the recovery 
of various pasts that never occurred (in history or memory), even if they happened (in a past 
present). This is both in terms of past objects and retracted narratives whose futures were never 
realized and in terms of experiences that never entered history’s memory to begin with. The 
former of the two was referenced previously and recurs throughout the work in the form of the 
subplot of the fraudulent past. In the case of the protagonist’s co-op friend, her self-discovery as 
a non-Arab, when informed by her mother of her true biological father, causes her skin “to fade” 
(104) from its ethnic color, invoking in its historical re-writing the possibilities for fading as 
erasure, in the case of Back to the Future, and fading as possibility, in the case of Joan of Arc.  
 The protagonist author likewise imagines a fraudulent correspondence as the very 
foundation of his book project, but instead writes his current book, thus absenting this imagined 
history, but including its absence through the trace of a wish (212). And he is told a tale of a 
friend’s father who cared for a lover that had posed, for years, as terminally ill (124-5). Later in 
the novel, the same friend’s father’s wife suffers from cancer, but the “embodied memory” of the 
prior fraud, in his life, interrupts his absolute belief in its veracity, causing him to suspect “that 
she could be faking”, on the one hand, or that on the other hand, to reconsider his original 
relationship’s lie as, in fact, true: “And by the way, then I find myself thinking...What if she lied 
about lying in order to release me?” (205) In each instance, a past whose future undoes its place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Indeterminacy is a critical lens through which Agamben reads the post-historical “halo” as retaining its 
fragmentation, its irreperable state, on the one hand, and its eternal potentiality as such, on the other.  
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in narrative history becomes both a fiction and an isolated history arrested in time and memory; 
when arrested, however, it is reopened to its bare potentiality—and reconsidered for possessing 
multiple histories. In an objective (and somewhat whimsical) manner, the consumption of 
“astronaut ice cream,” “a food from the future of the past, taken to space only once on Apollo 7, 
1968,” typifies the sort of material afterlife that an object enjoys, in Lerner’s work, when arrested 
in an unrealized history. 
Amnesia and Multiple Selves 
	  
 When taken to its extreme, however, such arrested moments are isolated not only from 
history, but from autobiographical memory—that is, they exist not as an engram recalled and 
reconstructed, but as a discontinuous event that remains isolated and irretrievable. In Lerner’s 
embedded New Yorker short story, “The Golden Vanity,” such a discontinuity is suggested by 
the author protagonist as a form of amnesia84, of absolute memory loss—and the loss, here, is to 
history—when he faces a dilemma regarding a wisdom tooth extraction and its associated 
experience’s abstention from memory. The author worries that while the experience of the 
extraction will be unable to be recalled at a later point, the experiencing self of the extraction will 
be fully aware of the painful process—and the amnesia will isolate and arrest this experiencing 
self within its particular history, as a “trauma cast out of time, experienced continuously, if 
unconsciously, instead of as a discrete event.” He continues: 
 If I take the drug, it’s like dividing myself into two people...It’s a fork in the  road: the 
 person who experienced the procedure and the person who didn’t. It’s like leaving a 
 version of myself alone with the pain, abandoning him. (64) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 This point anticipates the amnesiac wandering as the subject of the final two chapters in this dissertation. 
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As an ontological postmodernist fiction, Lerner’s work represents just this—multiple selves 
abandoned, and in flux, just as Kafka’s Odradek is left to wallow in oblivion. Yet, his companion 
Liza retorts, both off-handedly mocking and profoundly debunking his concern: “You already 
have amnesia. We have this conversation every day.” (ibid.) While amnesia properly 
foregrounds multiple selves excluded from history, the binary of amnesia/non-amnesia is a false 
one in terms of such an ontology of multiplicity, in which various selves are expressed and lived 
over the course of various pasts. Without a plot or conflict, Lerner’s tale adopts Benjamin’s 
philosophy of historical materialism for the living and narrating subject in the form of perception 
and recollection, on the one hand, and perception and amnesia, on the other—recalling and 
forgetting as an ontological multiplicity.  
 As I’ve discussed, Lerner’s subject wanders through his various pasts—both real (in the 
fictional world) and imagined, both unrealized and realized. Ironically, this wandering is made 
possible through a certain form of non-historical perception, characterized through the disabled 
mapping of proprioception, an atypical perception that is typified by an octopus, in Lerner’s 
work, and its inability “to determine the position of its body in the current.” (6) Confusing his 
own body with that of an octopus that he had just consumed, Lerner momentarily shifts the third 
person description onto the first person of his own body, continuing the aforementioned sentence 
with the phrase “particularly my arms,” before returning to a more clinical description of octopus 
proprioception failure:  
 ...and the privileging of flexibility over proprioceptive inputs means it lacks stereognosis, 
 the capacity to form a mental image of the overall shape of what I touch: it can detect 
 local texture variations, but cannot integrate that information into a larger picture, cannot 
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 read the realistic fiction the world appears to be. What I mean is that my parts were 
 coming to possess a terrible neurological autonomy not only spatial but temporal... 
Cast out of time and similar to the multiple selves of a disrupted amensiac consciousness, 
Lerner’s inability to map his reality confounds both spatial and temporal coherence. Here, 
Lerner’s weakened mapping straddles the opacity and joyous intensity that Jameson reads in 
Lacan’s schizophrenia as a postmodern affect:  
First breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time form all the 
activities and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby 
isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable vividness...This 
present of the world...here described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of reality, 
but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high. (26-
27) 
Lerner’s narrator, in perceiving subjects and objects whose irrelevant nature and non-futurity 
take on particular value beyond their contexts or commodity value, has both negative and 
positive reactions in representing and reacting to such cognizance. While working as a volunteer 
with Roberto on his dinosaur project, the narrator hears Roberto’s nightmarish dream and then 
describes a corresponding but embodied sensation in the same terms: 
 An increasingly frequent vertiginous sensation like a transient but thorough agnosia in 
 which the object in my hand, this time a green pair of safety scissors, ceases to be a 
 familiar tool and becomes an alien artifact, thereby estranging the hand itself, a condition 
 brought on by the intuition of spatial and temporal collapse or, paradoxically, an 
 overwhelming sense of its sudden integration, as when a Ugandan warlord appears via 
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 YouTube in an undocumented Salvadorean child’s Brooklyn-based dream of a future 
 wrecked by dramatically changing weather patterns and imperial juridical system that 
 dooms him to statelessness; Roberto, like me, tended to figure the global 
 apocalyptically. (14)  
For the subject, agnosia—a failure to process sensory input—is narrated in terms of a child’s 
dream, alternately fragmented from subjective consciousness, estranging a body and its cognitive 
map, and then integrated entirely through a radical collapse of space and time. Jameson’s 
affective register of both poles, in schizophrenic experience, of both anxiety and of “a high,” is 
similarly narrated during an episode of drug use while a resident writer in Malfa, focusing the 
use as both dissociated and euphoric. Absolutely shattered in this altered experience, Lerner’s 
protagonist collapses space and time to the point of dissolution, becoming a “relation,” and then 
nothing at all, holding onto the “terror at my personality’s dissolution.” Out of sheer desperation, 
he lights a cigarette, hoping for a sharp reminder of the familiar embodiment that he had cast off, 
but only to discover that he “had no sense of the arm or lips as mine, had no proprioception.” 
(186) Euphoric and/or horrific, the narrating subject undergoes shuffled constellations that bring 
certain subjectivity to a standstill, liberating the subject from a narrative subjectivity, if not 
turning any subjectivity into absolute objectivity.   
 In a comparable but far more euphoric conclusion, the fullness of identity with an 
experience approximates the amnesiac narrative that the author character of “The Golden 
Vanity” experiences during his euphoric ride home from the dentist, celebrating and mourning 
the passing of his amensiac self’s perception for its non-place in autobiographical memory: 
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I won’t remember this. This is the most beautiful view of the city I have ever seen, the 
most perfect experience of touch and speed...and I won’t remember it; the drugs will 
erase it. And then, glowing with the aura of imminent disappearance, it really was the 
most beautiful view, experience...That he would form no memory of what he observed 
and could not record it in any language lent it a fullness, made it briefly identical to itself, 
and he was deeply moved to think this experience of presence depended upon its 
obliteration. (81) 
While he later concludes, upon recounting the memory after the drugs had worn off, “I 
remember it, which means it never happened,” (ibid.) the protagonist’s fictional character belies 
its author’s compositional—and self-compositional—truism: to include all pasts, all selves, as 
they occurred, even if they never were encoded within autobiographical memory.  
 Liberating a mundane object from its history and cognizing the object as a work of art, on 
the other hand, plays out in this work in far more controlled ways, if only because the liberation 
is observed by a narrating subject, though the perception of such liberation is narrated in similar 
terms of an altered consciousness. One particularly extended example of such liberation takes the 
form of instant coffee on a grocery shelf, one of a few remaining objects in a history that 
anticipates a hurricane of apocalyptic proportions. With an imagined collapse of institutions, the 
author cognizes the coffee’s various participating economies, liberating it from its bare 
commodity value. The affective register of seeing the world differently in both expecting its end 
and arresting its progress—and attending to its profane elements—approximates feeling 
“stoned,” recalling the drug use referenced above and the euphoria as an identifying 
characteristic of Jameson’s postmodern affect: 
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 I want to say I felt stoned, did say so to Alex, who laughed and said, “Me too,” but what I 
 meant was that the approaching storm was estranging the routine of shopping just enough 
 to make viscerally aware for both the miracle and insanity of the mundane economy. (19) 
Here, the schizophrenic duality of both high/anxiety is inflected in the object world’s 
participating economy—and its horizon of liberation from said economy. Indeed, after reflecting 
on the various participating economies of the instant coffee, the author continues: 
 It was as if the social relations that produced the object in my hand began to glow within 
 it as they were threatened, stirred inside their packaging, lending it a certain aura—the 
 majesty and murderous stupidity of that organization of time and place and fuel and labor 
 becoming visible in the commodity itself now that planes were grounded and the 
 highways were starting to close. 
Thus, with the conditions of its production slowed and estranged, the coffee becomes less of a 
commodity and more of a ruin or even an aestheticized art object, entering its projected post-
history and stirring its observer into an altered mind state. For Theodor Adorno, who theorized 
about authentic art, “the shock aroused” by the art object in which “recipients lose their footing” 
(1997, 244) is “a feature of genuine aesthetic experience,” (147) in Brian O’Connor’s reading, a 
“self-forgetting” that is, too, a “dereification.” Here, too, Lerner’s protagonist is stirred by the 
potential liberation of the object from its reified, commodity value. And even when this future 
turns out to be a past that happened but never occurred—the hurricane never hits, and so this 
past, in anticipating an apocalyptic future, never comes to pass—he wonders about the shared 
sensation between himself and the coffee. Dismissing “apocalypse” and “utopia” as insufficient, 
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he decides that the feeling, of such shared liberation, is “a fullness indistinguishable from being 
emptied” (133)—an irreparable state at history’s end.   
 Recalling the amnesiac self’s perception, by definition, does not leave it to a past 
discontinuity; recalling the past and unrealized future of a material object unfolds its bare 
possibility. However, as narrated, the amnesiac’s experience of the aura as imminent 
disappearance, and the potentially liberated coffee’s “certain aura” that fades echoes Benjamin’s 
sense of the aura regarding the art object’s commoditization through distance in history and 
space, and it anticipates the halo at history’s end that the unchangeable object of history retains. 
For Benjamin, in his essay on the same topic, “what withers in the age of the technological 
reproducibility of the work of art if the latter’s aura,” as “the technology of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced art from the sphere of tradition” (“Technology” 254). In this sense, the 
auras in Lerner’s text reinscribe the absolute singularity of the subject’s experience or the 
object’s instantiation. However, in writing the aura into a text about not only of passing value but 
of coming value, of value of the world to come, Lerner references Agamben’s conception of the 
“irreparable” as redemptive in a negative theology of sorts—expressed in the image of an aura-
like “halo”: 
Redemption is not an event in which what was profane becomes sacred and what was lost 
is found again. Redemption is, on the contrary, the irreparable loss of the lost, the 
definitive profanity of the profane. But, precisely for this reason, they now reach their 
end—the advent of a limit. (Community 101)  
The coffee, in other words, realizes its full profanity. In so doing, it is redeemed. However, such 
redemption forbids closure—it is not a transformation of profane to sacred, but a deepened 
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articulation of its own being. Not unlike Stein’s “unbreakable” fragment, the “irreparable” is 
broken, but beyond repair. In its freedom from mastery and control, it has no essence to be 
preserved or historical destiny to be maintained.  
 In his continued philosophy of a political theology of redemption, Agamben offers a 
second twist on the status of the redeemed and irreparable historical material as redeemed by 
reading it through Saint Thomas’s treatise on halos: 
 One can think of the halo, in this sense, as a zone in which possibility and reality, 
 potentiality and actuality, become indistinguishable. The being that has reached its end, 
 that has consumed all of its possibilities, thus receives as a gift a supplemental 
 possibility...The imperceptible trembling of the finite that makes its limits indeterminate 
 and allows it to blend, to make itself whatever, is the tiny displacement that every thing 
 must accomplish in the messianic world. (ibid.) 
As a gift that comes after the fact, then, the halo allows the subject to return, from a state of 
completion, to a state of indeterminacy, to hover, even beyond history’s end, between 
potentiality and actuality. The gift, in other words, is the liberation from closure itself—and an 
affirmation, in other words, of the ethical (and if you like, materially theological) necessity for 
wandering as a cognitive base and ethical orientation.  
 In thinking then about the messianic end, the post-historical liberation of the historical 
object, while redemptive, forbids closure—or at least not in a narrative sense—and encourages, 
even at history’s irreparable standstill a certain indeterminacy, a waiting, that approximates a 
phenomenology of wandering. In Lerner’s narrative, then, the work’s conclusion regarding its 
nature and in its address to its readers fulfills Agamben’s imperatives. Once again, at the advent 
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of a super-storm, time seems to come to an end and multiple histories emerge through an altered 
perception. Remembering “bustling uptown neighborhoods..let alone Brooklyn...was like trying 
to recall a different epoch.” As the sensation of time collapses, a certain equidistance from all 
memories overcomes the narrator, with physical absences—the twin towers (237)—and 
historical absences—”the fireworks celebrating the completion of the bridge exploded above us 
in 1883” (239) taking their places alongside the invisible present. Even bare perception of social 
relations seems to collapse in the narrator’s mind—“in the absence of streetlights and established 
order there was a long moment in which I couldn’t tell if they were begging or threatening to rob 
us, making a demand”—losing a “social proprioception,” an ability to read social relations. As a 
perception that can’t distinguish between histories and memories with the possible future of 
history’s end, it wanders throughout them all as the narrator’s body wanders through an arrested 
city; at the tale’s end, even the cabs shuttle between “multiple worlds.” (237) In projecting 
towards the very end of history—and book—he repeats: “everything will be as it had been.” 
(239) 
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Chapter 3: Wandering With Sebald—History’s Collection and Cognition 
	  
Formally speaking, Hari Kunzru writes in a review of 10:04, Ben Lerner’s work “belongs to an 
emerging genre, the novel after Sebald” for its dissolution of plot and character “held together by 
occasional photographs and a subjectivity that hovers close to (but is never quite identical with) 
the subjectivity of the writer.”85 For its use of photography and semi-autobiographical narrator, 
Lerner certainly follows in Sebald’s footsteps. However, of not only stylistic but thematic 
inheritance , Lerner’s preoccupation with narrating historicity itself through a postmodernist 
cognition is borne out of Sebald’s oeuvre. For both Sebald and Lerner, the past becomes citable 
in all its moments through the animated cognition of such patient86 waiting and cognized 
wandering.  
 For both authors, wandering through the materials of memory and history forbids certain 
closure. However, for Lerner, the emphasis falls on wandering through the divergences in 
memory, which makes possible various subjective histories, whereas for Sebald, the wandering 
narrator not only reimagines human history, but the pilgrim-as-wanderer uncovers the natural 
history that wanders through human history, recovering not only memory’s but history’s shared 
material and movement between the social and the human. For Lerner, writing a contemporary 
cosmopolitan memoir of possible histories by reinscribing possible pasts and futures redeems his 
sense of history, and for Sebald, a countryside English pilgrimage is an opportunity for 
recollection that undoes diachronic history by reading relations among history’s spaces and 
materials, rather than its sequences and temporalities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See Hari Kunzru’s review in The New York Times on September 7, 2014, “Impossible Mirrors” in the Sunday 
Book Review, BR12. 
86 Notably, the recent film made about Sebald’s life, work, and death highlighted both the affect of patience and 
what it might mean to write after Sebald. See Patience (After Sebald) Dir. Grant Gee. Soda Pictures, 2011. DVD. 
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 As a work of wandering, then, Sebald’s work is not only lyrically stylized, like Lerner 
after him, but it is a poetics of history itself remembered. At once anti-narrativist and utterly 
concerned with cognizing and recalling history’s dissolutions, as Kathy Behrendt has 
suggested,87 Sebald focuses entirely on history’s material well beyond the subjective experience 
of such recollection. With an emphasis on history over subjectivity, then, Sebald’s concern 
shuttles between the poles of mourning and melancholy while attending to the dissolution of 
history’s very materials and their place within and without history. In this chapter, I continue to 
explore the ethics of a remembering subject articulating, recollecting, and rethinking history’s 
very materiality; while a language of the subjective, affective registers of mourning and 
melancholy is harnessed for this argument, this chapter’s focus is angled less towards an 
ontological multiplicity, as was the case for Lerner’s narrator, and more towards an ethics of the 
recalled object as realized in the subject’s cognitive motion of wandering. 
Sebald’s Non-Form 
	  
To start, I assume, like J.J. Long, that Sebald’s work is, structurally speaking, not only digressive 
but always already digressive.88 As an inheritor and bender of Romantic tropes of autobiography 
and travel-narratives, Sebald’s innovative prose fiction, as Sebald himself has termed it,89 has 
tested the patience of popular and even scholarly audiences. Geoffrey Dyer notes, for example, 
in reading Sebald’s Rings of Saturn that the reader is forced to attend with “patience-straining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See Kathy Behrendt’s “Scraping Down the Past: Memory and Amnesia in W. G. Sebald’s Anti-Narrative,” 
Philosophy and Literature 34.2 (October 2010): 394-408. 
88 J.J. Long, “The Sense of Sebald’s Endings...and Beginnings” in Digressions in European Literature: From 
Cervantes to Sebald, ed. Grohman and Wells (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
89 Sebald repeatedly termed his genre-less work of travelogue, autobiography, and lyrical history as “prose fiction” 
in interviews. See, for example, “Ghost Hunter: An Interview with Eleanor Wachtel” in The Emergence of Memory: 
Conversations with W.G. Sebald ed. Lyne Sharon Schwartz (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007), 37-62. 
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diligence” that proceeds “in tandem with the narrator’s weary tramping.”90 Mark McCulloh’s 
summary of the criticism leveled at Sebald’s elusive narration is equally blunt: McCulloh notes 
how “Sebald has been criticized for offering the reader little in the way of plot,” while the 
narrative movement that is generated in Sebald is principally “associative and digressive,” and 
primarily “generated by travel.” (2003, 14) Indeed, while the long tradition of digression, in the 
history of literature, celebrates the pleasures of digression for their escapist privilege, in Sebald’s 
work, digression is the rule, not the exception. In Long’s words, “digression is all-pervasive and 
as such cannot be seen as something that delays arrival at or wanders from the point of the 
narrative, but must rather be seen as the point.” (203) As such, critics Peter Arnds91 and Claudia	  Albes,92,	  ascribe	  a	  Deluzian	  rhizome	  to	  its	  inescapable	  and	  non-­‐centered	  structure	  and	  flattened	  and	  shallow	  roots;	  Nico	  Israel	  alters	  the	  structural	  image	  of	  the	  rhizome	  by	  reading	  the	  thematic	  and	  narratological	  tension	  between	  repetition	  and	  progression	  in	  Sebald’s	  work	  as	  distinctly	  that	  of	  the	  spiral.93	  
 As works of radicalized digression, indeed, of wandering, Sebald’s work attends to 
history’s losses with a brutal and unforgiving eye. Such absolute attention to “destruction” 
overwhelms his works’ narrators; “even where the evidence does not fully support such 
narratives,” Carolyn Duttlinger has argued, the narrator discovers “preexisting patterns” of 
“persecution” and “death.” (109) While I will take issue with such an extreme and somewhat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Geoff Dyer, Contribution to “A Symposium on W. G. Sebald.” The Threepenny Review 
(2002). http://www.threepennyreview.com/samples/sebaldsympos_sp02.html 
91 See Peter Arnds, “While Hidden Horrors of History Are Briefly Illuminated” in The Undiscover’d Country: W.G. 
Sebald and the Poetics of Travel ed. Markus Zisselsberger (Rochester: Camden House, 2010 ), 334-341. 
92 J.J. Long paraphrases Albes’s position as follows: “The Rings of Saturn is a decentred text, not only in the sense 
that the narrator’s spatio-temporal co-ordinates are repeatedly decentred by the chronotopes of other stories, but also 
in the sense that the dense network of meanings that accrues around each signifier turns the text into a rhizomatic 
structure from which there is no escape, and within which there is no hierarchy.” in Long, 194. For his reference, see 
Albes, Claudia. 2002. ‘Die Erkundung der Leere. Anmerkungen zu W. G. Sebalds”englischer Wallfahrt” Die Ringe 
des Saturn’, Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 46: 290-1. 
93 See Nico Israel, Spirals: The Whirled Image in Twentieth-Century Literature and Art (New York: Columbia UP, 
2015), 210-226 
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limiting reading of Sebald, I agree with Eluned Summers-Bremner who has noted that Sebald’s 
work of “history’s losses” does not enable its reader to “imaginatively incorporate those losses 
and go forward intact and unchanged” (306). Indeed, Sebald’s work is far more interested in the 
material of historical memory than in crafting and tracking a narrative catharsis of any sort.  
Summers-Bremner is correct, at least in a formal sense: Sebald’s nearly genre-less oeuvre 
of deeply exilic prose and poetic memoir, travelogue, and associative biography and 
autobiography eludes a neat narrative-driven catharsis in its sometimes literal and always 
cognitive peripatetic wanderings and loosely spiraling associations that, in multiple registers, 
invoke personal and collective memories. Further, Sebald’s inter-weaving94 throughout his work 
of an oblique photographic montage only seems to enforce the narrator’s—and reader’s—deep 
fixation on ‘history’s losses’: the photographs themselves read like the very artifacts of history’s 
losses, as they retain profound residual flaws, are always without source and caption, and 
frequently and awkwardly interrupt textual syntax.95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94The work of weaving is an important metaphor in Sebald’s work, as I will discuss later in terms of silk’s material 
history. In relating the project of writing to weaving in Sebald’s vision of spiraling repetition—a figure that both 
repeats and progresses—Nico Israel writes the following: “Yet while silk weaving (like writing) can never entirely 
be extricated from the all-too-human cruelties of resource extraction and inequitable distribution, the very fact of 
spiral silk spinning, its cultivation by humans, and its appearance in fabrics of use and beauty bears witness in the 
text to a different mode of apprehension than that of the grid, even if most weaving must follow the weft and the 
warp of the loom.” (221) In a less imagistic and more inter-textual vein, Silke Horstkotte has argued that three 
interdiscursive aspects of Sebald’s image-text—intertextual, intermedial, and intericonic—undermine the notion of 
textual ‘authenticity,’ or semiotic transparency, in “Photo-Text Topographies: Photography and the Representation 
of Space in W.G. Sebald and Monika Maron,” Poetics Today 29.1 (Spring 2008), 49-78. 
95 In what is perhaps the first essay on Sebald’s image-text layout, Noam Elcott writes that beyond, or ‘more than 
text or image alone, their rapport in layout dictates the ambivalent position of photography in Sebald’s oeuvre.’ 
Noam Elcott, “Tattered Snapshots and Castaway Tongues: An Essay at Layout and Translation with W.G. Sebald,” 
The Germanic Review 79.3 (2004), 205.  
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Rings Around Memory 
 As his most obviously digressive text, Sebald’s Rings of Saturn: An English Pilgrimage 
[Die Ringe des Saturn: Eine englische Wallfahrt] (1995, 1998) 96 digresses not only 
narratologically but cognitively and ontologically, as well—the text itself, Long notes, “re-
literalizes the dead metaphor contained in the word ‘digression’ in its interest in ‘a stepping 
aside’, the Latin ‘dis-grandi.” (194) The work is both an aimless wandering, and a goal-directed 
pilgrimage, as suggested in its misleading sub-title alone, and paradigmatic, in his oeuvre, as 
concerned with the cognizance of historical multiplicity and historicity—a thematic apparent 
from the work’s saturnine title connoting astrological melancholy.  
 The work is ostensibly a travelogue of Sebald’s 1992 walking tour of the bare Suffolk 
County countryside of East Anglia, currently one of England’s least populated counties but 
historically laden with traces of England’s imperial past. On his tour, Sebald encounters 
crumbling seaports and medieval ruins, occasions for extensive and tangential meditations that 
are both profoundly personal and broadly historical. Ultimately, the “paralyzing horror” Sebald 
experiences “when confronted with the traces of destruction” likely forces a mental breakdown, 
for he recounts, at the very beginning of his text, that “Perhaps it was because of this that, a year 
to the day after I began my tour, I was taken into hospital in Norwich in a state of almost total 
immobility.” (3) It is only a year after his discharge from the Norwich97 hospital that Sebald 
assembles his notes and begins to compose his work, and so his travelogue is not only written in 
retrospect, but it is told with a narrative voice that associates both the past and present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 All subsequent citations of W.G Sebald’s work are from The Rings of Saturn, trans. Michael Hulse (London: New 
Directions Press, 1998).  
97 Strangely, Sebald is killed in a car accident in the very same town of Norwich, only 9 years later.  
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grammatical tenses, thus adding an additional layer of remembered associations and narrative 
complexity.98  
 As a work that performs memory in its composition, then, it straddles modernity’s 
(dis)junction, vacillating between the memory recollected in the present and history left for the 
past—in Pierre Nora’s terminology, the lieux de mémoire, or “hybrid places,” that “without 
commemorative vigilance” of a remembering in the present, “history would soon sweep them 
away.”99 Modernity’s trauma, then, is Sebald’s own, even as he attempts a commemorative 
resistance—a firm ethical stance—in the face of history’s assimilating force through an active 
form of non-narrativity, wandering about history’s ruins and materials beyond history’s 
temporality. Writing as well at the end of the twentieth century, Sebald anticipates Andreas 
Huyssen’s insights into the social function of the museum—and the accompanying “museal 
gaze”—as a preserving function for the subject in the face of the “everyday present” generated 
by accelerated modernization and informational hyperspace.100 For Sebald, history’s ruins, even 
when absented of their memorializing status and significance, must be cognized as a gesture and 
model for the poetics, cognition, and ethics of memory at the century’s end.   
In a roving account of history’s ruins, then, Sebald’s work is, ostensibly, a work of 
mourning. However, as a hybrid site of cognition that is both a fixed melancholy in its non-
narrativity and active in its mindful tracing through history’s materials, Sebald seems to recall—
and wander between—two of Freud’s categories for commemorating loss. In his Mourning and 
Melancholia, Freud defines melancholy as the failure of the subject’s ego to transfer his libidinal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 I use the word “narrative” here to denote the telling itself; on the possibilities for narrativist and non-narrativist 
readings of Sebald, see Kathy Behrendt’s “Scraping Down the Past: Memory and Amnesia in W. G. Sebald’s Anti-
Narrative,” Philosophy and Literature 34.2 (October 2010): 394-408. 
99 Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” Realms of Memory, 1:7, 1:15, qtd. in Bill 
Schwarz, “Memory, Temporality, Modernity: Les lieux de memoire,” Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates, eds. 
Susannah RADSTONE and Bill SCHWARZ (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003) 53. 
100 See Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
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attachment from the lost object to a new and present object. The productive work of mourning, 
for Freud, is the successful transfer, investment, and establishment of ego-attachments; the 
melancholic subject, however, retains his fixated gaze on the absent libidinal object that is, too, 
the subject’s absent ego.101  
Where Freud outlined the psychoanalytic model of normative mourning and non-
normative melancholy, philosophers of the twentieth century encountered certain impasses in the 
ethics of mourning articulated—impasses that Sebald seems to have undertaken. In the personal 
and historical work of mourning, considered by Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Jacques 
Derrida, speaking definitively about the implications of the deceased’s life-work and memory, 
appropriating the deceased’s life-work and memory for personal or political purposes, or 
embodying the deceased’s life work and memory violates the essential human rights of the 
deceased—namely, the inalterability and impenetrability of the deceased’s memory, narrative, 
and work. Yet, to leave silent the work of memorializing altogether is to abandon the ethical 
vision of the material historicist; as Walter Benjamin reproaches us in his final manifesto “On 
the Concept of History,” 
The only historian capable of fanning the spark of hope in the past is the one who is 
 firmly  convinced that even the dead [emphasis his] will not be safe from the enemy if he 
 is victorious. And this enemy has never ceased to be victorious. (“History” 391) 
Writing at the end of and about a century in which loss of life has been compounded by 
not only a loss of memory, but a loss of ruins memorializing memory that is, life lost to history 
altogether, Sebald’s project strives to speak of the dead, at the very least. Each time we suffer 
loss, Derrida writes, we must recognize “our friend to be gone forever, irremediably absent [...] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 For further reading on the subject, see Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1914): 
243-58. 
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for it would be unfaithful to delude oneself into believing that the other living in us is living in 
himself.” (21) The post-structuralist critique of mourning walks a fine line: to mourn another is to 
mourn the loss of one’s own apprehension of that other—nothing more: to mourn another is to 
speak for the dead. Still, something must be said, even if a failed gesture: In the wake of Paul de 
Man’s death, Derrida writes how “speaking is impossible”, but “so too would be silence or 
absence or a refusal.” (5) 
Michel Foucault’s preface to his never-written Lives of Infamous Men acts as a certain 
model for resolving Derrida’s problematic and Benjamin’s alternate historicity in Foucault’s 
discussion of the limits of and possibilities for speaking for and about the deceased’s body and 
memory. In laying out his initial impulse for constructing his project, Foucault states that “for a 
long time” he thought of presenting his study of fragment-lives touched by power “in a 
systematic order, with a few rudiments of explanation, and in such a way that it would exhibit a 
minimum of historical significance” (280). He decided against this systematic method of 
ordering and organizing, and instead “resolved simply to assemble a certain number of texts, for 
the intensity they seem to [...] have” (ibid.). In stating his project as such—namely, as an 
assemblage of certain texts without explanation of historical contextualization and signification, 
Foucault touches upon notions of historicity that tend more towards the constellational or 
relational potential for historical fragments than their actual systematic ordering and organizing. 
He presents verbal “gestures” (282) to demonstrate how discourses of power both condemn and 
immortalize the fragment lives of his study, gestures that forbid representation and portraiture, 
but bear witness to the intersection of power and the individual’s very real fate. In writing about 
the apparatus of writing that recorded these fragment-lives, Foucault offers a new model for 
memorializing, for speaking of the dead, and for articulating a rights of the deceased: he 
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maintains editorial and imaginary distance, but seeks relationality of the fragment-lives—in the 
greatest possible number of ways—with other textual (historical, cultural, literary) discourses. In 
Foucault’s words, this memorializing work seeks to present “fragments of discourse trailing the 
fragments of a reality they are a part of.” (ibid.) Assuming Derrida’s impulse to mourn, even if 
mourning is a failed gesture, while adapting Benjamin’s model of historicity along with 
Foucault’s notion of conjuring fragment-lives, we can move towards Sebald’s method of 
representing the ruins of history. 
Melancholic Gaze in Space-Time 
Unlike either extreme of transference or fixity, of speaking for or maintaining silence, 
Sebald’s unique iteration of visual melancholy, of a narrative cognition of history’s dissolution, 
and recreation—in short, of history’s incessant motion and activity—allows for a middle ground, 
perhaps a hybrid, of both melancholy and mourning, of a silence and a saying. Sebald’s ironic 
“English pilgrimage” admits various aesthetic and phenomenological ambivalences through his 
generic violations and hybridities, as well as his embodied and performative rambles through his 
personal and collective memory. An ethical outcome of Sebald’s active melancholy, I show, 
realizes the mourned object’s necessarily creative reconstitution. Throughout my reading of 
Sebald’s image-text, I note his implementation of conceptual motifs in the perspectival and 
formal choices in these visual elements. Of central importance to my visual analysis is the 
inclusion of the shadow, the phenomenon of mirroring, the choice of a creaturely perspective, 
and the relation of distinctly formal elements amongst thematically related images. By closely 
reading these imagistic features and their relations, I further my argument regarding the uniquely 
visual and relational nature of the paradoxically transformative fixity that Sebald’s text 
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demands.102 In the end, I suggest that such attentiveness admits to the radical alterity of the 
remembered object through a narrative of highly spatialized wandering objectivity, even as it 
observes the object’s temporally finite bounds in its dissolution and the subject’s cessation 
through an interrupted and, finally, fragmented cognition.  
To secure certain perspectival terms unique to reading Sebald’s Rings of Saturn, then, we 
must first address how Sebald situates the melancholic gaze within a spatio-temporal framework. 
Beaches, in Sebald, stand as useful figures for exploring the way in which spatial awareness 
trumps temporal awareness, for beaches are the desolate landscapes that, in their marginal locus, 
wash the world clean of generations of history and civilization. The fishermen, for Sebald, who 
occupy the beaches of Lowestoft on England’s northeastern shore “just want to be in a place 
where they have the world behind them, and nothing before them but emptiness” (52). With their 
occupation of the eroding shore that brought ruin to the once thriving medieval seaports and 
strongholds, the fishermen not only stand as the melancholic model, fixated upon the emptiness 
of the sea, but as a possible portal to what Sebald later terms an “eternity” (59). 
The eternity, here, is not metaphysical or ethical—it is, instead, the positively recurring 
valence given to the melancholic gaze, one that allows for the dissolution and recreation of the 
materially oceanic world. Mark McCulloh writes how in Sebald’s work, paradoxically “it is 
transience itself that seems a necessary part of the sensation of timelessness afforded by intense 
and immediate aesthetic experience.” (“Destruction” 404) In this sense, Sebald’s “eternity” is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 I should note that my comments engage peripherally the great tradition of photography criticism, from the 
celebration of photographic Realism by the Victorians to the lamentation and cultural critique of such Realism by 
Baudelaire and, later, the Modernists. Ultimately, I wish to harness Marius de Zayas’s general distinction regarding 
the truth value of art and photography that ‘Art presents to us what we may call the emotional or intellectual truth; 
photography the material truth.’ See Marius de Zayas’s “Photography,” Camera Work, 43 (June 1913): 38, and 
Walter Benjamin’s particular thoughts regarding caption-less photography: ‘captions…understand the photography 
which turns all the relations of life into literature, and without which all photographic construction must remain 
bound in coincidences.’ See Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” trans. Howard Eiland, et. al., 
Selected Writings 1931-1934 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007) 507-530. 
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boundless time, inclusive of multiple histories, as Lerner foregrounds it in 10:04, but of 
boundless space in which multiple times have occurred, dissolved, and been reconstituted; it is 
this acute spatial awareness that then foregrounds the transience of the present history. Gilles 
Deleuze writes of a similar “world time,” a “fundamental state of time” that exceeds the 
“pointlessness of an evocation of the past” (Cinema 2 114) through an articulation of “the 
becoming impossible of evocation” in Orson Welles’s cinema. In illustrating both temporal 
forms, he explains “But there is no confusion in this; these are two different states of time, time 
as perpetual crisis and, at a deeper level, time as primary matter, immense and terrifying, like 
universal becoming.” (115) 
Sebald’s use of photography here performs this distinct attentiveness to a timeless space, 
or a time constituted as a universal becoming, in the autochthonic, Deluzian sense. Observe the 
photograph interjected into the text on page 51 of Rings; the coastline fades into the distance, the 
beach seems to absorb the minute tents of what Sebald terms ‘the last stragglers of some 
nomadic people,’ and the sea’s horizon seems to meet abruptly with the sky’s haze. The 
photograph is paradigmatic for much of Sebald’s work: it is blurred, shadowy, and even opaque 
at points. The dreamily surreal aesthetic effect of material space here greatly outweighs any 
interest in photographic realism.103 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 In this sense the photographic gaze, in Sebald’s work, is surreal, and in this sense, it follows the example of the 
great Surrealist and Archivist, Walter Benjamin. Susan Sontag calls Benjamin photography’s most original and 
important critic, partially because Benjamin’s great project of literary criticism that was to consist entirely of 
quotations (See his Das Passegen-Werk, for example) reads like the ideal photographer’s activity: it implies a claim 
to invisibility, a disdain for message-mongering, and an interest in retaining the inherent specificity of the 
photographed object—the particular and deeply historically contingent “that has been,” as Barthes terms it in his 
great work on photography, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010) 77. Certainly 
Sebald’s photography is quite Benjaminian in this regard. However, of even more related interest to our inquiry is 
Benjamin’s conception of the aura and its relation to photography. In both the essay titled “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second Version” trans. Howard Eiland, et. al., Selected Writings Vol. 3, 
1935-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007) 101-33, as well as in his essay titled “Little History of Photography,” 
trans. Howard Eiland, et. al., Selected Writings 1931-1934 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007) 507-30, Benjamin 
suggests that it is through the inherently modern possibility for reproducibility that photography liberates its 
imagistic medium from the fetishistic aura of distance and history. In a way, photography does not age the same way 
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The photographic gaze,104 then, foregrounds spatial eternity or material presence, despite 
the transformation of the subject of the gaze in material form. In what follows, I suggest that it is 
the particular motif of the “shadow” that haunts both Sebald’s textual narrative and photographic 
gaze as a certain correlation to this temporal transience but material fixity. Tracing a particular 
motif in Sebald’s work is particularly daunting in that his writing echoes, spirals, and spawns its 
own inter- and intra-textual web, so it may be most useful to examine the first occurrence of the 
shadow in Sebald’s imagistic text and outline possible relations to this first encounter. 
Ultimately, the shadow in and of the image stands as both a visual indicator for a determined 
mortality—a “deadness” already present in the living or relevant subject, a visible trace, 
perhaps—as well as an indicator of future material, textual, or even hermeneutic afterlives. 
Attending to the shadow’s presence in the subject passing into history, then, is an ethical 
orientation that sustains the departing subject’s material alterity in content or memory, even as its 
form shifts—and wanders—towards dissolution. In short, it is an ethics of ruins, of speaking of 
the ruin—the remains of the dead, broadly figured—that sustains the ruin’s history apart from 
memory.  
I suggested in my introduction that wandering, articulated through the aesthetic form of 
gesture, in Benjamin’s reading of Kafka, generated a comparable form of attentiveness to the 
shadowy distortions, foregrounding the very edge of perception and ontological being. Of 
course, many have noted Sebald’s keen interest in citing Kafka explicitly—or without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
paintings might; in Sontag’s formulation, photography is “aesthetically indestructible” because it is more akin to 
architecture that looks even better “tarnished, stained, or cracked.” See Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1977) 79.  
104 I should note that such a generalized formulation regarding the “vision” or gaze of the photograph was coined by 
Paul Valery in his 1939 talk ‘Centenary of Photography,’ Occasions: Collected Works in English of Paul Valery, 
Vol 11, trans. Roger Shattuck and Frederick Brown (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970) 158-67, when he identified 
photographic vision as the way in which man’s “seeing” begins to change—as well as its accompanying effects on 
art and literature.  
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quotations, as it were.105 By drawing our attention to what Benjamin terms the textually 
gestural—that is, the formative moment between, or within, the content of narration—Sebald 
foregrounds, and brings to consciousness, the critical importance of this moment of interruption.  
Of particular interest to us, in thinking about Benjamin’s materialist theology, is 
Benjamin’s theorizing of melancholy in comparable terms to Sebald’s literary performance. As 
Caroline Duttlinger has shown, Benjamin theorized melancholy as necessarily static and mobile 
(110). Not only does the melancholic have an “inclination for long journeys,” Duttlinger reminds 
us, but in such journeys, the melancholic tends to focus in “on particular objects with specific 
persistence.” (110) With such persistence, Benjamin suggests that melancholic attentiveness 
paradoxically rescues such objects, “dissociated from their everyday context,” from pervading 
indifference and oblivion (ibid.). Such a secular, humanistic ethic, then, allows the re-collection 
of the lacuna that had been elided through a fixed perception, which paradoxically, in an active 
mode, wanders about.  
In thinking, then, about the shadow as a fissure missed through inattention, the reader of 
Rings of Saturn is astounded by the attention Sebald pays to shadow-like manifestations in 
various physical and historical figurations. Consider the “blotches” that appear on Michael 
Parkinson’s face after he is found dead (6); the “scarlet and purple blotches” that mottle the 
“plaster-colored faces” of a number of family portraits found in the abandoned Somerleyton 
Manor (36); the “scarlet blotches” on the face of the waitress serving Sebald at the once-famous 
but now-deserted Albion hotel (43); and the “redness on the throat” (275) after the omni-present 
silkworm’s last skin sloughing. In fact, it is this final blotching of the silkworm’s that offers 
some signification to these recurring echoes: the silkworm’s blotch anticipates or “heralds the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Indeed, at least two of the courses listed on Sebald’s faculty page at University of East Anglia at the time of his 
death were in Kafka’s literature 
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onset of metamorphosis” (275) that it will soon undergo. This brief, naturalist gloss acts as the 
key to the meta-function this motif serves: the shadowy decay inherent in all of these dead or 
dying subjects also indicates the emerging—and already present—realization of the dying 
subject’s material transmigration.106 
The shadow is articulated as a site of ethical discovery in cultural history—fore-
shadowing, as it were, the aestheticized ethical impulse that Benjamin noted in  both the 
melancholic and in Kafka’s work. Through multiple degrees of association—first Sebald seeks 
Thomas Browne’s skull, then he briefly recounts Browne’s biography—he culminates his 
associations with speculating about the likelihood of Browne’s presence at the dissection of the 
criminal that inspired Rembrandt’s canonical painting An Anatomy Lesson. In his consideration 
of the painting, Sebald writes 
And yet it is debatable whether anyone ever really saw that body, since the art of 
anatomy, then in its infancy, was not least a way of making the reprobate body invisible 
[…] Though the body is open to contemplation, it is, in a sense, excluded […] it is with 
him, the victim, and not the Guild that gave Rembrandt his commission, that the painter 
identifies. His gaze alone is free of Cartesian rigidity. He alone sees that greenish 
annihilated body, and he alone sees the shadow in the half-open mouth and over the dead 
man’s eyes. (13-17)  
The inclusion of the shadow in this painting is significant, for it is the shadow to which 
Rembrandt (and Sebald—and Sebald’s reader) bear witness. The stylistic method by which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 In a way, such a naturalist motif echoes the remarks of the progenitor of modern photography, Louis Jacques 
Mendes Daguerre, made in 1839 regarding the Daguerreotype: “the Daguerreotype is not merely an instrument 
which serves to draw Nature; on the contrary it is a chemical and physical process which gives her the process to 
reproduce herself.” See L.M.J Daguerre: The History of the Diorama and the Daguerreotype by Helmut and Alison 
GERNSHEIM (London: Secker and Warburg, 1956). Even in the photograph’s inception, it was seen as a material 
emerging from the Natural to speak of and about itself. 
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painting is included performs Sebald’s very objective: literally, the image interrupts the textual 
narrative between pages 13 and 16, and it does so without caption and without syntactic 
explanation. While Sebald’s theorizing and performance of invoking readerly attentiveness is 
preoccupied with properly ‘seeing’ what others choose not to—neglected, criminalized, or 
marginalized bodies—what is critical here is the awareness of the shadow that Rembrandt 
memorializes and that he (and Sebald) alone see; for in a related passage describing Sir Thomas 
Browne’s idea of mortality, Sebald writes 
On every new thing there lies already the shadow of annihilation. For the history of every 
individual, of every social order, indeed of the whole world, does not describe an ever-
widening, more and more wonderful arc, but rather a course which, once the meridian is 
reached, leads without fail into the darkness (23-24)  
The mark of the shadow, then, is not only the spatialized eternity or the onset of transmigration, 
but the very mark of contingency—not only of mortality, but of materiality. The shadow, in other 
words, signifies the wandering underlying history’s material process, a characteristic of the 
contingent object of history. With a certain ethic here of attentiveness to the subject’s objectivity 
in Rembrandt’s painting, of particulars irreducible to the whole, such a heightened awareness of 
pervasive fragmentation, even within the always-present ‘shadow of annihilation’ in ‘every new 
thing’ is quite refreshing. Remember: only Sebald’s Rembrandt ‘alone sees’ the shadow; he 
alone sees the marginalized body. 
 Sebald’s reading and central placement of Sir Thomas Browne’s project, as initially 
demonstrated above, continues to offer a useful language for Sebald’s own work of historical 
cognizance. Through considering Browne’s thoughts regarding objects’ material afterlives in 
both Urn Burial, Browne’s “part-archaeological and part-metaphysical treatise” (11), and, later, 
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while forging a path towards discovering and resurrecting Browne’s very own skull, Sebald 
introduces the possibility of an end to his own historical associations and wanderings: 
Curiously enough, Browne himself, in his famous part-archaeological and part-
metaphysical treatise, Urn Burial, offers the most fitting commentary on the subsequent 
odyssey of his own skull when he writes that to be gnaw’d out of our graves is a tragical 
abomination. But, he adds, who is to know the fate of his bones, or how often he is to be 
buried? (11) 
Browne’s project defines Sebald’s project, then: Browne’s very own archaeological archiving of 
found objects both critiques itself in its future-looking anxieties of forced resurrection and 
informs Sebald’s own project of re-discovering Browne’s material remains. In considering the 
past histories and present afterlives of unearthed objects, however, much is at stake: “For 
Browne, things of this kind, unspoiled by the passage of time, are symbols of the indestructibility 
of the human soul assured by scripture, which the physician, firm though he may be in his 
Christian faith, perhaps secretly doubts.” (26) Thus, through documenting the miraculously 
preserved afterlives of these material objects—including, according to Browne’s account, “the 
circumcision knives of Joshua” (26)—Browne secretly hopes to be saved from oblivion in a 
similarly material rediscovery by a future archivist. Yet, as Browne notes in the passage cited 
above—to be “gnaw’d out of our graves” is “a tragical abomination”, and so while he hopes for 
resurrection, he fears (and is perhaps too aware) that the material resurrection—”the fate of his 
bones”—will entail a certain violence that even he will be unable to undo. 
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 Even while alive, Browne is already fixated on his own loss of ego, in Freud’s terms; in 
Sebald’s terms, Browne acknowledges that “the heaviest stone that melancholy can throw at a 
man is to tell him he is at the end of his nature” (26) so he  
 scrutinizes that which escaped annihilation for any sign of the mysterious capacity for 
 transmigration he has so often observed in caterpillars and moths. That purple piece of 
 silk he refers to, then, in the urn of Patroclus—what does it mean?” (26)  
“What does it mean?” stands as a hermeneutics of ontological selves and worlds, a historical 
inquiry into bare, natural material, and it is a question that will continue to guide Sebald through 
his associative and peripatetic wanderings as the very cognition of transmigration.107 As a 
question that is never resolved in any sense throughout Sebald’s work, “What does it mean?” 
instead acts as a bridge between the historical material’s past form and its future incarnation. 
Thus, the world is certainly a stage, in Sebald’s reading of Browne, and the possibility for the 
recurrence of a particular object—natural or otherwise—in a later history enacting a different 
role, points squarely to Browne’s crisis: on the one hand, materials undergo a certain violence in 
resurrection, on the other, as long as humanity asks “what does it mean”—that is, as long as 
people continue to read ruins, the material world will be reconstituted. This form of resurrection 
as a recollection of past materials through the work of memory has been theorized by Jacques 
Derrida, as well. Termed the “afterness of memory” (159) in Gerhard Richter’s commentary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107As Eluned Summers-Bremner has noted, not only is Sebald’s fictional voice unsure of the meaning of what is 
unearthed, but the readerly experience of Sebald’s circuitous mind-meanderings is disorienting in its narrative 
confusion. She writes that “It is this opening up of the reading experience to the peculiar lostness of the wanderer 
through alien landscapes, where we don’t know which signs may turn out to be signficant, heralding food and 
shelter, that disables us from the easy narrativity that makes fictions of the past and makes us, as readers, uninvolved 
observers. The effect of suspended narration, the flatness and iterability of the events described, adds to this spatial 
uncertainty a difficulty in registering narrative progress as a series of events in time, while narrative portentousness 
somehow increases. To read Sebald is to lodge temporarily in the experience of exile where life turns around an 
unknown absence.” (306) 
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Derrida writes that resurrection, “which is always the formal element of ‘truth,’ a recurrent 
difference between a present and presence, does not resuscitate a past which had been present; it 
engages the future.” (Memoires 58) 
Various material histories respond obliquely to Sebald’s and Browne’s question in their 
unfolding presence in Rings. Nico Israel has shown that silk, in particular, saturates the work in 
its “connection among spirals, catastrophe, and resurrection.” (219) Not only does the silkworm 
act as the central motif for material resurrection, but it serves a particular purpose in Sebald’s 
imagination: For Sebald, the recurrence of the silkworm and its prized cocoon strands throughout 
diverse historical epochs is a doubly effective metaphor for the bare materials that are used to 
drive civilizations both in their material base and in their material metamorphoses. Nearly every 
“part” (the book is divided into parts, not chapters) of the history that Rings of Saturn records 
addresses the usage of silk by various historical figures and bodies: silk is used to hang both 
criminals and suicides and is used for cloth of mourning shrouds; silkworm cultivation is used by 
various Chinese, French, English, and German governments at various points in ancient and 
modern history to fuel economies. Silk is gendered according to the national ethos: in the 
German Reich, it adopts a masculine valence in its promise of national self-sufficiency and usage 
for aerial defense (293); in 18th Century Germany it promises “social improvement of the fair 
sex” (290) in fostering work for women unaccustomed to hard labor. Ultimately, silk is the 
material that answers Sebald’s initial overture: “What does it mean?” It means inasmuch as it 
signifies itself, that is, the possibility for eternal recurrence and material rebirth for multiple 
selves and worlds.  
As a nearly melancholic model for the work of mourning, then, Sebald’s text suggests a 
different sort of what we might imagine as loose fixity, as a mournful, or active, wandering 
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melancholy. The peculiar nature of this re-staging of the same historical material—be it of a 
silkworm, photograph, or otherwise—is highlighted in Sebald’s meta-question: “What manner of 
theatre is it, in which we are at once playwright, actor, stage manager, scene painter and 
audience?” (80) While Thomas Browne’s knowledge of certain death is counter-balanced with 
“his belief in the day of resurrection, when, as in a theatre, the last revolutions are ended and the 
actors appear once more on the stage, to complete and make up the catastrophe of this great 
piece.” (24), Sebald’s awareness of the utter impossibility of Browne’s spiritual theology is 
apparent in his problematizing question: what sort of theater is it where the audience and 
performers are one and the same? For of what significance is this re-staging if there is still absent 
the distinct consciousness of both performers and observers? In a silent universe, who is aware of 
such radical drama? 
Yet Sebald seems to be quite aware of—not only in inquiry, but in response to—the 
complications Browne’s spiritualism raises, for as he wanders through the English countryside, 
he chronicles the ruins he encounters—be they medieval towns, Victorian manors, or abandoned 
beach towns—with a certain resignation and acceptance of their irretrievable ruin and passage 
into oblivion. An overlying perspectival awareness is fostered in which Sebald comes to see 
history from an atemporal vantage point—but cannot make sense of its chaotic clutter. While 
reflecting on his viewing of the Waterloo Panorama—a domed rotunda that is framed by a mural 
of the battle at Waterloo—Sebald is prompted again to think of the outlying panoply as “a 
deserted stage”, and this time, as a stage of history:  
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This then, I thought, as I looked round about me, is the representation of history. It 
requires a falsification of perspective. We, the survivors, see everything from above, see 
everything at once, and still we do not know how it was. (125) 
Unable to make sense of the great ruin of history, Sebald echoes Walter Benjamin’s renown 
angel of history who “sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet.” (“History” 392)108 Yet, unlike Benjamin’s angel, Sebald’s narrator might not 
know “how it was” but might still appreciate how ruins “cast us forward in time,” as Brian 
Dillon puts it—for in a certain historical paradox, “the ruin, despite its state of decay, somehow 
outlives us.” (11) 
 Occupying and embodying ruin, Sebald discovers decadence, decay, and an accumulation 
of inchoate images in his interpersonal interaction with the members of the Ashburys, a family 
that occupies a small country house at the foot of the Slieve Bloom Mountains in Ireland and 
with whom Sebald recalls his interactions many years ago. Upon being instructed to check with 
the now-deserted Ashbury bed and breakfast, both Sebald and his hosts partake of a ghostly 
dance, in which the greeter, Catherine, “looked right through” him, and she herself “walks in 
silence,” “barefoot,” vanishing into “the darkness of the background” (209). Not only are the 
Ashburys physical embodiments of ruinage and relics of time past, but Sebald’s integration into 
the family is paradoxically traumatic and tempting. At first, he records that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 For more on Sebald and Benjamin, see, for example, Eric Santner’s On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 
(Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 2006); David Kaufmann’s “Angels Visit the Scene of Disgrace: Melancholy and 
Trauma from Sebald to Benjamin and Back” (Cultural Critique. 70. (Fall 2008): 94-119); and James Chandler’s 
“About Loss: W.G. Sebald’s Romantic Art of Memory” (The South Atlantic Quarterly 102.1 (Winter 2003): 235-
262).  
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 whenever I rested on the that bed over the next few days, my consciousness began to 
 dissolve at the edges, so that at times I could hardly have said how I had got there or 
 indeed where I was. Repeatedly I felt as if I were lying in a traumatic fever in some kind 
 of field hospital. (210)  
Thus fully disassociated, Sebald repeatedly feels as if he “was left in a house that had been 
looted of everything” (ibid.) Upon departing, Mrs. Ashbury confesses to Sebald as follows: 
Unfortunately I am a completely impractical person, caught up in the endless trains of 
thought. All of us are fantasists, ill-equipped for life, the children as much as myself. It 
seems to me sometimes that we never get used to being on this earth and life is just one 
great, ongoing, incomprehensible blunder. (220) 
Aware of living in a state of ruin, of post-history, of transitory time between being and oblivion, 
Mrs. Ashbury echoes a retrospectival awareness that Benjamin’s angel senses in the great 
“catastrophe” of the “single event” of history—the catastrophe of so-called historical progress. 
Yet, Sebald is drawn to this state; and he himself confesses that 
When Mrs. Ashbury had finished her story, I felt that its significance for me lay in an 
unspoken invitation to stay there with them and share in a life that was becoming more 
innocent with every day that passed. The fact that I did not do so was a…[sic] failure that 
still sometimes seems like a shadow crossing my soul. (220)  
Here, Sebald sees a certain attraction in partaking in a state of ruin. This particular form of 
melancholy, of fading into an isolated life “more innocent with every day” is tempting for Sebald 
in that it no longer engages with the progress of the world; it allows the erosion of the world to 
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overtake the Ashburys being in its accumulated ruin. Susan Stewart described this descent into 
oblivion akin to the erasure of the souvenir, the final token of memory from memory itself, as a 
“reunion with the mother with no corresponding regeneration of the symbolic.” (41) This desired 
“innocence,” therefore, is not an ethical state, but an innocence of body politics—an innocence 
of increasingly moving towards baring oneself and embracing oblivion. Finally, as a “shadow,” 
Sebald’s desire to participate in this family’s trajectory towards oblivion triggers the sudden 
return of an embodied awareness of mortality, a wandering towards dissolution. 
The Photographic Gaze: Text and Memory as Photograph  
 Interestingly, in his penultimate interaction with the family, Sebald enjoys a slideshow of 
“mute images of the past” that recalls the years before the Ashburys haunted their present living 
space. Much as the silkworm both acts within Sebald’s disjointed narrative and offers a 
theoretical lens for reading Sebald’s text, the slideshow’s description offers a meta-text for 
reading Sebald’s unexplained usage of uncaptioned pictures throughout his text—even to 
interrupt sentences, at times. Certainly the “shock of discontinuity,” as John Berger notes, 
between “the moment recorded and the present moment” (86) is experienced by Sebald in his 
viewing and our viewing of Sebald’s photography—many of the sites photographed no longer 
exist, or exist only in ruins. Enacting photography is similarly traumatic, in that “most memories 
or momentos seem to confirm, prophetically, the later discontinuity created by the absence or 
death.” (87) 
Regarding the technology of the photography, Barthes writes in a similar vein in his 
Camera Lucida how its bare and immediate testimony of what once was, is in fact, sheer 
‘madness,’ as he calls it, for  
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Until this day no representation could assure me of the past of a thing except by 
intermediaries; but with the Photograph, my certainty is immediate: no one in the world 
can undeceive me. The Photograph then becomes a bizarre medium, a new form of 
hallucination: false on the level of perception, true on the level of time: […] on the one 
hand ‘it is not there,’ on the other ‘but it has indeed been.’ (115) 
What is reassuring, then, about Sebald’s project of what is not only photography but is, 
somehow, a distinctly textual photography, is that it retains the image of what has “indeed been.” 
Barthes writes earlier, interestingly enough, that “photography has something to do with 
resurrection” (82)—not because the subjects of photography recur, but because the photograph 
repeats mechanically that which is existentially irretrievable.109 It happened, as Lerner’s 
protagonist might say, even if it never occurred—and that is enough for an inclusion within 
history. For Sebald’s project of melancholy, however, the photographic fixation on the loss of 
self is itself a mechanical gesture that promises future recall for the material object, apart from 
the irretrievable temporality. Reading in space, rather than time, is the eternal recurrence—and 
resurrection—of the photography.  
With this ethical orientation towards the use of photography in Sebald’s work, his text 
might be termed hybrid photographic-text: text, photograph, photograph of photograph, even art 
image—all are constituted within as the theoretical photograph that retains this strange material 
essence that Barthes imagines. Perhaps it is the strangely archival nature of the images in 
Sebald’s text that foregrounds the entire text’s tacit photographic agenda. In this regard, it may 
be useful to cite Benjamin’s own quotation archive: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See Barthes, where a fuller exposition of such mechanical resurrection is explored (4). Siegfried Kracauer’s 
conception of photography differs wildly from Barthes’. For Kracauer, photography operates against memory in that 
it fixes a particular image in history. A memory image, on the other hand, “is loosened from any single moment of 
remembering.” For more, see Esther Leslie, “Siegfired Kracauer and Walter Benjamin” in Memory: Histories, 
Theories, Debates (New York, NY: Fordham UP, 2010), 126.  
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The past has left images of itself in literary texts, images comparable to those which are 
imprinted by light on a photosensitive plate. The future alone possesses developers active 
enough to scan such surfaces perfectly. Many pages in Marivaux or Rousseau contain a 
mysterious meaning which the first readers of these texts could not fully have deciphered. 
(“Convolute N” 482) 
Photographs (invoked here as a metaphor for text) anticipate “mysterious meanings” that were 
very possibly indecipherable to their original viewers. In this regard, it should also be recalled 
that Benjamin’s ideal form of archival pastiche, as embodied in his unpublished Das Passegen-
werk, is that which speaks structurally through a work that consists entirely of quotations, all of 
whose relations, constellations, and after-lives are constantly in a process of interpretation and 
realization. Benjamin thus preserves the unknown alterity, the “shadow” of history, in such a 
work of literary fragmentation, even as its reading and (re)collection demands a certain and 
distinctly fresh relationality both among its texts and between its self and reader. Esther Leslie, 
in reading Benjamin’s use of photography in his memoirs of Berlin, suggests a similar 
belatedness to the photography’s forward-looking use of memory:  
 The camera’s undiscriminating eye absorbs more than is consciously perceived and 
 records it all for later examination. In similar fashion, memory develops belatedly into 
 understanding, just as a photograph snatches an image from time and presents it to the 
 world again only after a process of development. (128)  
Of course, in reference to both the belatedness and futurity of memory’s realization, one need 
only quote Benjamin’s famous aphorism regarding the jetz-zeit—or now time—the “now of 
recognizability” that forms the constellation of the past and present at a standstill and into which 
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the past is blasted and in which “things adopt their true—surrealistic—face.” (“Convolute N” 
464) 
Creaturely Mourning: The Subject-as-Object 
	  
Whereas Summers-Bremner, Judith Ryan,110 and others see despair in Sebald’s 
melancholic gaze and a clear departure from Benjamin’s redemptive vision of history, I suggest 
that Sebald’s melancholic gaze has not been properly theorized.111 If his literary fiction wavers 
between the hope of recurrence and the despair of oblivion, one should remember that the 
transmigration Sebald proposes is of the peculiar form of theater he bemoans—the theater in 
which one is both audience and actor. This awareness of one’s bodily affinity with what Eric 
Santner calls “the creaturely” (xiii) is that non-dualistic awareness of one’s own self as material-
in-the-world. Ultimately, such an awareness allows for an ethical mourning of Sebald’s own 
narratological self, in that it allows for the subtle shifts in this text that transform the narrator 
from gazing reader to object-to-be-read, or receiver of the gaze.112  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See her “Fulgurations: Sebald and Surrealism,” The Germanic Review 82.3 (2007), 227-49. 
111 Some have developed critical theories about Sebald’s use of photography that refuse to theorize positively about 
his overwhelming ambivalence. See, for example, Silke Horstkotte’s “Photo-Text Topographies: Photography and 
the Representation of Space in W.G. Sebald and Monika Maron,” Poetics Today 29.1 (Spring 2008), 57: “The space 
between photography and text in Sebald’s works may be said to function as a gap or fissure in representation, 
causing the three spatial distinctions to overlap: represented space and the space of representation blend into the 
extratextual space of the reader, who becomes responsible for an interpretive integration of photography and text. 
On the one hand, Sebald’s presentation and placement of photographs is always suggestive of a meaning that 
negates the relegating of the photographic image to a subordinate position; but on the other hand, the lack of direct 
textual commentary leaves that meaning ambiguous.” 
112 Similar to my argument about a non-mourning, non-melancholic, but transformative melancholy, a “loose self,” 
Kathy Behrendt argues that Sebald’s work traces a middle-ground between both narrativist and non-narrativist 
schools: “Sebald’s work exemplifies narrative skepticism while conveying a profound sense of the importance of 
memory. This cuts through the false dichotomy that places concern for memory on the side of the narrativists and 
treats the anti-narrativist as free to reject or downplay memory’s significance. The implications for the narrative 
debate about selves are several. One is that the evident importance of memory to narrativism is no assurance that 
those who value the importance of memory will embrace the narrative outlook. Sebald offers a stark alternative to 
this outlook—one in which the past and one’s personal connection to it make closure, completeness, and self-unity 
remote, even inappropriate, aspirations. But conversely, the anti-narrativist needn’t feel compelled to advocate the 
unimportance of memory in order to sustain her position. There is a host of reasons for believing that a deep and 
compelling interest in the past is not merely the jurisdiction of the narrativist.” (407) 
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Certainly such awareness brings its own deep subjective confusion; it is an ethics of the 
subject, in other words, that attends to the objectivity always already present within the subject 
itself. In fact, in Sebald’s wandering through Orfordness, an abandoned English island, he is 
“frightened almost to death” in what is objectively a humbling visual exchange with the 
“creaturely” embodied in a hare:  
In that very fraction of a second when its paralyzed state turned into panic and flight, its 
fear cut right through me. I still see what occurred in that one tremulous instant with an 
undiminished clarity. I see the edge of the grey tarmac and every individual blade of 
grass, I see the hare leaping out of its hiding place, with its ears laid back and a 
curiously human expression that was rigid with terror and strangely divided; and in its 
eyes, turning to look back as it fled and almost popping out of its head with fright, I see 
myself, become one with it. (235) 
Sebald’s revelation here seems to be a reversal of how Agamben reads Heidegger’s “Dasein;” in 
Agamben’s words, “Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has 
awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. This awakening of the living being to 
its own being-captivated, this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human” (The 
Open 70). However, the bare animality imagined by Sebald in his rupturing exchange with the 
hare, is a disruptive force in that it undoes his own humanity—it does, in some sense, anticipate 
his own death. 
That such a breakthrough in experiencing the creaturely, the non-human, the objective 
world appears in terms that suggest mirroring is significant for Sebald, and arguably, is neatly 
supplemented in a relation of photographic images dispersed throughout his text. Observe the 
“colorless patch of sky framed in the window” (4), a gridded aperture from his psychiatric ward, 
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alongside the image of a solitary Chinese quail fenced and enclosed (37). Here, arguably, the 
quail’s experience is both observed and internalized in Sebald’s own; no relation links the two 
images other than that of readerly association and distinct visual perspective and emphasis: the 
quail might see outward what Sebald sees within; and such an association is invoked through 
both the choice of disconcerting perspective and in the graphic emphasis of netting in both 
pictures—a visual pattern that evokes, for Nico Israel, mapping as a sort of self-imprisonment in 
modernity,113 and in my reading of their correspondence, a simultaneous entrapment and 
porousness. In this context, a critical intertext that Sebald invokes regarding such an ambivalent 
creaturely perspective is Kafka’s Gregor Samsa, the “Ungeziefer,” or unspecified vermin of The 
Metamorphosis; while leaning against the glass, Sebald  
[…] Could not help thinking of the scene in which poor Gregor Samsa, his little legs 
trembling, climbs the armchair and looks out of his room, no longer remembering (so 
Kafka’s narrative goes) the sense of liberation that gazing out of the window had 
formerly given him. (5) 
Assuming such a creaturely perspective, then, threatens to undermine the very awareness of 
subjectivity or self-consciousness—to look outward, as a human, is to be transformed into a 
creature. Wandering, when taken this far, leads to an awareness of the self as an Other.  
The photographic gaze, that is, the gaze aware of the shadow, aware of the eternally 
material, and aware of a dissolution into the creaturely is really an enactment of mirroring 
(between the human and the creaturely, between the subject and the object, between presence 
and absence) and resistance to mirroring—a creative, stylized association that is both narcissistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 In reading the window image as a form of mapping, the foil of spiraling (and the subject of his work), Israel 
writes: “Its grid effectively reduces the Suffolk expanses to a sign of imprisonment, recalling the modern latitudinal 
and longitudinal mapping of the globe that eventually abetted the earth’s conquering. Here the gestures of mapping 
and conquering extends, from the perspective of the bedridden narrator, to the sky.” (212)  
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and delusional that stands as an animating feature in Sebald’s text. It is a gaze that is entirely 
melancholic, and entirely that of the creative, in other words. In his Stanzas, Giorgio Agamben 
explicates fully the affinity between these two faculties by pivoting his analysis on the 
phantasmic nature of the melancholic: the melancholic must imagine a loss that never occurs, 
and in doing so, the melancholic creates that which never was. Agamben writes, while 
elaborating upon Aristotle’s theory of the melancholic-as-artist114, that  
The traditional association of melancholy with artistic activity finds its justification 
precisely in the exacerbated phantasmatic practice that constitutes their common trait 
[…] the imaginary loss that so obsessively occupies the melancholic tendency has no 
real object, because its funereal strategy is directed to the impossible capture of the 
phantasm. The lost object is but the appearance that desire creates for its own courting 
of the phantasm, and the introjections of the libido is only one of the facets of a process 
in which what is real loses its reality so that what is unreal may become real. (25)  
The imagination, in this sense, creates loss in order to capture and recreate. This creative faculty 
persists under the melancholic’s gaze, and it is the work of the wandering mind and peripatetic 
narrator of Rings that symbolically ceases its associative spirals through the cessation of 
mirroring, in the non-closure, the fragmentary ending, of the book’s end. 
For as the work comes to a close, Sebald recalls the customary act of mourning, as 
practiced by his patron saint Sir Thomas Browne, as a covering of all mirrors and landscapes, so 
that the soul will not be distracted in its movement towards an afterlife. Sebald writes: 
And Sir Thomas Browne, who was the son of a silk merchant and may well have had an 
eye for these things, remarks in a passage of the Pseudodoxia Epidemica that I can no 
longer find that in the Holland of his time it was customary, in a home where there had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 See, for example, Aristotle’s Problemata XXX.1 953a, 10-14 
129	  
	  
	   	  
been a death, to drape black mourning ribbons over all the mirrors and all canvasses 
depicting landscapes or people or the fruits of the field, so that the soul, as it left the 
body, would not be distracted on its final journey, either by a reflection of itself or by a 
last glimpse of the land now being lost forever. (296) 
Mirroring here is the associative, productive work of a ‘loose’ melancholy, it is the seductive 
self-gaze that is at once fixated upon the oceanic ruin and reading Thomas Browne’s skull into 
its afterlife; and so to cover mirrors, then, is to at once silence the soul and cease its attachments: 
doing so releases the experience of narrative as spoken and embodied to become object or text-
to-be-read. What remains is a productive indeterminacy.  
Saturn carries certain melancholic connotations in historical and etymological registers, 
but the rings of Saturn, as Sebald makes us aware in his encyclopedic epigraph to his work, are 
transformed and re-constituted materials: 
The rings of Saturn consist of ice crystals and probably meteorite particles describing 
circular orbits around the planet’s equator. In all likelihood these are fragments of a 
former moon that was too close to the planet and was destroyed by its tidal effect. (i)  
In Sebald’s poetics, then, the rings of Saturn are themselves the realization of a transformative 
possibility for imaginary wandering even in—and perhaps because of—their relation to the 
fixed, saturnine, melancholic gaze. Form’s transience—and drifting mobility—is a fact of being 
in the world, but the ethical stance of the subject that honors, recognizes, and attends to its subtle 
alterity indicated in the shadow both anticipates and follows an object’s transmigration, its 
passing through and on, its mobile pilgrimage into the next material incarnation. Despite its 
oceanic form, then, the material world’s procession of becoming is both celebrated and mourned 
through Sebald’s melancholically photographic gaze. However, in the absence of a subject’s 
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ethical orientation—in the absence of an ethical subject—memory’s creative recollection 
becomes lost to history.  
 With this conclusion, Sebald’s Rings of Saturn achieves a work of self-mourning that 
transcends its melancholic (self)-gaze by offering itself as historical object or text to the reader in 
its own cessation of mirroring and associating. The reader, then, makes sense of the text’s own 
traumatic melancholy by experiencing it anew—recreating it with each read—and ceasing this 
search for meaning amongst the historical catastrophe only with the abrupt and traumatic end, or 
death of the text. The readerly experience of the text, therefore, re-enacts Sebald’s own quest, 
and it concludes without any resolution other than absorption of the readerly experience back 
into the creaturely objectivity, in Being, or what Rilke calls “the Open” in his “Eighth Elegy” 
(the inspiration for Santner’s book title): [“Mit allen Augen sieht die Kreatur / das Offene”] 
“With all its eyes the natural world looks out / into the Open.” (1-2) The reader is thus reclaimed 
by the object-world, much as Sebald’s narrator is reclaimed by the object-world in his 
simultaneous cessation—from wandering—as narrator and through a (wandering) transmigration 
into being as text-object. 
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Chapter 4: Amnesic Fictions: Narrating Beyond Memory 
Lerner’s work, as I’ve shown, explores the cognitive base of memory as an ontological 
multiplicity; Sebald’s work, while less interested in multiplying subjectivities, acknowledges the 
weight of history’s burden as cognized by the remembering subject.  Both works figure memory, 
and the capacity to remember, as a central presence to the poetics of wandering. Even when 
memory refuses to contribute to a subject’s narrativity or autobiographical identity, the narrating 
subject’s basic capacity for recollection and remembered association is assumed by both authors, 
and as I’ve shown, in the form of wandering.  
 Absent the capacity to remember, however, what are strategies of narrating and 
representing experience? Is it possible, in other words, to imagine a narrating identity without a 
situated memory? It is possible for an amnesic to write a work of memory—a memoir—absent 
the capacity for recollection and the associated identity with an autobiographical past? As the 
flipside to Lerner and Sebald, this chapter is not concerned with wandering through too much 
memory, or wandering within memory—instead, it reads wandering as the very base of 
perception in amnesic narrators and narration. 
 Without autobiographical context or even the capacity for recollection, narrative 
techniques of wandering perception experiment with cognitive mimesis in first or third person 
forms. As I’ll show, amnesia and amnesic narratives can take varied forms in both fiction and 
memoir, and so no particular model will be the focus of this chapter’s study. In the case of Kazuo 
Ishiguro’s The Unconsoled (1995), Ryder, the work’s first-person narrator, exists in a perpetual 
state of present-tense perception, with only a vague sense of autobiography and purpose as he 
wanders the streets of a dreamy Central European city. In Maud Casey’s The Man Who Walked 
Away, Albert Dadas, a historical fugueur, is described by an omniscient third-person narrator as 
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wandering dissociatively—departing home and arriving elsewhere without an identifiable 
memory of his travels. And in David Stuart MacLean’s The Answer to the Riddle is Me, a work 
addressed in this dissertation’s conclusion, MacLean begins his amnesic memoir on a train 
platform in India and without a sense of autobiographical identity. Without insight into memory 
loss, without insight into the lack of autobiographical context, without the ability to recall lived 
experience, and without the ability to recollect autobiography, each work adopts various 
strategies for narrating cognition and representing identity aside for and apart from the normative 
narrativity and memory that typically constitute subjectivity.  
 In particular, I discuss how the works’ narrative techniques require any of the following: 
experimental first person narration in which a character narrates perception absent memory; third 
person narration describing a character’s fugue states; and first person recollection—a sort of 
first person/third person hybrid—of estranged perception. In each instance, the narrator must 
circumvent conventional techniques for narrativity based on recollection and capacity for recall, 
and in each instance, I show, such narrators offer critiques, in their very performances, through 
an aestheticized, narratological, and cognitive form of wandering.  
 In reading these experiments in narratorial consciousness, I focus on the theory and 
articulation of narrating consciousness beyond the normative limits of intentionality, or Theory 
of Mind (ToM) and the relation between the literary gesture, as theorized by Benjamin, and 
disabled narratorial consciousness. With a focus on certain sequences in which discontinuous 
consciousness overshadows diachronic awareness to such a degree that the singular gesture is the 
only perceptible experience to be narrated, I suggest that these works challenge the 
conventionally teleological narrative consciousness of travel narratives through their foreclosure 
of context. However, I show that such a cognitive problematic has been sufficiently explored 
133	  
	  
	   	  
with regards to inquiries into empathy and Theory of Mind with regards to autism, and I suggest 
that a comparable disability is narrated here, as Theory of Mind demands an awareness and 
judgment of contextual normativity.  
For Levinas, as shown in the introduction to this dissertation, embodied cognition occurs 
before recognition; for Benjamin, gestural writing—and reading—generates a certain 
attentiveness. Both phenomenological choices, I’ve shown in my readings of the Romantics, 
Lerner, and Sebald, carry certain non-normative weights in relation to conventional narrativity, 
and both are burdened with a significant aesthetic and ethic of attentiveness to the motion of 
perception and the isolated, perceived gesture. In the genealogy of the wandering narrator, then, 
we may acknowledge both the form and content of his embodied and cognitive mode: he is 
preoccupied by gestures in his pre-recognition cognition; in his recollection, he circles about the 
blindspots of his memory, both frustrated and liberated by the nearly existentialist capacity to 
make his life anew, unhindered by the structuring, normative forms of autobiographical 
narrativity.  
With the understanding that the poetics of wandering exists in a perceptual space that 
approximates both consciousness at-a-standstill and the attentiveness generated by the gesture, 
we can rethink the possibilities for narrative consciousness when represented beyond the 
normative scale. In particular, in what follows, I suggest that we rethink the limits of narratable 
consciousness in the absence of memory, a normative Theory of Mind, and a normative capacity 
for narrativity—and to start, in the narrative of an amnesic wanderer in Kazauo Ishiguro’s The 
Unconsoled, an important inheritor of Sebald’s fiction and technique.115 I follow my reading of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Ishiguro received his master’s degree in creative fiction from the University of East Anglia in 1980, where W.G. 
Sebald had already been teaching in the English department for 10 years. While Sebald only first began publishing 
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Ishiguro’s amnesic—a narrator whose memory does not extend beyond the immediate 
moment—with a reading of Maud Casey’s The Man Who Walked Away, a far more pathologized 
fictionalization of such a dissociated amnesia. I conclude the chapter—and this study—with a 
few notes about the present interest in amnesic memoir and the associated aesthetic, social, and 
political challenges and opportunities in this emerging sub-genre.  
To start, then: The first section of this chapter employs a phenomenological, cognitive, 
and aesthetic framework for thinking through impasses in normative cognition represented in the 
absence of Theory of Mind in Kazuo Ishiguro’s text of a wandering body and mind, The 
Unconsoled (1995). The aesthetic theory of the gesture, as articulated by Walter Benjamin, in his 
reading of Kafka, is shown as the aesthetic correlate and absolute nexus to a decontextualized 
moment of perception that is, too, an embodied form of episodic consciousness. This culminating 
theory of the gesture, in particular, offers a useful lens for reading the embodied, episodically 
amnesic wandering undertaken by Ishigruo’s narrator Ryder. By reading Benjamin’s reading of 
Kafka alongside select passages of Ishiguro’s work, I show that contrary to Lisa Zunshine’s 
position that normative bounds of empathy—a Theory of Mind—are necessary for representing 
narrative consciousness, Ishiguro’s text, by way of the structural underpinnings of wandering, 
allow for the mimesis of an arguably non-normative form of consciousness.  
Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Cognitive Cultural Studies 
In his study “Facial Expression Theory from Romanticism to the Present,” Alan Richardson 
reminds us that “successful social communication” would be greatly impoverished if “we did not 
have a reasonably reliable and speedy, and therefore largely unconscious, cognitive mechanism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in the late 1980’s, and while there’s no record of any correspondence or interaction between the two thinkers, it’s 
quite difficult to imagine that the two thinkers had not interacted and read one another’s work. 
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for gauging the emotions and intentions of others through reading their faces.” (65) This innately 
sympathetic capacity for “mind-reading”—that is, for interpreting others’ facial expressions as 
indicative of internal states of mind—is historically termed “Theory of Mind” (ToM) by 
cognitive psychologists, philosophers, and primatologists.116  
Notably, discussion of ToM has mostly revolved around the question of successful or 
failed empathy, with autism as the standard for such cognitive failure. In 1985, Simon Baron-
Cohen conducted a critical study that “strongly support[ed] the hypothesis that autistic children 
as a group fail to employ a theory of mind.” (“Autistic Child” 43) The experiment’s procedures 
challenged the children’s capacity to identify the beliefs held by another. In the experiment, the 
children witnessed a puppet show in which a marble was first placed by one puppet, Sally, into 
her own basket. Following Sally’s exit, another puppet, Anne, transferred the marble from 
Sally’s basket into her own. Then the children were asked the “Belief Question”: “Where will 
Sally look for her marble [upon returning]?” If the children pointed to the previous location of 
the marble, then they passed the Belief Question; if they pointed to the marble’s current location, 
they failed the question, “by not taking into account the doll’s belief” (41). Ultimately, Baron-
Cohen concluded that such a failure demonstrated “a cognitive deficit that is largely independent 
of general intellectual level and has the potential to explain both lack of pretend play and social 
impairment by virtue of a circumscribed cognitive failure” (44). In his later and more thorough 
study of the subject, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and a Theory of Mind, Baron-Cohen 
highlights the necessary and effortless nature of such normative mind-reading: theory of mind, 
he writes, is the act of “attributing mental states to a complex system (such as a human being)” 
(Mindblindness 21); the failure to properly imagine another’s cognitive mechanisms is a failure, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 For further theorization regarding the evolutionary, psychological, and philosophical theories for ToM, see Peter 
Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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for Baron-Cohen and others—including Gloria Origgi, Dan Sperber,117 and Ann Jurecic118—to 
be properly empathic.  
 Just as the work of reading human behavior and expression primarily depends on the 
internal operations of empathy, Alan Palmer suggests that the work of reading fictive texts 
likewise succeeds to the degree of empathic imaginary generated in its reader, for “narrative is, 
in essence, the description of fictional mental functioning. . . . Readers enter the storyworlds of 
novels primarily by attempting to follow the workings of the fictional minds contained in them.” 
(“Storyworlds” 177) It is for this reason that Palmer thinks it particularly useful to consider the 
various theoretical frameworks of cognitive psychology in literary analysis, for all readers “have 
to be cognitivists. Otherwise, we would not be able to read at all” (ibid.).  
Certainly, much recent work has been done in bringing the humanities into conversation 
with cognitive psychology. Lisa Zunshine, editor of the recent collection of such a hybridity 
titled Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies (2010), recounts how “the membership in the 
MLA official discussion group on cognitive approaches to literature has grown from 250 in 
1999, the year It was organized, to more than 1,750 in 2010.” (“Introduction” 1) But Zunshine 
herself, a founder of and pioneering scholar in the field of cognitive studies, notes the necessarily 
reciprocal relationship between the two fields. While scholars such as Palmer successfully map 
cognitive readings onto literary texts, illuminating structural complexity and psychological 
profundity within the text’s construction, Zunshine wonders if it is when “writers of fiction 
experiment with our mind-reading ability, and perhaps even push it further, that the insights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 See Gloria Orrigi and Dan Sperber, “Evolution, Communication, and the Proper Function of Language,” in 
Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language, and Meta-Cognition, ed. Peter Carruthers and Andrew 
Chamberlain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 140–69. 
118 See Ann Jurecic, “Mindblindness: Autism, Writing, and the Problem of Empathy,” Literature and Medicine 25.1 
(Spring 2006), 1–23. 
137	  
	  
	   	  
offered by cognitive scientists become particularly pertinent.” (“Theory of Mind” 203) She 
continues:  
Is it possible that literary narrative trains our capacity for mind reading and also 
tests its limits? How do different cultural-historical milieus encourage different 
literary exploration of this capacity? How do different genres? Speculative and 
tentative as the answers to these questions are at this point, they mark the 
possibility of a genuine interaction between cognitive psychology and literary 
studies, with both fields having much to offer to each other [my emphasis]. (ibid.) 
The burgeoning field of cognitive literary analysis, then, should turn towards experimental 
literariness and its accompanying history of critical scholarship. As Zunshine notes, the long 
history of literary experiment enjoys both replicating normative cognition and challenging those 
very norms by testing their limits and even speculating what might lie beyond their bounds. 
Ultimately, such a project would place literary structures and aesthetics in an active, reciprocal 
relation with cognitive studies.  
As a paradigm for literary experiment, there may be no better place to look than early 
twentieth-century modernism and its long literary genealogy across the twentieth century. For, 
while certain literatures before the twentieth century were often cast as reflecting both the social 
and the cognitive norms of their contemporaneous settings, literary modernism was interested, 
self-consciously, to “make it new,” as Ezra Pound put it in 1934. Modernism’s identifying 
features, in broad strokes, were to subvert and reimagine the aesthetics of conventional forms, 
methods, and styles prevalent in the existing arts and literatures.119 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See, for example, Peter Childs’s excellent introduction to the field for a thorough treatment of the shift in 
aesthetics across disciplines: Modernism (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
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As an extended application of the interdisciplinarity between modernist aesthetics and 
cognitive psychology, then, I would like to examine particular expressionist aesthetics within 
The Unconsoled, with an eye for the work of Ishiguro’s literary and aesthetic progenitor, Franz 
Kafka. Select passages by both authors, I argue, demonstrate aesthetically the limits of normative 
ToM by experimenting with non-normative methods of narration. In so doing, I also want to 
challenge some of Zunshine’s assumptions regarding the application of ToM to literary study, 
with the hope of discovering new methods of reading apart and aside from those performed by 
normative cognition. Ultimately, however, I want to channel Zunshine’s assertion that the history 
of literary experiment and its accompanying scholarship might generate unique and useful 
models of narrative cognition, the very purpose of this dissertation, more generally.  
Modernism and Cognitive Experiment: Amnesia and the Limits of Theory of Mind 
Ishiguro’s body of work has been invariably misunderstood as solely concerned with 
memory’s functions and movements, oftentimes besetting his work with a certain ontology—
amnesia, dream-space—of which his readers (but never his characters) are solely aware. Michiko 
Kakutani, writing in the New York Times, describes The Unconsoled, for example, as “Alice on a 
visit to Wonderland: he finds himself going in and out of strange little doors that apparently lead 
him in circles.”120 Others, like Barry Lewis, have suggested that his characters are beset with an 
“inexplicable amnesia,” (104) one, Natalie Reitano’s reading, that they can “barely 
acknowledge” (361). Eluding a simple diagnosis in its fictional manifestation, other writers have 
puzzled over the complexity of Ryder’s amnesic presentation. Rebecca Walkowicz writes, for 
example, that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 “From Kazuo Ishiguro, A New Annoying Hero,” The New York Times, October 17, 1995.  
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Ryder’s problem is not his inability to face the past in figurations so much as his inability 
to acknowledge that the past, always figured, cannot be faced. Ryder cannot see, as all of 
Ishiguro’s protagonists cannot, that one takes responsibility for the past only by 
acknowledging its loss: the attempt to deny this loss, and thereby to deny that there is any 
betrayal of self or community…[is] the worst evasion of all. (1050) 
Walkowicz thus frames the question of forgetfulness as one of evasion—denying the loss of a 
past is to live, in her reading of Ishiguro, in a solipsistic “floating world.” Others read the 
amnesic consciousness of Ryder as far less nefarious. Barry Lewis famously frames Ryder’s 
consciousness as occupying a dream-space, though perhaps not his own—he concludes 
uncertainly “Whose dream it is, is not clear.” A. Harris Fairbanks responds with an ontological 
read of such a dreamspace, the literalization of which becomes the ground of the characters’ 
logic: 
The answer I would propose to Lewis’s question is that Ryder is not living in anyone’s 
dream but in a dreamworld, one that has no ulterior reality behind it, a world in which 
events happen to a given subject ego in the ways that they happen in dreams and which 
that ego registers in ways typical of dreaming rather than waking life. (605) 
Ishiguro himself has characterized his novels’ work as occupying the logic of a dream 
space, aligning himself with the ontological category of Fairbanks’ most recent argument 
regarding the narrator’s lack of insight and others’ projected forgetfulness, too. In an essay of 
mine (parts of which are featured in this dissertation), I assume that at least the partial amnesic 
consciousness of Ishiguro’s narrator generates a disabled form of consciousness.121  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See Hillel Broder. “Attending to the Gesture in Experimental Modernism; or, Reading with(out) Theory of 
Mind.” Philosophy and Literature 38.1 (2014): A230-A247. 
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Still, regardless of its ontological characterization, his work is always deeply 
contextualized within sites of movement and through mobility. Like Sebald’s itinerant narrators, 
the narrators of nearly all of Ishiguro’s work are, for their entire narrative scopes, errant and 
mobile, circling cities (The Unconsoled, When We Were Orphans) and shuttling across country-
sides (Never Let Me Go, Remains of the Day, The Buried Giant). In his other works (A Floating 
Artist, A View of Pale Hills) such movement is far less embodied, but as engaging and sometimes 
as difficult to trace. However, it goes without saying that even the superficial concerns of the two 
modernists under consideration possess distinct affinities. In her reading of The Unconsoled, 
Reitano opens with the admission that “among the initial reviews” of the work, “few failed to 
point out the novel’s stylistic evocation of Kafka.” (361) Reitano is certainly correct in her 
general assertion that Ishiguro’s text mimics Kafka’s work in its surreal, dreamlike quality that 
insists on a nearly mundane realism in its depiction of private failure within the public sphere.122 
Others, more recently, have explored more systematic parallels between the text, with Robert 
Lemon’s comprehensive chapter on the Kafkaesque and the Kafkan (an important distinction) 
parallels in Ishiguro as a leading study.123 
However, I intend to go beyond the relatively cursory parallels between Ishiguro’s and 
Kafka’s dizzying plots, character compositions, and disorienting ambience and suggest that 
Ishiguro’s uniquely Kafkan genealogy lies in the formal mode of the two authors’ correlating 
aesthetic and cognitive structures. It is apparent from the very start that Ryder, the confident but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 A brief perusal of reviews contemporaneous with the book’s release evince this to be the case. Michiko Kakutani, 
for example, see Ryder, Ishiguro’s amnesic pianist protagonist, and his misadventures as “sometimes” sounding 
“like a Kafka character, caught up in a mysterious and vaguely sinister plot that surpasses his understanding,” while 
“at other moments” sounding “more like Alice on a visit to Wonderland: he finds himself going in and out of strange 
little doors that apparently lead him in circles, and he meets an assortment of curious people who draw him into a 
series of intrigues that threaten to distract him from his appointed rounds.” 
123 See Robert Lemon, “The Comfort of Strangeness: Correlating the Kafkaesque and the Kafkan in Ishiguro’s The 
Unconsoled” in Kafka for the Twenty-First Century ed. Stanley Corngold, Ruth V. Gross, (Camden House: 
Rochester, NY, 2011) 
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unreliable narrator of The Unconsoled, occupies a sort of amnesic dream-space: he is aware of 
his own self and surroundings but seems to wander in and out of—to ride—an anchoring stream 
of long-term memory. His orientation is driven mostly by tangents, and he fails utterly to project 
himself onto a greater narrative. Most of all, he seems to lack certain insight into his condition, a 
typical characteristic of a dreamer’s state of mind. Indeed, in an interview, Ishiguro himself has 
argued that the novel’s mindscape replicates the insight into its own condition that a dreaming 
mind lacks, and in this sense, the surreal consciousness represented is closest to that of a 
dreamer. 
Reading Ryder: Aesthetics and Cognition 
	  
For the purposes of this chapter, however, I draw attention to the microcosmic 
phenomenology of character by looking at the uncanny, telescopic moments or “double takes” 
that Ryder reports, as well as the highly theatrical and often disturbing gestures that Ryder 
witnesses; in so doing, I demonstrate that Ishiguro inherits and adapts Kafka’s troubled 
relationship with character, as read by Benjamin. In this sense, both Kafka’s narrators and 
Ishiguro’s Ryder perform a particular form of non-normative reading that challenges theories of 
reading that employ ToM as their base. Zunshine glosses ToM as the cognitive tool that enables 
normative, or “proper,” reading. What follows, then, are particular readings that demonstrate 
both Ryder’s failure to read—as well as the Kafkan precedents to such failures—and the 
resulting focused attentiveness generated by such a failure of ToM. Such decontextualized, 
arrested, or “disabled” forms of reading, I will suggest, are enabled by a concurrent focus on the 
gestural and an absence of contextualized ToM, which subsequently allows for the cultivation of 
a particularly elusive form of attentiveness within a wandering mind.  
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But to enjoy such readings, or readings of the failure of reading, one must have the proper 
narrative context. Admittedly, a summary of beginnings and ends in The Unconsoled 
demonstrates its quotidian and seemingly unexceptional story line—only in the experience of 
reading Ishiguro’s work does one appreciate his formal innovation and Kafkan invocation and is 
one properly challenged as a reader; on the surface, then, the tale is simple enough. Ryder, an 
amnesic pianist arrives in an unnamed Central European town to perform a much-anticipated 
recital. Over the course of three days, he encounters various other characters, including Sophia, a 
woman who relates to him as a girlfriend, and Boris, Sophia’s son, who relates to him as a son 
(Ryder, of course, aside from a vague sense of recognition and slight déjà vu, seems to be 
unaware of the depth of their mutual—and true familial—relationships). Sophia’s father, Gustav, 
is Ryder’s porter at the hotel, and Gustav becomes quite involved in interweaving Ryder’s life 
with Sophia’s and Boris’s. Hoffman, the manager of the hotel, oversees Ryder’s care and his 
affairs, and Hoffman’s son, an aspiring pianist and disappointment to his parents, relates his 
failures and hopes to Ryder. Finally, Leo Brodsky, the town’s orchestra conductor, drunkard, and 
provincial beacon of hope and inspiration, bares his heart to Ryder when his dog dies and when 
he is rejected by Miss Collins, the town’s foundational therapist.  
Over the course of his stay, Ryder flits from one scene to the next, from one character 
cluster to the next, all the while missing unknown appointments and meetings, seemingly 
obeying no structured schedule, often improperly dressed, and usually neglecting the objective of 
his visit: to inspire the town with his artistic talent and complete the work Brodsky fails to fulfill. 
Ryder’s amnesia seems to keep his conscience absolved to the very end of the novel, even as he 
unknowingly interferes in others’ lives: his missive is perpetually interrupted by his attempts to 
fulfill a favor or need to those around him, but he is unaware of a “grand narrative” or larger 
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sense of purpose. His amnesia allows him to steadily engage with a perpetual present at the 
expense of a lost past or expectant future; for, even when he misses the culminating recital at the 
very end of the novel, he consoles himself later that day by riding a bus around the circuit of the 
city with a buttery croissant in hand, the memory of his final and most important missed 
appointment, his musical denouement, dissolving as rapidly as the melting butter.  
One need only follow Ryder, or read even a few lines of Ishiguro’s restrained but nearly 
explosive prose, to sense the uncanny nature of Ryder’s narratorial consciousness—as well as 
Ishiguro’s distinct Kafkan register. Take an early moment in the novel during which Ryder, 
strangely enough, visits a local movie theater on a late night, having followed the advice of his 
hotel manager, Hoffman. Having spent much of his time in the theater chatting with those 
surrounding him, observing raucous card games, and, in general (and along with most of the 
audience), missing the feature presentation of 2001: A Space Odyssey, Ryder follows Karl 
Pedersen, a local townsperson, out of the theater: 
Pedersen got to his feet and I watched his crouched figure edging down the row 
muttering apologies. On reaching the aisle, he straightened and gestured to me. 
Weary though I was, there seemed nothing for it but to join him, and I too rose 
and began to make my way towards the aisle. As I did so, I noticed that an almost 
festive mood was pervading the cinema. Everywhere people were exchanging 
jokes and little remarks as they watched the film, and no one seemed to mind at 
all my pushing past. On the contrary, people seemed to tuck their legs to one side 
or jump to a standing position with eagerness. A few people even rolled right 
back in their seats, feet stuck up in the air, squealing with delight as they did so. 
(102) 
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Certainly, such a passage reads like many from Kafka’s oeuvre. Here, a familiar social space is 
figured so that it becomes increasingly unfamiliar, strangely bizarre, slightly comical, borderline 
disturbing, and even slightly grotesque. Figures are crouched, weary, and compelled by forces 
unseen; and all throughout, gesture informs—indeed, mediates—human interaction. I chose the 
passage above because it demonstrates both features under discussion: the telescopic, focused 
“double take” and the subsequent attentiveness to the theatrical gesture. For the first time—and 
only while exiting the theater—Ryder notices the “festive mood pervading the cinema.” While 
he had supposed that the theatergoers had been taking in the film, he only notices now that, in 
fact, nobody seems quite as engaged in watching the film as he had originally supposed. This 
realization brings with it a further focus that is at once illuminative and highly opaque: the 
theatergoers are so joyous that, while some carelessly move out of the way and others eagerly 
move to a standing position to allow Ryder to pass, a few roll back in their seats in an embryonic 
position, “feet stuck up in the air” and “squealing with delight.” The telescopic focus on this 
particularly absurd gesture decontextualizes the characters (actors) from their setting (scene), 
creating a highly unfamiliar moment for both Ryder and his reader, not only because of its 
absurdity, but also because of its focused isolation. By generating such a distinctive narrative 
consciousness in Ryder and his sympathetic, and now highly attentive, reader, Ishiguro both 
mimics Kafka and highlights the reigning project of his work: a singular, decontextualized 
attentiveness that threatens, as Benjamin writes, “to break out into wider areas,” in the minds of 
normative readers in which such an awareness is, typically, elided. The aesthetic of the 
gestural—both expressionist and textual—becomes most apparent here as the aesthetic correlate 
to cognitive amnesia, and, arguably, as a marker of the absence of the interpretive domains that 
accompany Zunshine’s normative ToM.  
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Precedent for such simultaneous narratorial and readerly “double takes” extends across 
the genealogy of modernist fiction, and is well founded in some of Kafka’s most memorable 
narrators. Take, for example, Georg Bendemann, the condemned protagonist of Kafka’s early 
breakthrough work “The Judgment.” At the start of his tale, Bendemann writes confidently to a 
friend in St. Petersburg about his upcoming marriage and his ailing father. It is only as the 
narrative progresses, with Georg’s father’s poignant challenges to his narrative confidence, that 
the reader realizes—along with Georg—that Georg may very well not have remembered 
everything correctly. In fact, we realize, he may have imagined the friend and the marriage 
prospect, and he may have misapprehended his father’s current state. Georg’s first double take 
follows his undressing of his father: at first, Georg “resolutely made up his mind to take his 
father along into his future household. On closer inspection, it looked almost as if the care his 
father would receive there might come too late.”  (9) Here, the narrative telescoping is evinced in 
the initial assumption becoming deeply complicated by a second consideration: “on closer 
inspection.” Georg, a once-confident narrator, undermines not only his own confidence, but also 
the reader’s faith in the possibility of a coherent and seamless narrative. Another example: take 
the Country Doctor’s inspection of his unnamed patient, a young boy, and his amorphous wound 
in Kafka’s “Country Doctor.” At first the doctor narrates that “I am somehow ready to admit 
that, under certain conditions, the boy might really be sick.” Then, “now I discover: yes, the boy 
is sick.” Then, “thus from a distance. Close up, further complications are apparent. Who can look 
at that without giving a low whistle?” (63) Again, the double-take formula of “on first looking . . 
. upon further/closer inspection” follows through: the telescoping toward what was previously 
misread, unseen, or unacknowledged unveils something close to the Freudian uncanny—
anxieties originally repressed by the conscious mind reemerge with full force—and in this 
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register the vaginal connotations of the boy’s wound, it should be noted, are highly Freudian.124 
 But perhaps it is Kafka’s terse text “Give It Up!” that most typifies this amplification of 
disorientation through its rapid movement and focus of attention:  
It was very early in the morning, the streets clean and deserted, I was on my way 
home to the station. As I compared the tower clock with my watch I realized that 
it was much later than I had thought and that I had to hurry; the shock of this 
discovery made me feel uncertain of the way, I wasn’t very well acquainted with 
the town as yet; fortunately, there was a policeman at hand, I ran to him and 
breathlessly asked him the way. He smiled and said: “You asking me the way?” 
“Yes,” I said, “since I can’t find it myself.” “Give it up! Give it up!” said he, and 
turned with a sudden jerk, like someone who wants to be alone with his laughter. 
(157-8) 
Kafka’s parable almost reads like a condensed version of The Unconsoled; it is only as the 
supposedly confident narrator moves forward temporally that he experiences the extreme 
disjunction between his own sense of time and orientation in space and that of the world around 
him. Unlike Kafka’s narrating voice, however, Ryder does not need to be told to “give it up”—
he’s already resigned from seeking an origin, a home, or anything familiar; in fact, he’s already 
“given up” before he’s even started. As Reitano so beautifully writes in her reading of The 
Unconsoled, “ground is never ‘recovered’, only ‘lost’, deliberately, in order to begin again 
without beginning” (371). In some sense, Ryder, imagining himself as an outsider to the town’s 
social and even spatial structure (though it quickly becomes apparent through his social relations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In Freud’s essay on the uncanny, or unheimlich, the repressed matter is the infantile knowledge of the mother’s 
genitals that was once familiar, or heimisch. 
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that he is a resident of this town), has generated a certain distance in desire—he has no interest in 
ends, because he has no interest in beginnings. 
Placing Ryder’s unconscious desires underlying such narrative two-steps aside, we can 
explore how such “double takes” are comical in their unfolding and pleasing in their discovery—
even as they horrify. Kafka is purported to have laughed gleefully during a public reading of 
“The Judgment.” Ishiguro’s work is likewise comical; take, for example, the sequence in which 
Hoffman delivers Ryder to a room in which Ryder can practice for his recital later that evening. 
In his excitement to reach a piano, Ryder seems to miss a variety of crucial details of his setting, 
details that scale both large and small. His sequence of telescopic focus and double taking runs 
as follows: After pushing the door closed and then noticing that it had become “unlocked and 
was hanging open,” Ryder “clambered to a standing position” and “then noticed the latch 
mechanism was dangling upside down on the door frame.” Then, “after further examination, and 
with a little ingenuity, I managed to fix the latch back in place” (339). This solution was only a 
temporary one, however, as “the latch was liable to slip down again at any moment.” With his 
focus entirely on the latch, it is only later, just as his fingers were “poised over the keys,” that 
Ryder is further distracted by “a small creaking sound.” This in turn prompts him to swivel in his 
chair again, only to notice this time that “although the door stayed closed, the whole of its upper 
section was missing, so that it more or less resembled a stable door” (340). Incredibly enough, 
Ryder had missed this crucial, though seemingly obvious, detail; he claims that he “had been so 
preoccupied with the faulty latch [that he had] somehow completely failed to register this glaring 
fact.” To top it off, it is with a second creak that Ryder realizes “not only that someone had been 
in the next cubicle the whole time, but that the sound insulation between the cubicles was 
virtually non-existent.” This sequence is comical in its exposition, but demonstrative of the limits 
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of ToM: the character misreads his situation, and the reader, while unfazed at this point by 
Ryder’s mind gaps, is foiled again in his own “reading” of the scene. In this double complication 
of ToM, the character’s judgment fails his own assessment, while the reader is both amused at 
the character’s mishaps and troubled by such an elision—might he, the reader, also be prey to 
such temporal lapses in awareness and memory, even if they be more brief and even more subtle 
than Ryder’s? When this sort of normative ToM falls away, what sort of distinct attentiveness 
remains? 
Arguably, Zunshine and other theorists of normative and non-normative ToM would 
insist on the binary nature of human reading: either one reads normatively (or at least 
consciously so), or one does not read at all. In her monograph on the subject, Why We Read 
Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (2006), Zunshine distinguishes between the ToM critical 
to normative cognition and the cognitive results enabled by such cognition, results that trigger a 
multiplicity of interpretive readings that are performed within normative bounds. She writes that  
it is important to underscore here that cognitive scientists and lay readers (here, including 
literary critics) bring different frames of reference to measuring the relative “success” of 
mind-reading. For the lay reader, the example of a glaring failure in mind-reading and 
communication might be a person’s interpreting her friend’s tears of joy as tears of grief 
and reacting accordingly. For a cognitive psychologist, a glaring failure in mind-reading 
would be a person’s not even knowing that the water coursing down her friend’s face is 
supposed to be somehow indicative of his feelings at that moment. (13-14) 
For Zunshine, a crucial insight offered by cognitive psychologists “is that by . . . parsing the 
world and narrowing the scope or relevant interpretations of a given phenomenon, our cognitive 
adaptations enable us to contemplate an infinitely rich array of interpretations within that scope” 
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(14). In other words, once normative theory of mind becomes properly empathic, it can deduce 
reasonable and relevant interpretations within a limited scope—yet, even within said scope, the 
interpretations might be of an “infinitely rich array.” In reading both people and literary fiction, 
then, the dual assumption in reading is that the reader (and the characters read) possesses a 
certain normative ability to parse behaviors as reflecting intentions, and that such intentions are 
contained within particular “interpretive domains.”  
Yet, imagine that a non-normative reader of others—a failure at theory of mind—were 
not autistic, as in Zunshine’s study, but profoundly amnesic, even dreamily so, as in Ishiguro’s 
fictional account. The amnesia that I propose here is entirely hypothetical and not at all clinically 
based; it is, instead, constructed as a means for a thought experiment. In this hypothetical, the 
individual’s failure to read the minds of others would not be premised on an inability to be 
properly empathic, but on an inability to properly retain temporal context through memory. This 
perfectly amnesic reader would read others and the world around himself non-normatively in that 
he would scan each moment as its own singularity, devoid of context and history. In such a 
theoretical experiment, the individual would not possess normative ToM principally because of 
the particular kind of attention that he can and cannot pay to each moment. For even if the 
amnesic can posit an “infinitely rich array” of plausible intentions to another’s behavior, his lack 
of historical retention disables any sense of “interpretive domains.” Unlike the autistic, the 
amnesic can be properly attentive and even properly empathic; however, since he does not 
possess a sense of context, he is unable to distinguish reasonable interpretations from 
unreasonable ones. Such a cognitive personality might be highly attuned and attentive to the 
realm of the interpersonal, even as he fails to respond in a normative manner. 
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Admittedly, such a literary case study of a non-normative psyche has certain parallels in 
the annals of neurospsychological research, but its simplification, both in fiction and in my 
hypothetical case, have no absolute parallel in terms of diagnosis, even as its literary modeling 
articulates a critique of normative cognitive models. Endel Tulving, a pioneering researcher in 
the field of memory and consciousness, has studied pathological amnesics who seem to “be 
living in a ‘permanent present.’” (“Memory” 1) One subject, named N.N., “possess[es] anoetic 
and noetic consciousness but not autonoetic consciousness” (4); that is, he registers the temporal 
and spatial “current situation” (anoetic), he is aware of and operates on objects and events even 
in their absence (noetic), but he fails to remember personally experienced events (autonoetic). 
Ryder, in his bizarre, nearly moment-to-moment “ordinary consciousness”—and his failure to 
register the figures and surrounding drama engulfing those closest to himself—seems to parallel 
such a case study quite nicely. More recently, Tulving notes that such individuals, while rare 
cases, have been described as “noetically aware of many autobiographical facts, but this kind of 
awareness is greatly impoverished in comparison with that afforded by noetic consciousness.” 
(“Where in the brain” 217) Likewise, Lawrence Weiskrantz has shown that the amnesic can 
“carry out complex operations” and “think about items in his semantic memory” and “general 
knowledge”; however, the “amnesic subject” loses his evolutionary advantage “by not knowing 
what he can remember, by not remembering what he retains.” (217) Indeed, while the amnesic 
possesses consciousness, he does not possess what Weiskrantz terms “awareness”—the 
achievement of the very ability to “make a commentary of any particular event” (76). 
Weiskrantz’s “awareness,” importantly, is an echo of Tulving’s argument for a system of 
episodic memory—that is, a system in which a self is aware of itself as recollecting the past. In a 
similar vein, the prerequisite for a fully “conscious state,” philosophers David Rosenthal and 
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Daniel Dennet have both shown,125 is the ability to have “higher-order thoughts”—or thoughts 
about thoughts (71).  
For the purposes of this study, however, I want to bracket the question of medical 
diagnosis and psychological form and focus, instead, on the question of aesthetics and 
representation of cognition, and the subsequent critique such a representation of consciousness 
makes possible on the normative bounds of ToM as proposed by cognitive psychologists. In the 
foregrounding of the gestural and dissolution of the teleological, interpretive domains determined 
by context become less relevant. The reader of Ishiguro (and Kafka) cultivates, through his 
empathic experience of such fictional narrators’ forgetfulness, a distinctly new and perhaps even 
queer way of seeing—and reading: a certain alternative to normative attentiveness of what is 
normatively missed or elided, through, paradoxically, the elision of proper plot contextualization. 
As a literary experiment of cognition, then, such authors’ experiments employ their expressionist 
aesthetics to explore and reveal even further, beyond cognitive norms, the possibility for narrated 
and represented human experience. 
Arguably, then, Ryder, Ishiguro’s narrator with such a distinct, non-normative amnesic 
consciousness—an amnesia so profound that even he himself is entirely unaware of its profound 
effect—foregrounds the limits of ToM in his fragmentary, moment-to-moment consciousness, 
which at once eludes the “interpretive domains” of Zunshine’s normative character and pays 
great attention to the gestural, to the necessarily decontextualized singular moment of character 
performance. If anything, then, the reading experience of Ishiguro’s fiction for the so-called 
normative reader challenges the neat assumptions in Zunshine’s normative framing and suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 On the “higher-order thought” model of consciousness that defines consciousness as thinking about cognition, 
see, for example, David Rosenthal, “Thinking that One Thinks,” in Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical 
Essays, ed. Martin Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp. 198–223; and, more 
recently, David Rosenthal, “Being Conscious of Ourselves,” The Monist 87, no. 2 (2004): 159–81. See also Daniel 
C. Dennet, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin Press, 1991). 
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a continuum of shared blind spots in even the most “normative” of conciousnesses. Kafka, too, 
was aware of this popular narratological and epistemological blind spot when he wrote, “‘But 
then he returned to his work as if nothing had happened.’ This is a remark that we are familiar 
with from a vague abundance of old stories, although it perhaps does not occur in any of them.” 
(“Reflections” 236) To continue “as if nothing had happened”—this is what Kafka depicts as the 
illusion of reading situations, people, and books alike. We return at each moment as if nothing 
disruptive had occurred between the present moment and the past, and certainly Ryder and 
Kafka’s narrators spend much of their peripatetic lives doing so; but, in fact, much has occurred, 
and, oftentimes, something quite uncanny, disturbing, and deeply disruptive has transpired. 
While Ryder’s long-term memory remains defunct, it is moments like these that highlight the 
elision within so-called normative awareness itself, within moment-to-moment living, that in its 
discovery disturbs the so-called normative mind that imagines itself as wholly attentive and 
aware.  
While the discovery of lapses in conscious awareness is sometimes comical, as Ishiguro 
and Kafka both suggest, perhaps the desire to cast such sorts of reading as “non-normative” may 
reflect the perceived danger such foregrounding of attentiveness entails. As Benjamin notes in 
his reading of the gesture, certain gestural moments highlight the threateningly explosive 
potential of the nearly decontextualized gestures to the embedded narratives in which they are 
located. In a sense, then, attention to the gesture seems to enable a particular dissociation of 
event from context, and a disembedding of self from the surrounding events and culture that 
define it. One particular instance comes to mind in Ishiguro’s work: toward the end of the second 
evening, Ryder visits Sophie’s apartment (which, unbeknownst to him, is in fact his own 
apartment), and Sophie settles on playing a board game with dice. Boris had been given the book 
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that Ryder had acquired the previous evening, and is immediately fascinated by its content, 
murmuring “It’s great” and “It shows you how to do everything” (287). Leafing through the 
book, “he turned over some pages, and as he did so the book gave a sharp crack and fell apart 
into two sections.” Unperturbed by this disruption—in a book full of interruptions—Boris 
significantly “carried on turning the pages as though nothing had happened” (287). While this 
moment echoes Kafka’s aphorism—returning as if nothing had occurred—it foreshadows a more 
significant lapse later in the same scene. As Sophie settles to play with the dice, Ryder becomes 
gradually conscious that she  
had been rattling the dice for an inordinate period. In fact, the rattling had  
changed in character since she had first started to play with the dice. She now 
seemed to be shaking it with a feeble slowness, as though in time to some melody 
running through her head. I lowered the newspaper with a sense of alarm.  
On the floor, Sophie was leaning on one stiffened arm, a posture that made 
her long hair plunge down over her shoulder, concealing her face entirely. She 
appeared to have become completely absorbed with the game, and her weight had 
tipped forward oddly, so that she was hovering right over the board. The whole of 
her body was rocking gently. Boris was watching her sulkily, passing his hands 
over the crack of the book.  
Sophie went on and on shaking the dice, for thirty, forty seconds, before 
finally letting it roll in front of her. She studied it dreamily, moved some pieces 
about the board, then began to shake the dice again. I could sense something 
dangerous in the atmosphere and decided it was time I took charge of the 
154	  
	  
	   	  
situation. Throwing the newspaper aside, I clapped my hands together and got to 
my feet. (288–89) 
Most disturbing to the reader for its unforgiving focus on what is an entirely uncanny moment, 
this narrative frieze highlights the gesture when observed in human behavior: in fact, it is the 
observation of a lapse, of a pause or break between two related narrative moments. Ryder 
significantly notes that he could “sense something dangerous in the atmosphere” after observing 
Sophie’s foreboding posture and frozen mien; but what is most dangerous here is the suggestive 
nature of attentiveness to the gesture—such attentiveness threatens, as a site of fissure within 
narrative, as an unaccounted-for break, to explode the very context in which it is embedded. 
While this essay admits to bracketing the diagnosis of such experimental amnesics in favor of the 
attentiveness generated by their altered, non-normative perspectives, I conclude with the results 
of a study by experimental psychologist Frederick J. Evans. Evans demonstrates conclusively 
that posthypnotic source amnesia, the successful recall of semantic content without its temporal 
context—in which “an apparent dissociation between the content of accessible memories and 
context in which the episodic event originally occurred” (556)—is an experience shared by those 
who experience “a variety of normal and pathological contextual memory lapses” (557). 
Disembedded remembering, Evans notes, is an experience that humans share, to a greater or 
lesser degree; “commonly,” he states, “We may meet somebody whose name or face is 
hauntingly familiar, but we cannot remember where we have met this particular person before, 
sometimes with disastrous social consequences.”  
As this study of the varieties of consciousness proceeds, cognitive scientists who 
recognize the spectrum of amnesia might also recognize the spectrum of attentive experience that 
emerges in the very moments of forgetting. Experimental modernism, represented here by both 
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Kafka’s and Ishiguro’s works, attempts to articulate a new form of character consciousness by 
circumventing the necessary framework for the “interpretive domains” that ToM demands. With 
narrative context brushed aside, such forgetful, wandering narrators perform a sort of reading of 
gestures that, in turn, generates in its character—and reminds its reader of—a forgotten 
attentiveness that might exist between and amongst all narrative moments.  
Of Fugues, Flaneurs, and Fictions 
	  
Where Ishiguro’s work narrates context-less narrative from the extreme vantage point of 
a first-person present perception, Maud Casey’s recent The Man Who Walked Away narrates 
from an omniscience that excludes the amnesic’s conscious perspective but makes possible a 
network of inter-discursive voices that alternately read and care for the amnesic. As a highly 
lyrical, “luminous,” and “liminal” work, Casey’s reviewers noticed a central “paradox”, in her 
work’s “triumph of style over story”, even with its “centrality of storytelling to human 
connectedness” (“One Step” BR9)—it at once explores the limits and possibilities for 
representing such a non-normative state by casting aside conventional narrative tropes of 
autobiographical narrativity and closure. 
 In Casey’s work, the amnesic in question is Albert Dadas, a fictionalization of Jean-
Albert Dadas (1860-1907), whose curious case history is documented in a thesis by his resident 
asylum psychiatrist, Philippe Tissie (1852-1935), entitled Les Alienes voyageurs126.  In the 
troubled, dissociated, and far-flung trans-European travails of the historical Albert, Ian Hacking, 
in his foundational study of the “mad traveler,” a “transient mental illness” of the late nineteenth 
century (1), considers epilepsy and hysteria as its source, before concluding that the fugueuer, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 (Paris: Doin, 1887), Cited in Ian Hacking, Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illness 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998), 13.  
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he terms it, is the darker pathological manifestation of a social phenomenon in the late nineteenth 
century: 
There is nevertheless a distinct class of prototypical fugueurs, all drawn from very similar 
 social backgrounds. Such men have all sorts of problems, and they are curiously 
 powerless in the face of their daily lives. It is these men who find, in the possibility of the 
 fugue—which after all, means flight—an escape over which they have no control, and for 
 which, after the event, they have no memory except when they make use of another 
 device that allows them to remember, namely, hynotism. I do not find in these cases any 
 significant vestige of fraud or shamming. Instead, their powerlessness, which produces 
 temporary mental breakdown, finds release in a mental illness which relieves them of 
 responsibility, is cultured by medicine, and is medicalized in the culture of the day, a 
 culture that includes both tourism and vagrancy. (50) 
Finding expression in both tourist and vagrant cultures of the day, fugueurs take flight 
from their constricting lives, freed from powerlessness and culpability in a dissociated state. 
With the contemporary social and medical discourses and apparatuses of observation and 
diagnosis, dissociative fugue, a transient mental illness, becomes articulated for a time—but then 
ceases to be in the twentieth century.127 In Casey’s fictional work as well, Albert’s symptoms 
come to manifest a certain cultural diagnosis that is historically bound by its contextual 
discourses. Much as Hacking demonstrates the anomalous nature of this history-specific cultural 
diagnosis, it would be easy to imagine Albert, as one character notes, as “part of the throngs of 
pilgrims during the Middle Ages...if he had lived then, he might very well have been considered 
a spiritual pilgrim.” (124) His embodied dissociated walking, however, coming at the fin-di-
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siecle, carries with it the cultural baggage of modern medicine through the modern institutions of 
psychiatry and the asylum, as well as of the modern pathological discourses of madness.128 
In terms of cultural diagnosis, the historical Dadas’s fugues fit comfortably between the 
middle-class epidemic of luxury tourism and criminal vagrancy. In terms of stylized, privileged, 
and even normative cultural practices, however, the most obvious antecedent to the figure of the 
fugueur in Casey’s fictional work is the privileged and mythologized flaneur, a foil to the 
fugueur but a single figure whose behavior aligns neatly in opposition. The flaneur is the 
conscious surveiler, chronicler, and materialist philosopher of the nineteenth-century Parisian 
arcades and crowds that Walter Benjamin famously read in Baudelaire’s Paris and Poe’s London. 
As the flaneur’s dissociated double, the fugeueur is in little possession of his faculties while 
walking, and retains little control of the public and social spaces that he inhabits; the flaneur, as 
the fugeur’s flipside, is autonomous, aware, and centered in his urban setting—a cosmopolitan 
romantic of the city. In Benjamin’s study, “the street becomes a dwelling place for the flaneur” 
(“Paris” 19); in Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire, the flaneur enjoys the physiologies of both the 
city’s shops and faces; in his reading of Poe, the flaneur becomes an invisible detective, an 
“unknown man in the middle of the crowd.” (27)  
In The Man Who Walked Away, Casey includes various characters who romanticize the 
flaneur as a traveling type and counter-point to their own social and cultural constrictions, as I 
will discuss; for Dadas the fugeur, the flaneur’s privilege, control, and even mastery of his mind 
and social sphere embodies everything beyond his reach. Unlike the flaneur who can reflect and 
collate his collected memories, the fugueur embarks on mindless walking tours of rural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 For an excellent introduction to the cultural history and rhetoric of madness and mania—and the relation of 
madness’s pathologization to modern psychiatry, see Lisa M. Hermsen, Manic Minds: Mania’s Mad History annd 
Its Neuro-Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2011). See also my review of Hermsen’s work in Hillel Broder, 
Journal of Medical Humanities (2013) 34: 81-84. 
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countrysides, escapades that fail to enter the unified autobiographical memory of its subject.129 In 
Albert’s words, after taken into asylum, his attempts at accessing his past experiences are barred: 
“I am living in different rooms. But with no doors between them.” (200) For Albert, his sense of 
self is at once defined by retrospective impasses and subjective multiplicities.  
In his inability to recollect past experience as a coherent self, Albert’s displays a 
dysfunctional episodic memory, as Tulving has defined it, as the normative convergence of “self, 
autonoetic awareness, and subjectively sensed time.” (“Episodic Memory” 6) However, while 
restrained from embarking on his walking fugues, Albert  is able to form new memories and 
recall new experiences, even as his retrograde amnesia, that is, his inability to recollect past 
dissociative episodes, is only subdued through fleeting flashes or sustained hypnosis. 
Ethics of Narration: Reading the Amnesic 
 
As Casey’s highly stylized work demonstrates, representing the tale of an amnesic 
fugueur, a dissociated, wandering subject whose past is fragmented and whose narrativity is not 
only apart from his subjectivity but absent and irretrievable, possesses certain formal challenges. 
Unlike Ishiguro’s narrator protagonist, whose first person narration enabled direct, immediate 
description, Casey’s unidentified third-person narrator is omniscient at points and limited at 
others, adopting a nearly Woolfian indirect discourse in its adhesion to and reflection of 
characters’ thought streams. In this way, she makes possible a narration of an amnesic’s thought-
stream as it occurs, but she also offers objective distance for the observation of Albert by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 In an earlier iteration of this dissertation, I proposed that Teju Cole’s narrator in his Open City embodies both the 
figures of the flaneur and the fugeueur, deconstructing the binary by demonstrating how each contains the other. I 
have since discovered that Pieter Vermeulen offers such an argument in his “Flights of Memory: Teju Cole’s Open 
City and the Limits of Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism” in Journal of Modern Literature 37.1 (Fall 2013), 40-57. In this 
article, Vermeulen argues that Cole’s narrator straddles the masterful control of the flaneur and the dispassion and 
desperation of the flaneur’s opposite, the fugueur as a critique of both discourses. Related to my reading of Casey’s 
work, I discuss how fugue states exist on a continuum of experience, with abled and disabled fugues typifying 
various forms of wandering.  
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himself—as he awakens from his dissociated romps—and by others, including the Doctor and 
Nurse Anne who come to observe, care, and treat Albert.  
The narrator, in other words, is a critical site of articulation and disarticulation—of 
narration and distance—that makes possible an oblique representation of an amensic’s cognition. 
At the work’s unconventional opening, the reader is called to attention to a missed presence, by 
conventional readers, of a radical presence of becoming in the act of walking. The prelude to 
chapter 1 begins “It was as though he had always been there, haunting the landscape, if only you 
were paying attention;” it ends in a series of walks of the same as-of-yet unnamed character, with 
the conclusion that “wherever he walked, he was filled with a wonder so fierce it was as if he 
were being burned alive from its astonishing beauty. When Albert walked, he was astonished.” 
(5) As an acknowledgment of always already wandering—”he had always been there”, the 
narrator calls to our attention that which exceeds a place within history through the subject’s own 
abstention from subjective time. Not only does Albert’s wandering precede the bounds of the 
novel’s beginning, however, but Albert wanders within his astonishment as well, within a 
perception apart from a continuous self, and this wandering, in turn, calls out to the viewer—by 
way of the narrator—to be noticed: “if only you were paying attention.” Transcending the 
impossible recall by the subject, the narrator allows the affects experienced in this fragmented 
subjectivity—wonder, astonishment, to enter the narrative of the work, and to spur a different 
sort of observation, or reading, by the observer/reader.  
In this sense, Casey’s third-person narrator completes the representative work that 
Ishiguro’s first-person discloses. Both authors, when challenged by the narrative impossibility of 
representing that which does not enter subjective time—by way of Tulving’s episodic memory, 
the capacity for reflecting upon memories themselves—adopt a nearly frozen attentiveness to the 
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singular moment, or gesture—Tulving’s noetic awareness, the unreflective “conscious state that 
accompanies thinking about (knowing) the world” (“Memory” 4).  
For Albert, the narrator later tells us, at the moment of his walking, memory is besides 
the point. Indeed, for Albert, the experience of walking need not be assimilated to memory and 
autobiography for its heroism to be pronounced: “Even when is lost, he not lost...he is, he is, he 
is here...He is all those Alberts. He is himself and himself and himself again.” (20) Insisting 
against identity as definitionally based on an able episodic memory, his narrator imagines Albert 
as unified in—and through—his multiplicity. His presence, in other words, is fully realized at 
each of his isolated, fugue moments.  
However, where the narrator is generous in affirming and attending to Albert’s existence 
even without narrativity, Albert himself suffers in alternately experiencing his life as fragmented 
and present, and Albert’s Doctor, too, perpetuates such suffering by imagining Albert’s mind as 
a “dark street” in which the Doctor will “light the lamps, one by one.” (107) While able to recall 
the interludes between his dissociated spells of continental wandering, Albert lists the sites where 
he awoke from his fugues. However, in his walking, nothing can be recollected, nor can he 
weave together a narrative among his various stops. Instead, “he was here and then he was there. 
There is nothing in between,” (124) the work’s narrator summarily states. 
And the so-called and nameless Doctor, himself a vagrant and wanderer who has fled a 
home in which both parents died of illness,130 and who continues to flee his apartment, flee 
Bordeaux, and flee the asylum on his bicycle, is determined to pin not only a name but a history 
on the disjointed identity of Albert: “Who are you Albert?” the Doctor thinks, in a “question that 
swims beneath the other questions.” (134) Determined to name Albert’s condition and figure as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See Hacking, 14, for a brief corresponding history of Tissie’s parents’ unfortunate deaths and Tissie’s early 
vagrancy and flights of childhood.  
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that of the fugueur (147)—that of both fleeing and chasing—the Doctor hopes to give “shape” to 
the drawn, physical map of Albert’s travels, and in turn, to give a continuous identity to Albert’s 
sharp fragmentation, a desire that underlies his own desire for self-knowledge and internal 
reconciliation (153-5).  
Eventually, the Doctor treats Albert through hypnotic therapy, “discover[ing] another 
door in the mysterious house that is Albert,” (204) an act that he describes as “dreaming 
together.” (203) Hacking, in his reflections on the hypnotizer/hypnotized relationship as recorded 
by the historic Doctor Tissie, characterizes it as a relationship in which both figures were 
“extremely accommodating to each other’s needs and expectations...know[ing], without verbal 
formulation, the needs of the other.” (111) This might explain how, in response to the Doctor’s 
quest to uncover Albert’s narrativity, Albert himself is inspired to wish for a normative self-
knowledge of a coherent history in his wish to be “a man...forged out of days, adding up to 
something with weight and heft.” (136) He assumes the Doctor’s wish to such a degree that he 
even lies in recounting his past, at one point, by offering an epic tale that includes a coherent 
“story with a beginning, a middle, and an end.” (158) Ultimately, while the Doctor proceeds to 
fail in normalizing Albert’s episodic memory and unified subjectivity, he comes to appreciate 
that “A life exceeds our ability to describe it” (145), allowing himself to heal his own 
fragmented, lost, and childhood memories, in a process that is very much self-directed towards 
reconciling his own past.  
Indeed, what the narrator and implied reader understand, the Doctor, as a narrator-analyst 
of a more conventional sort, has to come to terms with the inability to narrate an identity. As 
Hacking puts in, in his historical description, “The man and his doctor were made for each other, 
opposite but parallel.” (14) When asked by the Doctor “What was it like, Albert? To walk? To 
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walk so far?” Albert responds: “Everything was...funny....the trees took fantastic shapes.” The 
Doctor is left speechless, in response: “It sounds...” he trails off, for he thinks, “it is difficult to 
know the truth when someone professes oblivion.” (130) With his impulse to name Albert’s 
illness, on the one hand, and Albert’s truth of oblivion’s impasse, on the other, the healing of an 
analyst in therapy—a central tenet to Freudian psychotherapy, in attempting to impossibly “see 
past the familiar” (132) and into his patient’s mind, becomes very much about seeing past the 
familiar in his own life, and especially the ambitions that blind him to his own forgotten past.  
Indeed, the construction of Albert’s life resolves as impossible as the Doctor comes to 
construct his own childhood as impossibly retrievable and reconcilable. As Roger Kennedy has 
shown, in his reading of Freud’s work, “the conviction of truth may be just as therapeutic as the 
recapturing of a lost memory.” Both analyst and patient alike “do not have to know all about a 
past event for it to have significant consequences.” Instead, the construction of the past event in 
the present “is just as therapeutic.” (184-5) For Freud, the articulation of memory in the present 
may in fact be the site of the memory’s formation, construction, and reconciliation: 
...memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood   
 memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later 
 periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood 
 memories did not...emerge; they were formed at that time.131 
Whereas for Albert, fragmentary perception while wandering eludes language’s 
signifying functions, the Doctor, who imagines himself “so close to grasping the something of 
Albert,” eventually comes to self-forgiveness through a certain acknowledgment of Albert’s 
impossible cloudiness, and his own forgiveness and reconciliation with his suppressed past: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories” (1899) in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud ed. James Strachey, et. al. (London, UK: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953-74), 
3:300-322:322. Qtd in Roger Kennedy, 185. 
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 He is so close to grasping the something of Albert; he would give anything to grasp
 it....He  rushes ahead, through space and time to the moment when he will give Albert an 
 answer to his  question: This is who you are. The wind on his face slices through the 
 feeling of almost and then his bicycle lifts off; it flies above the lake, over the city. It 
 flies until there are his mother and father. Their answer is: You are forgiven. When he 
 puts his face in the warm crook of their necks, they are healed...he pulls at his 
 mother’s skirts, pointing at the sky, his finger tracing the path of the geese as they fly 
 away.” (157) 
With the desire to offer an absolute identity to Albert pushed to its absolute limits, Casey’s 
narrator offers a highly lyrical, even poetically truncated resolution, in which the movement of 
the Doctor’s bicycle mimics Albert’s own accelerated and fragmentary fugues, and the 
embedded scene conspires to guide the Doctor to his own reconciliation, a reading of his past 
losses and myths in his mother’s skirts and father’s fairytales of geese. Lifting off into his own 
compressed time-space with his bicycle, a newly popular object that is frequently figured as the 
corresponding technology to achieving Albert’s compressed fugues,132 the Doctor speeds beyond 
time, enjoying the drifting and timeless consciousness that eludes a neat temporality and 
narrativity. Famously, Tissie is the first doctor in Bourdeaux who pedaled on his rounds, a result 
of the flight that he experienced vicariously, as a child, while observing the renowned Leotard on 
a velocipede fly by.133 Within such a comparably mobile body—and a wandering, boundless-
moment of contemplation—the fictional Doctor imagines a vision of forgiveness from his 
parents whom he failed to heal, as a child—a history from which he had fled and from which he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See Casey, 131: “This sort of movement is astonishing. He may not know exactly how Albert felt when he 
walked and walked and walked, but he knows the wonder of this.” 
133 See Hacking, 14-16. 
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had suppressed, on the one hand, and towards whom he flees, on the other, in assuming a life of 
healing.  
 With healing figured as self-healing, and narrative construction for the other as narrative 
reconciliation for the self, the Doctor’s newfound understanding of Albert’s opacity 
approximates the position of the active, engaged narrator who participates, much as the Doctor 
does while performing hypnosis on Albert, in the shared indirect inter-discursive narration 
among the characters. In an admission to the Director of the asylum that a full articulation of 
Albert’s identity “has not yet taken shape,” the Doctor offers a metaphor that speaks to his use of 
and reliance on Albert: “The hypnotized belongs to the hypnotizer as the traveler’s stick belongs 
to the traveler.” (198-9) As a journeyer with Albert as his utility, the nexus of “dreaming 
together” that hypnosis makes possible occurs in the indirect discourse of the narrator. Take this 
moment of awakening from hypnosis, in which a certain transfer is imagined: “When his 
[Albert’s] eyes flutter open again, the Doctor’s eyes say: I know everything you have forgotten.” 
(194) Here, it is unclear if the Doctor’s eyes in fact communicate anything to Albert: Does 
Albert read reassurance in the Doctor’s eyes? Does the Doctor, in fact, communicate such 
reassurance, or does the narrator imagine it as being acknowledged—or even articulated? The 
space that this narrative holds, in establishing a spectrum of possibility and impossibility of 
communication, are possible only through the omniscient, indirect discourse of the narrator, a 
sort of wandering performance that keeps open these various multiple readings.  
 Ultimately, the narrator—along with the Doctor, as the work progresses—model a hybrid 
model of flanerie/fugue, in which wandering, as I’ve defined it, is a mode of cognition. The 
narrator of Casey’s work watches Albert, but cares for his predicament, too, even as they wander 
in tandem. The narrator, one could argue, is a highly ethical iteration of Benjamin’s flaneur—
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adopting a presence of close monitoring while assuming distance in the foreclosure of absolute 
knowledge of experience. And the Doctor comes to appreciate and share, along with the narrator, 
a certain healing through assuming—or claiming as his own—Albert’s wandering consciousness, 
as a temporality of sequences that are radically fragmented and absolutely singular. The Doctor’s 
flight—from home, on his bicycle—is a fugue that he has practiced, but with which he has never 
come to terms. 
 And not only does the Doctor’s errancy enter into an ethical but a structural and cognitive 
relation with Albert, shifting Albert’s dissociated fugues from excluded to participating in a 
shared continuum of walks away. Nurse Anne, Albert’s regular caregiver, much as the Doctor, 
“walked out of a life” (73) of wealth and domesticity to serve others and heal wounds, as a 
military nurse. Even for Nurse Anne, who can recall her past, such autonomous walking away 
stands in contradistinction from any sort of flanerie (116)—it is, in her experience, a self-
imposed exile. The myth of the flaneur, for Nurse Anne, is projected onto a particular object—a 
sea shell carried from the Red Sea, by her father, who insisted that she would make a “a 
wonderful flaneur,” but who insisted, at the same time that she marry her “flatulent cousin.” 
(ibid.) In sharing and admiring the shell with Albert, she includes her own discontinuous walks 
with those of Albert, both characters admiring and envious of the shells that “carry their past 
with them.” (117) But of course, an object like the shell, much as the wind’s rustling through 
multiple lives and the narrators’ shared closeness with multiple narrated minds, comes to signify 
the very possibility for a story to be told otherwise.  
 Indeed, with the persistent movement of both the abled and disabled characters alongside 
the shifting, nearly cinematic drifting of the narrator’s vantage point, all of the assorted 
characters and voices in Casey’s work come to share a certain relief in the possibility of 
166	  
	  
	   	  
becoming within fragmentation, converging in the voice of the narrator: “Moments like this one, 
moments of relief between who we were and who we will be: You are better now. We are better 
now. And now. And now. And now.” (203) Mimicking Albert, in their shared moments of 
healing, the “we” here (the Doctor, the narrator, perhaps the assumed collective triangulation of 
the aforementioned and the reader) realize how they’ve wandered, forgotten, and experienced 
healing on a spectrum of dissociated experience. Wandering, in other words, makes possible 
discontinuous self-identification. The work’s prelude to pay attention to such wandering, the 
figure of Albert, is also a call to attend to what’s missed in excluding Albert’s fugues as a form 
of self-expression. Attending to such wandering, in other words, makes possible a self-
forgiveness for others’ own lapses in narrative.  
 Narrating the tale of a fugueur  is on the one hand a highly ethical gesture—like Lerner’s 
and Sebald’s protagonist-narrators, the enlivening of an occluded and (literally) forgotten 
experience and on the other, an impossible, in the conventional sense. Unlike Ben Lerner’s 
narrator who can recall multiple selves through multiple pasts, Albert’s multiplicity remains 
barred from present recall, a sheer fragmentation of subjective experience. Yet, this 
fragmentation is narrated as a form of discrete, singular experience—akin to the gesture and 
heightened awareness in Ishiguro’s narrative. And this fragmentation becomes the language with 
which a flaneur-like Doctor—and narrator—can appreciate the blindspots of narrativity in his 
own life, and the method by which a narrator can attend through the repeated and final call to 
“listen,” at the work’s end, as a certain denial of narrative closure: “Albert will not return...He 
will not need to return. At least, that is how the story should end. It is the Doctor’s wish for him. 
Here, Albert, a story just for you. Listen.” Listening here, at the work’s end, recalls Albert’s 
invitation by his father to listen to his folktales about a prince with one wing who demands more, 
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to walk into the world, and forbids closure. It is, too, a collusion of the narrator’s voice and the 
Doctor’s wish: the Doctor’s wish for closure realized through a gift given by the Doctor, in the 
form of closure, and by the narrator, in articulating this wish—as the observer, flaneur, and 
analyst—of the Doctor himself.  
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Conclusion: Amnesic Memoir and Mimetic Experiment 
	  
As works of narrated failures of memory and experiences of amnesia, Casey’s and Ishiguro’s 
novels adopt various imaginative strategies that represent consciousness and that situate amnesic 
non-narrativity within non-normative narrative history. Both works, I’ve shown, rely heavily on 
aesthetic techniques for the mimesis of immediate and non-normative phenomenological 
experience that produce forms of wandering cognition. Such wandering, I’ve shown as well, is 
not unique to the cognitive space within narratives absent memory—they are the ground of both 
cognition without memory and the ethical mimesis in the face of a great profusion, if not 
overwhelming presence or multiplicity, of memory, as produced by both Lerner’s and Sebald’s 
narrators.  
 In this conclusion, I reach beyond the tenuous generic boundaries of fiction/non-fiction 
by assuming that the production of autobiographical narrative and the aesthetic and ethical 
strategies of wandering minds takes place on a varied spectrum of memory and fiction. As I 
demonstrated earlier, the inception of the novel is founded on the production of Romantic 
autobiography, and so the very binary of fiction/non-fiction is irrelevant when assuming the 
fallibility of recollection and the creation of memories. In particular, reading the recent 
proliferation of amnesic memoir in light of the strategies offered by Casey and Ishiguro offers 
certain insight into the limits of narrating cognition and the diverse techniques offered by such 
memoirists in attempting to represent that which cannot be recalled. Of course, while the variable 
personal and inter-personal suffering from amnesic states should not be minimized in this study, 
I do argue that in reading articulations of identity apart from memory, we might honor the varied 
possibilities for identity and cognition apart from conventional narrativity and subjectivity.  
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 The enactment of narrative wandering as a form of narration and narrative identity 
distinct from diachronic memory and autobiographical history has enjoyed a recent surge in 
memoir writing, though one founded on a long history in science writing and cognitive studies.  
David Stuart MacLean’s recent experimental The Answer to the Riddle is Me (2014) is 
representative of such an emerging sub-genre,134 as much as Su Meck’s investigative and 
journalistic I Forgot to Remember (2013). MacLean’s, Meck’s, and others’ works stand in the 
shadow of Suzanne Corkin’s very recent Permanent Present Tense (2013), a remarkable history 
of the amnesic patient known throughout the case study literature as H.M., and comparably 
renowned case studies mentioned throughout the cognitive and neuroscientific literature, 
including Endel Tulving’s famous “N.N”135 and “K.C.,”136 case studies of retrograde amnesia, 
and Oliver Sacks’ case study narrative of “The Last Hippie,” among others. 
 As the focus of my study has been the representation of memory and perception, when 
narrated, apart from narrativity, the political and social causes behind such a mainstream 
acceptance of and interest in the oxymoronic amnesic memoir, the memoir that fails in its 
remembering, are multiple, complex, and beyond the scope of this dissertation. Andreas 
Huyssen, for example, might argue that such fascination with amnesia reflects our own anxieties 
behind an age of memory’s displacement into digital archives.137 An earlier critical theorist of 
our century, Theodor Adorno, might read the interest in amnesic memoir as a cultural admission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Another recent notable amnesic memoir includes Adam Burns and Maureen Burns’ self-published Surviving 
Amnesia: Mind Over Memory (2013), a memoir that chronicles anterograde amnesia—or the inability to retain 
memory following a traumatic brain injury—narrated by Burns’ mother with excerpts from Burns’ insufferable 
experience as a perpetual amnesic. The two memoirs that this chapter discusses are memoirs of retrograde amnesia, 
or amnesia of autobiographical memories that precede a traumatic brain injury, but in which the subsequent capacity 
for memory retention is not entirely disabled.  
135 See Endel Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness,” Canadian Psychology 26, no. 1 (1985): 1–12. 
136 See Endel Tulving,  “Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain” Annual Review of Psychology (53:2002), 12-16. 
137 See Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
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to the forgetting that accompanies all materialist and hegemonic reification.138 More recently, 
Anne Whitehead has resuscitated the ethical question of forgetting—without amnesia—as a form 
of radical forgiveness, as articulated by both Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricouer.139 The fantasy of 
forgetting, then, plays into the religious-political discourses of salvation and rebirth. In a similar 
vein, in narrative studies, Jason Tougaw recently suggested that fictions and non-fictions 
acknowledge the suffering accompanying amnesia while positing, at points, that “there may be 
solace in amnesia, and menace in memory.”140 Generically, David Lethem writes, literary 
amnesia has been a basic condition of twentieth century literature, as “an existential syndrome 
that seemed to nag at fictional characters with increasing frequency, a floating metaphor very 
much in the air.” In introducing a representative collection of the literary sub-genre of amnesic 
fiction, he decides that amnesia, whether it be of the collective political type, the experience of 
the passing of human existence, or the blank backdrop onto which characters are conjured, is “a 
modern mood,” and “a very American one.” (xiii) And most recently, in a forthcoming volume 
on memory, Sebastian Groes suggests that the “fear of forgetting” has become central to our 
cultural discourse around memory, not only because of digital displacement and post-modern 
characterization, by Frederic Jameson and others, as necessarily ahistorical and amnesic, 
incapable of recalling past or retaining present experiences (ix), but in our social cognizance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1972), 230: “All reification is a forgetting.”  
139 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, “On Forgiveness” in Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley 
and Michael Hughes (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), and Paul Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting, 
trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: U. of Chicago Press, 2004). In Ricouer’s reading 
of Derrida, pure forgiveness assumes definitive “forgetting through the erasing of traces” (414), a problematic 
formulation that he critiques, preferring instead “a forgetting in reserve,” a forgiveness that retains the trace of the 
original act. For more, see “Conclusion” in Anne Whitehead, Memory (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 
153-157.  
140 In the forthcoming “Forgetting: Amnesia and Identity in Contemporary Literature.” Memory in the Twenty-First 
Century Ed. Sebastian Groes (Palgrave: 2015).  
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deteriorating minds, through the “growing public awareness of an ageing population” and its 
impact on the “individual’s sense of their own identity.”141 
 Regardless of the ambiance, alarm, and appeal of amnesia in contemporary culture and 
fiction, the narrativization, that is, the pulling and putting into language of the amnesic’s 
experience, has been a preoccupation of some of the leading scholars in the fields of cognition, 
though variably articulated with a certain philosophical twist. Famously, Oliver Sacks studied 
various amnesics;142 and in the introduction to his first amnesic case study, he quotes Luis 
Bunuel as saying “You have to begin to lose your memory, if only in bits and pieces, to realise 
that memory is what makes our lives. Life without memory is no life at all...Without it, we are 
nothing.”143 While Sacks’ various essays on the relationship of memory loss and identity 
complicate Bunuel’s formulation, Sacks uses this framing definition as the normative bounds of 
identity, with the narrative arc for his studies built through his own literary form, at times, or, at 
other times, through his admission of—and usually vague gesture towards—a sort of diminished 
or disabled identity in the absence of memory.  
 Most evident, in Sacks’ writing, to create narrative and sense identity absent memory, is 
in his study of Greg F., a hippie, Hare Krishna devotee who was later discovered to have had a 
massive brain tumor that severely impaired his memory in the form of retrograde amnesia, 
making him unable to retain and recollect new experiences beyond 1970. Even worse: after a 
long illness, Greg lost insight into his own blindness. Without memory, and without the insight 
into his inability to recall or see, Greg is described by Sacks as confined “to a single moment—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See “Introduction” to Chapter 5, Memory in the Twenty-First Century Ed. Sebastian Groes (Palgrave: 2015), 
Forthcoming.  
142 Besides for the present review of “The Last Hippie” in An Anthropologist on Mars (New York: Random House, 
1995), see his case studies “The Last Mariner” and “A Matter of Identity” in The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a 
Hat (New York: Summit Books, 1985).  
143 See “The Last Mariner,” 23.  
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‘the present’—uninformed by any sense of a past (or a future).” Greg, Sacks observes, “seemed 
immured, without knowing it, in a motionless, timeless moment.” (“The Last Hippie” 203) 
 Sacks is quick to judge, or at least distinguish, between value systems in the Krishna 
temple and in the modern laboratory. He decides that “this living-in-the-moment, which was so 
manifestly pathological, had been perceived in the temple as an achievement of higher 
consciousness,” and in perpetuating the supremacy of perceived, modern diagnosis over 
culturally relative subjectivities, he marginalizes non-normative, disabled identity and discounts 
the possibility for subjectivity apart from normative memory and narrativity. “[W]hereas for the 
rest of us the present is given its meaning and depth by the past...for Greg it was flat,” (203) he 
writes, in privileging the richness of a remembered life—and with the assumption of narrativity 
and a unified self, in the process—over life experienced in the absolute present. This is not to 
say, of course, that Greg is not at all disabled, in need of assistance, and often suffering. He is, as 
Sacks shows, unable to remember to perform—and uninterested in performing—basic life and 
bodily functions. It is the descriptive language that Sacks employs, in attempting and failing to 
locate a so-called identity, “ego,” or “soul” that is so troubling. Indeed, Sacks begins to sound 
much like the Doctor in Casey’s work—driven to uncover the essential, continuous identity of 
his study, and thereby save his study from what he imagines to be certain oblivion. 
 Yet Sacks’ very language undoes itself in its ambivalence. He diagnoses Greg’s 
“brooding” state as pathological mental “idling,” even as such a state was appreciated in the 
Krishna temple as “meditating.” (207) He finds disquieting and bizarre Greg’s word play, even 
as he describes it as “childlike spontaneity.” He worries about the ways in which Greg is “seized 
by his environment,” unable to distinguish himself from it, losing “its coherence, its inwardness, 
its autonomy, its ‘self’” but celebrates when Greg blends with the crowd at a Grateful Dead 
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show, showing a “rare and wonderful continuity of attention, everything orienting him, holding 
him together.” For a moment, in Sacks’ eyes, “he seemed completely normal...the music infusing 
him with its own strength, its coherence, its spirit.” (225) 
 Of course, the trouble with this portrait is manifold. Not only does Sacks distinguish 
between coherent and incoherent selves, but his assumptions lead him to conclude that his failure 
at narrating Greg’s experience for a sense of continuity and closure necessarily means that 
Greg’s experience is impossibly unknowable—and even to Greg himself. Greg, for Sacks, is a 
shell of his former self, doomed to repeat short durations of memory for the rest of his life—but 
his life-as-experienced is one of absence—and disadvantaged suffering. In a far more absolute 
manner of relating life to functional memory and normative narrativity, Sacks pronounces in his 
study of Mr. Thompson, the amnesic subject of his essay “A Matter of Identity,” that  
	   To be ourselves we must have ourselves - possess, if need be re-possess, our life-stories. 
 We must ‘recollect’ ourselves, recollect the inner drama, the narrative, or ourselves. A 
 man needs such a narrative, a continuous inner narrative, to maintain his identity, his 
 self. (109)  
Of course, as I mentioned earlier, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan’s work on illness and narrative 
identity is a caution against the impulse for an  “implied redemptive or therapeutic role of telling 
and writing.” For Rimmon-Kenan, the dearth of fragmented illness narratives suggests the 
genre’s fear of exposing the “ill subject’s vulnerability.” (22) 
 In reading amnesic memoir for the possibility not only of narrating and representing 
identity apart from memory, then, I offer a critique of Sacks’ assumptions regarding baselines for 
soulfulness and normativity. I follow a slew of contemporary cognitive psychologists, 
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researchers,  and philosophy referenced earlier in this study, as well. Writing about the 
distinction between memory and consciousness, for example, Endel Tulving offers a case study 
of N.N., an amnesic who suffered a closed head injury in a traffic study and who, as a result, has 
no capability “of experiencing extended subjective time, or chronognosia.” (“Memory” 4) 
Absent the capacity for retro- or pro-jection in time, N.N. “has no difficulty with the concept of 
chronological time” and “has a good deal of preserved memory capability.” N.N.’s impaired 
memory directly affects his autonoetic consciousness, defined by Tulving as the phenomenal 
experience of episodic memory conscious of the moment of recollection (6), even as his 
semantic memory about his past is retained. The experience of his consciousness as it remains, 
characterized by Tulving, is the dwelling in a “perpetual present.” (4) Stanley Klein and others 
refined Tulving’s thinking by showing that semantic trait self-knowledge may very well function 
independently of factual semantic and episodic memory (“A Self” 25-46).144 In one particular 
study, Klein examined the amnesic 79-year-old D.B. who suffered from severe retrograde and 
anterograde amnesia but could demonstrate reliable and consistent judgments for personality 
traits for self-description in terms of how he others perceived him. This consistent pattern, 
according to Klein, suggests that “the human cognitive architecture includes a subsystem of 
semantic memory that is functionally specialized for the storage and retrieval of trait self-
knowledge” (“Diachronic” 797-8).145 Tulving’s and Klein’s case studies were very recently 
reinforced by Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols, who showed the character trait perception is 
retained to the degree that a moral faculty can be identified. Thus, independent of memory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 In addition to this citation, see also Klein, et. al “A Social-Cognitive Neuroscience Analysis of the Self” Social 
Cognition 20.2 (2002), pp. 105-135 and Klein, “The Sense of Diachronic Personal Identity” Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 12.4 (2013), 791-811. 
145 This particular case study is reinforced by additional evidence in the comprehensive analysis offered in an earlier 
article by Stanley Klein and Moshe Lax, “The Unanticipated Resilience of Trait Self-Knowledge in the Face of 
Neural Damage” Memory 18 (2010), 918-948. 
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functionality, perceived identity “is at risk for deteriorating during neurodegeneration primarily 
when the moral system is impaired...This effect is observed whether moral change is measured 
as a function of changes in moral traits or symtomatology related to moral behavior.” (9) Thus, 
identity discontinuity and relationship deterioration were affected only, in the presence of 
neurodegenerative diseases, by the injury to a moral faculty. 
 As the narrative correlate to such a cognitive theory of identity in the face of disabled 
memory, amnesic memoir, in its articulation of dispositions, trait self-knowledge, and even 
moral direction offers a strong, complementary perspective from the Humanities, though in its 
articulation through the mimesis of consciousness, it chooses to say less about memory-less 
consciousness than it does attempt to narrate it from the inside. Such memoirists attempt to 
narrate the unique textures of the “blankness” or “permanent present” that Tulving observed in 
his case study’s subject. In so doing, I suggest, they harness the aesthetic terms unique to a 
wandering mind—a mind both active and absolutely anti-narrativist.  
 Take, for example, Su Meck’s recent I Forgot to Remember, a memoir of amnesia in the 
form of investigative journalism whose whimsical title seems to conflate and confuse normative 
forgetfulness with pathological amnesia. In her work, Meck pieces together her “prior life” 
through interviews, documents, and some speculation, holding her pre-amnesia self at a great 
epistemological distance. She suffers from what she calls a “peculiar sort of identity crisis,” in 
which she states, presently, “I don’t know who I’m supposed to be” (271); and to the present 
day, she still suffers from her trauma in memory, experiencing “traces of anterograde amnesia,” 
with “occasional blackouts” that leave her with “entire days” that she cannot recall. In her own, 
confessional words, she still struggles greatly with the concept of time, unable to project into the 
future or conceptualize elapsed time (272).  
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 Yet, Meck notices that her “brain” is “happiest in the present,” and she’s come to 
distinguish, along with her husband, Jim, the difference in her cognition between “Now” and 
“Not now.” (190-1) Situating the “Now” in a history is challenging—when tasked to recall past 
“Now” moments, she notices how she has to replay all intermittent moments to reach the desired 
moment, a lengthy and often futile task. Still, she notices how she can “make sense of that thing” 
happening now—and, she opines, even if she had access to her past self’s memories, she “would 
have to figure out exactly who I am all over again” (273), an option her present self would rather 
do without. In other words, she acknowledges that her present self would simply have to make 
sense of past selves—but a continuity with these past selves is far from guaranteed.  
 Meck’s narrative is an extreme insistence of mimetic foreclosure. At no point does she 
attempt to narrate or represent a dissociated or amensic cognition. Writing in a distant tone and 
retrospective perspective, Meck submits most of her pathological scenes to the eyewitness, 
remote memory of others, and especially when recounting recurring amnesic episodes.146 Still, 
she does not speculate about the quality of her cognition, nor does she privilege continuous or 
narrativized identity over and above a discontinuous, fragmented, or even developmentally 
stunted one. By the work’s end, her nascent self-conception and related narrative has just begun: 
she is a community college student who confesses to having read her first book (in memory) at 
the age of 22 (241); as she begins to tell her story of memory loss, and as her story spreads, she 
is invited to speak in college classrooms, private institutions, and radio stations, and she is 
featured in a cover story in the Washington Post (240-6). Her story’s resolution, if there is one, is 
the discovery that amnesics, too, can tell their stories of impasses, lapses, and forgotten selves.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See, for example: “She says I could barely talk and I was holding my head in my hands, and people kept coming 
up and asking if I needed any help. At the hotel the next morning, I was still a mess. Barb can remember checkout 
time coming and going. She describes me as being” really groggy and slow, almost in slow motion.” (122) 
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 Meck’s work of wandering through the textual and oral evidence, and piecing it together, 
encounters its limits—but it becomes a story that she learns to embrace as her own, too. She 
imagines possible histories upon encountering gaps in collective, shared memories. Early in her 
work, for example, she imagines what might have occurred in the ambulance en route to the 
hospital after the freak, traumatic accident in which her kitchen fan concussed her head: 
 The ambulance door swung closed, and I began my journey to the hospital. I would like 
 to tell you that the paramedic gazed pensively at my vital signs, steadied my wounded 
 head, held my hand, and even though I couldn’t hear the words, he told me in a think 
 Texas accent, “Everything’s gonna be just fine.” But Jim wasn’t there, and I don’t 
 remember, so there is nothing more to tell. (23) 
For Meck, the futility of imagining what is irretrievable in memory is defeating, foreclosing in 
turn the very usefulness of the imagination’s workings. Yet the memory of the trip to the hospital 
is itself a remote one informed by Jim—and so transcribing this remotely held memory demands 
a certain leap of faith, a trust in the memory of others, and a certain imagining in assuming this 
story as her own.  
 For Meck, then, the ethics of her investigative work is the responsibility to her past self, 
but it ends with what might be reasonably confirmed. Jim, her doctor, the paramedic— all exist 
in that same space as the past self, and are as useful—or as continuous—with her present self as 
her past self might have been. Implicit in this amnesic narrative, then, is the acknowledgment 
that past selves’ discontinuities are fundamentally irreconcilable with a present self—a truth that 
Meck articulates throughout—even as the wandering through memory (and even memory 
remotely held by others) contains a broader definition of speaking for one’s self.  
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 If Meck makes it possible for the definition of a narrating, autobiographical, mimetic self 
include past selves whose relation is discontinuous and whose memory is stored elsewhere, then 
David Stuart MacLean’s The Answer to the Riddle is Me attempts to enfold the mimesis of an 
amnesic self into a continuous narrative across a spectrum of non-normative cognition. Situated 
on the opposite extreme from Meck’s, MacLean’s work is not as imaginative as much as it 
stretches the limits of what it means to narrate a life anew from the retrospective vantage point of 
an amnesic memoirist.  
 The book is a personal memoir narrated as a fragmentary epic, broken into short chapters 
of varied lengths (some as short as a paragraph) in which MacLean narrates his awakening from 
an amnesia induced by the malaria vaccine malarium, and his subsequent adjustment to making 
sense of his past life and future—and newly “born”—self. His narrative is a sequence of 
vignettes, sometimes paragraph length, that constitute their own chapters within the multiple 
sections of the book. Much of his narrative articulates and attempts to make sense of the 
subsequent confusion and psychiatric hospitalization for a bout of intense hallucinations (at times 
horrifying, as he narrates it, and at other times comical) that follow his “awakening,” as well as 
his eventual re-learning of his passions, his family, his lovers, and his friends—as well as his 
past personality.  
 While his life is certainly discontinuous from pre-amnesia to post-amnesia, his gift as a 
writer on a Fulbright  is clear in the memoir’s articulation of the very first moments of coming-to 
on a train platform in India, to the subtle social complications, back in suburban Ohio, with the 
assumption of his past personality through visual, textual, and even photographic cues. His first 
memory, in his new-self-narrative, begins with disclosing very little, allowing the reader to 
awaken, as it were, with MacLean: “I was standing when I came to. Not lying down. And it 
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wasn’t a gradual waking process. It was darkness darkness darkness, then snap. Me. Now 
awake.” (3) Nearly Kafkan in his awakening (but not lying down, like Kafka’s Gregor Samsa), 
we know little of MacLean’s life before awakening—and we fail in recovering any objective 
insight along with MacLean.  
 Indeed, the reader has no indication that MacLean’s amnesia is not drug-induced, as 
MacLean’s limited insight and absent memory entertains such a possibility when suggested by a 
policeman. Narrated in the immediate past present, MacLean offers flashes, brief vignettes, of 
drifting in and out of consciousness and conscious awareness, all narrated in the immediate past 
present. At the very beginning, while still in a psychiatric ward, this performance dramatizes his 
wildly Biblical hallucinations and the “roulette wheel” of his waking consciousness, in which 
“any moment could be any moment.” (46) Even upon returning home to convalesce, MacLean 
notes a certain familiarity, even as he “never experienced an avalanche of identity data.” (91-92) 
Ultimately, MacLean tries to make sense of his amnesic split as one on a continuum of 
experiencing the self as a multiplicity: 
 In the life I had woken up to, I found that I was often split between who I was and who I 
 wanted to be. I grew up in small-town Ohio, but I wanted to be a world traveler; I went to 
 small unheralded schools, but I wanted to compete with the country’s best academics for 
 a Fulbright scholarship; I was dating Anne, but I wanted to be the kind of guy who dated 
 someone like Geeta. These aren’t unique fractures when compared to anyone else on the 
 planet, but it was into these fractures that the Lariam nestled, and instead of being merely 
 divided, it blew me apart from the inside. (214) 
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Like all sufferers of amnesia, his pain and confusion is palpable, even as it seems to be an 
enhanced version of his propensity for duplicity—or a multiplicity of selves. As a method of 
narration, too, MacLean chooses to adhere closely to his memoiristic subject, challenging his 
reader to enter a narrative space with a limited, if not absent history.  
 Even more interesting is MacLean’s stylistic ability to represent his amnesic 
consciousness—an impasse performed by Meck—and the descriptive choices that he makes in 
the process. Nearly echoing Ishiguro’s Ryder, MacLean’s narrative voice has little insight, at 
first and at times, into his absented self—writing in truncated sentences, he presents a truncated 
self: “I stood still. I had no idea who I was. This fact didn’t panic me at first. I didn’t know 
enough to panic.” (3) In fact, his perception overwhelms his need to make narrative sense of his 
embedded history and of his embodied subjectivity.  
 What follows, absent narrative sequencing and coherence, is a fragmentary narration of 
pure perception—echoing the most discontinuous moments in Ishiguro’s narrative, and 
corresponding with both Benjamin’s theory of the gesture and Jameson’s theory of cognitive 
mapping. Coming to on a train platform, MacLean notices that “In front of me was a train,” and 
then proceeds to describe the train’s being and movements, along with his own movements in 
correspondence: 
 A heavy, shuddering train, its engine, half-submerged in smoke, painted a deep red. It 
 blasted its horns, then clanked and panted into motion. People waved to me from open 
 windows as the train shook itself free of the station. I waved back and noticed the 
 whiteness of my arm, covered in hairs the color of straw. (ibid.) 
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MacLean’s writing glistens with attentiveness to the isolated object, and seems to process the 
acting subjects as distinct objects. Even a wave is an opportunity for his attention to wander, to 
notice his arm color and arm hair color, too. Liberated from its various contexts, much as 
Benjamin’s reading of the gesture in Kafka’s work, cognition is left to play in the margins, as it 
were, proceeding from object to object, wandering in its absolute attention, and without a need to 
categorize or prioritize objects within a perceived scene.  
 Following his absolute absence of self-knowledge, MacLean discovers himself to be 
absent: he becomes aware of his memory’s absence. This initial discovery of an absent self, on 
the train platform, spurs an anxiety (“I wondered if I should have been on that train”, “This is 
when I panicked”). MacLean soon finds comfort in a policeman, who reassures him of the cause 
of his lapse: “You foreigners come to my country and do your drugs and get confused. It will be 
all right, my friend.” While quick and presumptuous comfort, MacLean is thankful and relieved 
to finally know his identity and history—and the cause of his trouble: 
I was relieved. I should have known. This was the kind of trouble drug addicts ended up 
in all the time. It was serious, but I was thankful that this police officer had let me know 
who I was and that I wasn’t to be trusted. I knew who I was. He had given me a key to 
my identity. I didn’t have a name, but I now knew the kind of person I was. (7) 
This anecdote illustrates a more regular drama in MacLean’s life of retrograde amnesia: the 
shuttling between genuine clarity and absolute anxiety due to the great gap and irreconciliable 
riddle between his pre- and post-amnesic selves.  
 Furthermore, whereas MacLean takes incremental comfort in his fresh discoveries, he 
alternates this biographical comfort with a continued eye for the absolute gesture, both a source 
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of revelation and self-discovery, and a recurring motif throughout. Take another early instance of 
such clarity of pre-narrativized cognition: 
 At the center of the snarl of the intersection, inserted in the chaos, three boys popped 
 from vehicle to vehicle, clasping their hands together in routine genuflection, affecting a 
 moment of solemnity, then darting their hands out for rupees. They were identical. Each 
 wore small wire frames with no glasses in them, each wore a short length of cotton 
 wrapped around him like a diaper, each was shaved bald, each had a tiny mustache drawn 
 above his lip, and each was slathered head to toe in silver paint. Silver heads. Silver 
 glasses. Silver dhotis. Silver sandals. Three silver boys dancing in the middle of the street 
 in the middle of the day. Their tiny heads glinted as they climbed upstream through 
 traffic like salmon. (13) 
Moving from context to absolute perception, this chapter closing inverts the typical description-
explication model of perception and narrative meaning. It starts with a speculation about 
motives, but ends with a double-take that reduces the boys to a nearly impressionistic image of 
fragmented objects, making possible a second, more gestural description of “three silver boys 
dancing in the middle of the street”, with a highly stylized, abstract re-conception of their fish-
like color and movement.  
 For MacLean, wandering becomes both the cognitive motion and the style in which his 
work engages. On the one hand, MacLean wanders in and out of consciousness—and the 
aphoristic style of storytelling accommodates a broken history. But on the other, the narrating of 
cognition, itself, possesses its own method of wandering, too, that seems to resolve itself in 
perception at a standstill, an irreconcilable narrative form, but an absolute image.  
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 Perhaps MacLean’s tale offers insight into Albert’s fugues, in the ways in which they are 
both punctuated by darkness but that are narratable, too, in their dissociated moments. MacLean, 
as it were, makes the narration of such fugues possible in his recollection of a newborn 
consciousness, a cognitive perception emerging in an extreme bareness.  
 Perhaps MacLean’s memoir, too, offers insight into the generic possibilities for the 
memoir, more generally, and for fiction, too: in his detachment from the series of self-portraits 
with which he is presented, he has little need to reconcile his past and present as a factual 
relation. The past might remain a fiction, and the fiction that can be written—as an answer to his 
self-riddle, in what can be recalled of the past—allows for highly lyrical moments of both 
perception and articulation and representation of that perception. Here, MacLean’s work recalls 
Rousseau’s, Wordsworth’s, or De Quincey’s more disoriented states in which lapses of memory 
made possible new modes of perception and autobiography.  
 And here, too, MacLean’s persistence to narrate apart from narrativity speaks not only to 
an ethical imperative to enact subjectivity and historicity as multiple, as Lerner and Sebald have 
shown, to wonder and wander about multiple possibilities of one’s and history’s past futures. But 
it once again confirms the very motion of wandering as the aesthetic motion underlying 
cognition, as Ishiguro and Casey have shown, as the limits of cognitive mimesis harnessed by 
writers when all else fades away.  
 In his philosophy of consciousness, Daniel Dennett argues that narrative and selfhood are 
deeply intertwined—and counter-intuitively so:  “Our tales are spun, but for the most part we 
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don’t spin them; they spin us.” (418)147 Our stories, in other words, create our selfhood—and so 
for Dennett, in his groundbreaking theory of consciousness, the experience of one’s self isn’t 
actually the knowledge of a self—it is instead the experience of a representation of a self. This 
self-representation, sustained by a self-spinner, is the center of one’s “narrative gravity” (429).  
 In this study, I’ve attempted to reach beyond what it means to represent one’s self to 
one’s self as a necessary point of departure for self-consciousness. I’ve attempted to articulate 
cognitive models in narrative experiments that manifest beyond—or without—the bounds of 
normative cognition, memory, and narrativity. While the “narrative gravity” in Dennet’s model 
is, certainly, a “magnificent fiction” (ibid.), Dennett has expressed this sweeping theory without 
an eye for non-normative selves. For Dennett, “if you think of yourself as a center of narrative 
gravity...your existence depends on the persistence of that narrative.” (430) Overwhelmed by 
remembered and unrealized past selves, or absent basic autobiographical contextual memory, 
what sort of self-representation can be isolated, retained, and focused? Perhaps none that can be 
articulated and recorded in real-time and normative language, though perhaps, too, another form 
of subjective consciousness and even self-knowledge remains without a distinctly narrative self. 
Jonathan Franzen sensed as much in his father’s silenced body and degenerated brain: the 
“stirrings of a will” (Living Autobiographically 57), the persistent and particular desires and 
gestures through which an embodied mind cognizes and wanders. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 See also Daniel Dennett, “Skinner Skinned” in Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), and 
Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett, The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul. (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 1981), especially “Reflections,” 191-201.  
185	  
	  
	   	  
Works Cited 
Adorno, Theodor. Aesthetic Theory. Trans. Robert Hullot Kentor. Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1997.  
 
Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community, Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
 
---------.Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience. Trans. Liz Heron.  
London: Verso, 2007. 
 
---------.The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003. 
 
---------.Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture. Trans. Ronald L. Martinez.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977. 
 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith. “Deleuze and the Overcoming of Memory.” in Memory:  
Histories, Theories, Debates, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz. New  
Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2010), 61-76. 
 
Atkins, Kim. “Narrative identity, practical identity and ethical subjectivity.” Continental  
Philosophy Review. 34 (2004): 341–366. 
 
Baker, Nicholson. U and I: A True Story. New York: Vintage, 1991. 
 
Baron-Cohen, Simon, et. al. “Does the Autistic Child Have a ‘Theory of Mind’?”  
Cognition. 21.1 (1985): 37–46 
 
Barthes, Roland. S/Z. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.  
 
Behrendt, Kathy. “Scraping Down the Past: Memory and Amnesia in W. G. Sebald’s Anti-
Narrative.” Philosophy and Literature. 34.2 (October 2010): 394-408. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. Berlin Childhood around 1900. Trans. Howard Eiland. Cambridge: Harvard  
UP, 2006. 
 
-----------.“Convolute N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress.” The Arcades 
Project. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 2007: 
 
-----------.“Franz Kafka: On the 10th Anniversary of his Death.” Selected Writings: Vol. 2,  
Part 2. Ed. Jennings, Eiland, Smith. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1999. 794-818. 
 
-----------. “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man.” Selected Writings:  
Volume 1. Ed. Bullock, Jennings. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1999: 62-74. 
 
------------.“On the Concept of History.” Selected Writings Vol. 4, 1938-1940. Trans.  
186	  
	  
	   	  
Harry Zohn. Ed. Eiland, Jennings. Cambridge: Harvard UP,  
2007,  
 
-----------.“The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” in Selected Writings Vol. 4:  
1938-1940 Ed. Eiland, Jennings. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006), 3-92. 
 
-----------.“Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility.”  
Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 1938-1940. Ed. Eiland, Jennings. Cambridge: Harvard U. 
Press, 1999. 251-283. 
 
Berger, John. Another Way of Telling. New York: Vintage, 1995. 
 
Blanchot, Maurice. Infinite Conversation. Trans. Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: U. of  
Minnesota Press, 1992. 
 
Broder, Hillel. “Attending to the Gesture in Experimental Modernism; or, Reading  
with(out) Theory of Mind.” Philosophy and Literature. 38.1 (2014): A230-A247. 
 
Brooks, Geraldine. “One Step at a Time”, New York Times Sunday Book Review. 18 May  
2014, BR9. 
 
Casey, Maud. The Man Who Walked Away. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.  
 
Chambers, Ross. Loiterature. Lincoln: U. of Nebraska Press, 1999. 
 
Chaucer, Geoffrey. The Canterbury Tales. Ed. Larry D. Benson. New York: Houghton Mifflin,  
2000. 
 
Damasio, Antonio. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of  
Consciousness. Orlando: Harcourt, 1999.  
 
----------.Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. New York: Pantheon,  
2010. 
 
de Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life, Trans. Steven Rendall. Berkeley: U of  
California Press, 2011. 
 
de Quincey, Thomas. Confessions of an English Opium Eater. Ed. Grevel Lindop.  
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta.  
London: Athlone, 1989. 
 
----------.The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. Ed. Constantin V.  
Boundas. London: Athlone Press, 1990. 
 
187	  
	  
	   	  
Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1991. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Memoires: For Paul de Man, revised edition, trans. Cecile Lindsay,  
Jonathan Culer, Eduardo Cadava, and Peggy Kamuf. New York: Columbia UP, 1989. 
 
---------.Derrida, Jacques. The Work of Mourning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
2003 
 
Dillon, Brian. Ruins. London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2011.  
 
Duttlinger, Carolyn. “A Wrong Turn of the Wheel” in The Undiscover’d Country: W.G.  
Sebald and the Poetics of Travel. Ed. Markus Zisselsberger. Rochester: Camden  
House, 2010: 92-120.  
 
Eagleton, Terry. “The Ideology of the Aesthetic.” Poetics Today. 9.2 (1988): 327-338.  
 
Eakin, Paul. Living Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Narrative. Ithaca:  
Cornell UP, 2004.  
 
Evans, Frederick J. “Contextual Forgetting: Posthypnotic Source Amnesia.” Journal of  
Abnormal Psychology. 88.5 (1979): 556–63. 
 
Fairbanks, A. Harris. “Ontology and Narrative Technique in Kazuo Ishiguro’s The  
Unconsoled.” Studies in the Novel, 45.4 (Winter 2013): 603-619. 
 
Ferguson, Frances. “Romantic Memory.” Studies in Romanticism. 35 (1996): 509-533. 
 
Fisher, Tony. “Heidegger and the Narrativity Debate.” Continental Philosophical Review.  
43 (2000): 241-265.  
 
Foucault, Michel. “Lives of Infamous Men.” The Essential Foucault. Ed. Paul Rabinow  
and Nikolas Rose. New York: New Press, 2003: 279-294. 
 
---------. “Of Other Spaces.” Diacritics Trans. Jay Miskoweic 16.1 (1986): 22-27.  
 
Frow, John. Time and Commodity Culture: Essays in Cultural Theory and  
Postmodernity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
 
Groham, Alexis (editor), et. al. Digressions in European Literature: From Cervantes to  
Sebald. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
 
Gasche, Rudolph. Of Minimal Things: Studies on the Notion of Relation. Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1999.  
 
Gilmore, Leigh. The Limits of Autobiography. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001. 
 
188	  
	  
	   	  
Gros, Frederic. A Philosophy of Walking. Trans. John Howe. London: Verso, 2014 
 
Guignon, Charles B. “Philosophy and Authenticity: Heidegger’s Search for a Grond for  
Philosophizing.” Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity. Ed. Mark Wrathall and  
Jeff Malpas. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000: 79-102. 
 
Hacking, Ian. Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illness.  
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998 
 
Hamacher, Werner. “The Gesture in the Name: On Benjamin and Kafka” Premises:  
Essays on Philosophy from Kant to Celan. Stanford: Stanford UP,  
1996: 294-336. 
 
Herman, David. Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative. Lincon: U. of  
Nebraska Press, 2004. 
 
Hitchcock, Peter. Oscillate Wildly: Space, Body, and Spirit of Millenial Materialism.  
Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1999. 
 
Huyssen, Andreas. Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. New  
York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Hyvarinen, Matti. “’Against Narrativity’ Reconsidered” Core Concepts of Narrative Theory.  
Wien: Peter Lang, 2012: 327-345. 
 
Ishiguro, Kazuo. The Unconsoled. New York: Vintage, 1995.  
 
Israel, Nico. Spirals: The Whirled Image in Twentieth-Century Literature and Art. New  
York: Columbia UP, 2015. 
 
Jameson, Frederic. Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham,  
Duke UP, 1991. 
 
Jost-Frey, Hans. Interruptions. Trans. Georgia Albert. Albany: SUNY UP, 1996. 
 
Kafka, Franz. The Basic Kafka. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.  
 
------------.The Blue Octavo Notebooks. Ed. Max Brod. Trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne  
Wilkins. Cambridge: Exact Change, 1991.  
 
-----------.Kafka’s Selected Stories. Trans. Stanley Corngold. New York: Norton Critical  
Edition, 2007. 
 
Kakutani, Michiko. “From Kazuo Ishiguro, A New Annoying Hero.” The New York  
Times, 17 October 1995. 
 
189	  
	  
	   	  
Kennedy, Roger. “Memory and the Unconscious.” Memory: Histories, Theories,  
Debates. Ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz. New York: Fordham UP, 2010: 179-
197.  
 
Klein, Stanley B.  “A Self to Remember: A Cognitive Neuropsychological Perspective on  
How Self Creates Memory and Memory Creates Self.” Individual Self, Relational  
Self, and Collective Self. Ed. C. Sedikides & M.B. Brewer. Philadelphia: Psychological 
Press, 2001: 25-46 
 
--------.“A Theory of Autobiographical Memory: Necessary Components and Disorders  
Resulting From Their Loss.” Social Cognition. 22.5 (2004): 460-490. 
 
--------.“The Sense of Diachronic Personal Identity.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive  
Sciences. 12.4 (2013): 791-811. 
 
Lerner, Ben. 10:04. New York: Faber and Faber, 2014. 
 
Leslie, Esther. “Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin.” Memory: Histories, Theories,  
Debates. Ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz. New York: Fordham UP,  
2010: 123-135.  
 
Lethem, David. The Vintage Book of Amnesia. New York: Vintage, 2000. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Existence and Existents. Trans. A. Lingis. Dordrech: Martinus  
Nijhoff, 1988. 
 
--------. “Meaning and Sense.” Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. Ed.  
Adrian Peperzak, et. al. Bloomington: Indian UP, 1996: 33-64.  
 
---------. Proper Names. Trans. Michael B. Smith. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997. 
 
--------. “Reflections on Phenomenological ‘Technique,” in Discovering Existence with  
Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith. Evanston: Northwestern  
University Press, 1998:  91-110.  
 
--------. “Socialité et argent.” Emmanuel Lévinas. Ed. Catherine Chalier and Miguel  
Abensour. Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 1991. 
 
--------. Totality and Infinity. Trans. A. Lingis. Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press,  
1969.  
 
Lewis, Barry. Kazuo Ishiguro. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000. 
 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Rodger Woolhouse.  
New York: Penguin, 1997. 
 
190	  
	  
	   	  
Long, J.J. “The Sense of Sebald’s Endings...and Beginnings.” Digressions in European  
Literature: From Cervantes to Sebald. Ed. Grohman and Wells. New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 193-204.  
 
MacLean, David Stuart. The Answer to the Riddle is Me. New York: Houghton Mifflin,  
2014.  
 
Mark McCulloh. “Destruction and Transcendence in W. G. Sebald.” Philosophy and  
Literature 30.2 (October 2006): 395-409. 
 
---------. Understanding W.G. Sebald. Columbia: U of South Carolina Press, 2003. 
 
McHale, Brian. “From Modernist to Postmodernist Fiction: Change of Dominant.”  
Postmodernist Fiction. New York: Routledge, 1987: 3-25. 
  
--------. “Weak Narrativity: The Case of Avant-Garde Narrative Poetry.” Narrative 9.2  
(2001): 161-7.  
 
Meck, Su. I Forgot to Remember: A Memoir of Amnesia. New York: Simon and  
Schuster, 2014.  
 
Meyer, Steven. “‘The Physiognomy of the Thing’: Sentences and Paragraphs in Stein and  
Wittgenstein.” Modernism/modernity 5.1 (1998): 99-116.  
 
Neisser, Ulric. Cognitive Psychology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967. 
 
Noe, Alva. Out of Our Heads: Why Your Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from  
the Biology of Consciousness. New York: Hill and Wang, 2009.  
 
O’Connor, Brian. “Adorno on the Destruction of Memory.” Memories: Histories,  
Theories, Debates. Ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz. New York:  
Fordham UP, 2010: 136-149. 
 
Palmer, Alan. Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U. of Nebraska Press, 2004. 
 
---------. “Storyworlds and Groups.” Introduction to Cognitive  
Cultural Studies. Ed. Lisa Zunshine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010: 176-192.  
 
Radstone, Susannah. “Working with Memory: An Introduction.” Memory and  
Methodology. Ed. Susannah Radstone. New York: Berg, 2000: 1-19.   
 
Reitano, Natalie. “The Good Wound: Memory and Community in The Unconsoled.”  
Texas Studies in Literature and Language. 49.4 (2007): 361-86. 
 
Richardson, Alan. “Facial Expression Theory from Romanticism to the Present.”  
Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Ed. Lisa Zunshine. Baltimore: Johns  
191	  
	  
	   	  
Hopkins UP, 2010: 65–83 
 
Richter, Gerhard. “Derrida and the Fictions of Anteriority.” Memory: Histories, Theories,  
Debates. Ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz. New Brunswick: Rutgers  
UP, 2010: 150-160.  
 
Ricouer, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting trans. Barney and Pellauer. Chicago: U. of  
Chicago Press, 2004. 
 
Rilke, Rainer Maria. The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke. Ed. and Trans. Stephen  
Mitchell. New York: Vintage, 1989. 
 
Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. “The Story of 'I': Illness and Narrative Identity.” Narrative. 10.1  
(2002): 9-27. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Trans. J.M. Cohen.  
London : Penguin, 1953)  
 
----------. Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Trans. Peter France. London: Penguin, 2004.  
 
Sacks, Oliver. “A Matter of Identity.” The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. New  
York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 
 
----------. Anthropologist on Mars. New York: Random House, 1995. 
 
---------. “The Last Hippie” in The Vintage Book of Amnesia. Ed. David Lethem. New  
York: Vintage, 2000. 
 
Santner, Eric. On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. Chicago: U. of Chicago  
Press, 2006. 
 
Sebald, W.G., The Rings of Saturn, trans. Michael Hulse. London: New Directions Press,  
1998. 
 
Shachter, Daniel. Searching for Memory New York: Basic Books, 1997. 
 
Stein, Gertrude. The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. New York: Vintage, 1990. 
 
----------. Gertrude Stein: Selections Ed. Joan Retallack. Berkeley: University of  
California, 2008. 
 
----------. How to Write. Paris: Plain Edition, 1931. 
Stewart, Susan. On Longing. Durham: Duke UP, 1996. 
 
Strawson, Galen. “Against Narrativity.” Ratio. 17.4 (2004): 428-452. 
 
192	  
	  
	   	  
Strohminger, Nina and Shaun Nichols. “Neurodegeneration and Identity.” Psychological  
Science. 26.9 (September 2015): 1469-1479. 
 
Summers-Bremner, Eluned. “Reading, Walking, Mourning: W. G. Sebald’s Peripatetic  
Fictions.” Journal of Narrative Theory. 34.3 (Fall 2004): 304-334.  
 
Thelen, Esther and Smith, L. A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of  
Cognition and Action. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.  
 
Tammi, Pekka. “Against Narrative (‘A Boring Story’).” Partial Answers: Journal of  
Literature and the History of Ideas. 4.2 (2006): 19-40.  
 
Terdiman, Richard. Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis. Ithaca: Cornell UP,  
1993 
 
Thoreau, H.D. “Walking.” The Atlantic Monthly. 9 (June 1862): 657-674. 
 
Tulving, Endel. Elements of Episodic Memory. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983. 
 
---------.“Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain” Annual Review of Psychology. 53  
(2002): 1-25.  
 
---------. “Memory and Consciousness.” Canadian Psychology. 26.1 (1985): 1–12. 
 
---------. “Where in the Brain Is the Awareness of One’s Past?” Memory, Brain, and  
Belief. Ed. Daniel L. Schachter and Elaine Scarry. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000:  
208–29 
 
Turner, Mark C. Erring. Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1984.  
 
Tzu, Lao. Tao Te Ching. Trans. Stephen Mitchell. New York: Harper Perennial, 1992. 
 
Upstone, Sara. “Writing the Post-Colonial Space: Ben Okri’s Magical City and the  
Subversion of Imperialism.” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the  
History of Ideas. 2.2 (2004): 139-159.   
 
Walkowitz,  Rebecca L. “Ishiguro’s Floating Worlds.” ELH, 68.4 (Winter 2001): 1049- 
1076. 
 
Weber, Samuel. “Going Along for the Ride: Violence and Gesture: Agamben reading  
Benjamin reading Kafka reading Cervantes.” Germanic Review. 81.1 (2006): 65–83. 
 
Weiskrantz, Lawrence. Consciousness Lost and Found. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
1997. 
 
Whitehead, Anne. Memory. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
193	  
	  
	   	  
 
Wordsworth, William. The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850. Ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H.  
Abrams, and Stephen Gill. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1979.  
 
Zunshine, Lisa. Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  
UP, 2010. 
 
----------. Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel. Columbus: Ohio State  
University Press, 2006.  
 
